From OAU to AU : New Wine in Old Bottle?
Paper Prepared for CODESRIA’s 10TH General Assembly on "Africa in the New Millennium", Kampala, Uganda, 8-12 December 2002.
Dr. Armstrong Matiu Adejo,
Head,
Department of History,
Benue State University,
P.M.B. 102119, Makurdi - Nigeria
E-mail: Armstrong_adejo @yahoo.com
.If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of Africa’s rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and the full expectation of our national and human means, in the full interest of all our people. To go it alone will limit our horizons, curtail our expectations and thereafter our liberty
(President Kwame Nkuruma of Ghana)
Introduction:
The coming to fruition of African Union at the seminal assembly of African states, held in July 2002 in South Africa "closed the shop" on the Organization of African Unity which had been in existence since May 1963. Incidentally, this momentous development came a little over a century since the first ever Pan-African Conference was held in London. This development has generated much excitement among African analysts with some cautious disposition as to the future of the new Union. This is because the problem of who controls the development agenda of African states has been a matter for concern over the decades. At independence, nearly all the states of Africa and their leaders were in no position to undertake meaningful progress because they were too engrossed in the struggle for survival and the need to cope with the many problems threatening their countries and their power.
However, against the realities of the international division of labour many leaders of African states were quite aware that on their own individual countries would not make any reasonable economic headway in a world that discriminates overtly against them. Consequently, since 1960 many attempts have been made to channel African aspirations towards a greater political unity based on freedom, equality, and justice programme. Against several odds, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) emerged, with high hopes of tackling Africa’s problems. The search for progress in a competitive, progressive world indicated clearly to Africans that the cause of the OAU will be tortuous. Thereafter, the continent has been subjected to decisive waves of regional integration initiatives and, keeping in mind the challenges of globalization and marginalisation, the only choice for Africa’s salvation lies in the continental union. The emergence of the African Union thus came out of the litany of initiatives dating over decades. It is this struggle that is the subject of this paper. The paper discusses four major areas as related to the roots of the African Union: i.e. a brief theoretical framework which looks at the lure of regionalism, the roots of OAU, the road to the African Union itself and the challenges ahead.
The Lure of Regionalism:
At independence, the African states’ economies were structurally disarticulated because they had been developed as aggregations of enclaves, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another. As Claude Ake notes, even though individual state of Africa seemed content to surrender their development agenda to external development agencies, they however did grope collectively towards a vision of how to proceed.1 The lure of regionalism has had profound effects on the foreign policies of African countries. It is contended that such collaborative efforts will serve as building blocks of a future African Economic Community or African Union.
However, much confusion often arises as to the application of regionalism or sub regionalism in describing or analyzing integration efforts in Africa. Much often many of the attempts are informed by the experiences of North America and Europe. But the argument could be put forward that many regional cooperation efforts are ‘home grown, an organic development within specific historic, political, economic, regional and global contexts2.
The arguments put forward by the political elite in favour of regional cooperation, as Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk writes, are simple and elegant; regional efforts will strengthen the efforts of countries to manage relations with powerful external actors and can facilitate the expansion of markets that will aid industrialization; secondly, faith in regional cooperation is strengthened by the post-Cold War academic ‘discovery’ of a new form of regionalism which is the multidimensional form of integration that includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects.3 The first argument favoured the emergence of the OAU since the states of Africa were not committed to any formal regionalism which could be the outcome of state policies that will involve transfer of national state powers to a supra-natural body or a hegemonic state. The cautious disposition resulted in half measures and commitment even to regional and subregional groupings, which emerged. Consequently, the impact of inter-state relations remained only regionally important. Instead of integration, the experience in inter-governmental cooperation is more successful arising from the desire to coordinate sectoral policies.
Thus, the first generation of African integration arrangements focused principally on trade promotion through trade liberalization schemes based on the creation of free trade areas. This strategy, as the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo reveals, was to overcome three fundamental development constraints characteristic of African economies: namely the relative small-sized economies, the lack of structural complementary as manifested in the narrow set of similar low-value and the dependence on import of intermediate and capital goods.4 Consequently, a plethora of regional integration institution which came into existence included:
It is critical to indicate that inspite of the proliferation of regional integration instituions on the African continent, over the decades, a dispassionate assessment of he impact of Africa’s efforts at regional economic cooperation and integration between the ‘60s and ‘90s suggest that the expected benefits have eluded the continent. It is not difficult to establish the reasons for these unprofitable results. At independence, it was assumed that the international order would significantly help to alter the African condition. African leaders put great efforts into development through internationalism, thinking perhaps that this would be a useful way of getting resources from the West while diversifying their dependence enough to find some space for maneuvre. This approach was tested in the demand for a new world order, which accomplished nothing – if anything it increased the frustration of the impoverished nation-states of Africa.
In themselves, Claude Ake rightly observed, African states were structurally disarticulated because they had been developed as aggregation of enclaves,, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another. As such critical junction, dependence development approach was a politically driven decision and with ‘dearth’ of native economists and planners, reliance on expatriates which in turn caused and reproduced neo-colonial notions of development persisted. However, complacency of the political leaders in relying on foreign development paradigm continued to decline. The need to develop endogenous plans led to what Claude Ake usually refers to as the emerging or a ‘confusing agenda’7. But as Ake himself was quick to observe, although individual African states seemed content to surrender their development agenda to external development agencies, they did grope collectively towards a vision of how to proceed, especially with the establishment of the OAU.
One of such visions was the Lagos Plan of Action, which was the implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa (adopted in July 1979). The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was the most comprehensive and systematic statement of the vision of Africa’s leaders on the development of the continent. It stemmed from the effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies, which have been felt more sharply in Africa than elsewhere. To the irritation of Africa’s foreign patrons, the LPA agreed that Africa’s economic problem were partly caused by Africa’s dependence and opening to exploitation, hence the necessity for self reliance. The Brettonwood institutions and the West would not accept the approach of the Lagos Plan, although they refrained from opposing it openly. Unfortunately, African leaders began to retreat, discovering that they were too weak and too dependent and so they began to reform their economy along the lives suggested by the Brettonwood institutions. Most significantly was the adoption of the devastating SAP.
For progressive action, one could posit that marginalisation, on the scale that African states historically faced, has its usefulness. This is because, marginalisation, often decried, is what Africa needs for it to evolve an endogenous development agenda. It is on this ground that the development of relatively cohesive and integrated regional grouping has concerned some writers whose focus have been upon the maintenance of world order and stability9. During the 1960s and in the wake of what appeared to be widespread enthusiasm for developing regional groups and schemes to promote economic integration, regions in international politics began to be comprehensively defined; some stating it as "a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual independence"9. This must not be taking exclusively as the dominant paradigm for regionalism, because it required not only geographical proximity and increased economic interdependence for its promotion but other factors that are significant in underpinning potential development of regional problem-solving processes. These include: historical experience, power and wealth distribution within and outside the grouping, cultural, social and ethnic tradition and ideological or political preferences10.
Regionalism, according to Hurrell, could be broken down into specific or concrete types to identify important variations in the concept and such variations could be explained according to the level of growth in socio-economic interdependence; according to the extent to which shared values and cultural traditions persist; according to the extent to which formal institutional arrangement are sought and the extent to which a regional grouping displays a cohesive identity and external presence.11 Some may be solely concerned with maximizing economic welfare and gains from international trade and investment, while others are concerned with defence and security or the protection of social and cultural traditions.
A corollary of that development, which has attracted attention in recent decades, is the concept of integration that is rather more difficult to define. It could, however, be understood as a condition or as a process; as a description of a system with its element already in existence; or as an explanation of how a political system is sustained and developed in a particular direction. A useful definition, as posited by Baylis and Smith, sees integration:
As the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous limits. These patterns may be partly economic,. Social and political in character.12
Integration could be a form of formal process which involves conscious political decision, a process designed to deepen interrelatedness and exchanges between a group of countries inform of economic integration or political integration, which can involve, not merely the formation of institutional mechanism and decision-making procedures but also the development of shared values and expectations, peaceful resolution of disputes and socio-political cohesiveness. Integration could also be in form of informal process involving economic, social and cultural flows.
The study of regionalism and integration lies in the problem of how conflict can be avoided, how cooperation and stability can be maintained. The development of regional cooperation and structures is often explained as a utilitarian and state-driven process enabling states to reconcile competing demands in the face of global political and economic challenges. However, neo-realist-neo-liberal debate in international relations, as Baylis and Smith posit, is divided on whether regional cooperation and grouping are effective and reliable instruments to maintain order and peace.13 This debate, as the authors note, encourages analysts to think about important characteristics of cooperation such as reciprocity, i.e. expectation of mutually regarding behaviour and distribution of gains from cooperation. For instance, countries of Latin America have consistently pursued forms of regional economic integration since 1950. South America is also characterized by a number of regional integration schemes and cooperation between the richer developing countries. In any case, this enthusiastic process had patchy traits as political difficulties associated with different government philosophies, territorial disputes and infrastructural weakness have combined to dilute the progress made.
In South East Asia, political and economic cooperation afforded the Association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN) since 1967 invaluable cooperation. Since 1992, there have been progressive efforts toward regional economic integration with agreement to development an ASEAN Free Trade Area and the establishment of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as a wider forum. Significant economic differences do characterize the region’s economy but it is also an important factor in future development of intra-regional cooperation.
The European regional integration approach and process has been more fundamental and has influenced almost all regional experiences. During the post-1945 period Western Europe gradually constituted itself as a highly integrated and cohesive grouping of economies and peoples. It should be, however, stated that historical and political changes that shaped and continues to shape European experience may not exist in other regional groupings. Consequently, it will be inappropriate to readily transpose the European expectations to the study of other regional groupings.
The African experience readily comes to mind on this reference. Most African states have continued to confront colonial legacies of arbitrary territorial boundaries; weak and inefficient state structures, profound social and cultural cleavages and protracted conflicts. However, many regional integration schemes, after the establishment of the OAU, have been initiated.
In all the regional integration efforts, the central influence of the state has remained resolute. Global changes call into question the usefulness of the nation state itself because it is not appearing to loose control and integrity. The nation-state over hearing forces and the emotion that surrounds national matters of security, economic and political development hinder effective cooperation. As a matter of fact, the nation state appears to be the wrong sort of unit to handle the new circumstances of global change. In this regard, neo-realist theory helps to explain why they proposals for international cooperation and change often seem dim. Inter-governmental organizations are products of the interest of the nation-state and in their operation, fear is endemic to the system as long as states wish to survive, being wary of the threat posed by others and they tendency to protect themselves against others (a persistent circumstance most experienced in developing states of Africa). The states are sensitive to their relative position in the distribution of power and the conditions of insecurity, at least, the uncertainty of each about the others’ future intentions and actions work against their cooperation as discovered among the welter of states in Africa.
Consequently, the argument is that when the states dominate international organizations, like the OAU, the prospects for international cooperation decline because states typically resist any organization actions that could compromise their interests. However, neo-liberal theorizing holds the perspective which maintains that cooperation among states, even powerful ones, is possible and that international organizations help produce it; for instance EU (known as EC prior to November 1993). The EU combines two important features – that of being a ‘supra-national entity’ and a ‘pooled sovereignty’. The EU has the power to make some decisions binding on its members without being subject to their individual approval which in a sense qualifies it as a supra national entity because it goes beyond the state, mirroring the vision of its founding fathers. Secondly, the EU, although incorporate some supra national elements, is a pooled sovereignty because states remain paramount in its institutional structures and decision-making procedures. Sovereignty is shared in this process.
The OAU and Africa’s Development:
Pan Africanism has a rich history of origin which dates back to about the 18th C, coming from the new world rather than Africa itself. Prince Hall, a black cleric in Boston, campaigned unsuccessfully in 1787 for help from the state Assembly in returning poor blacks to Africa. He was followed by Bishop McNeil Turner who worked out the American colonization society, also in America.
However, it was the naked scramble for Africa, after the 1884 Congress in Berlin, that gave new urgency to the Pan- African response. In 1886, George Charles, President of the African Emigration Association, declared to the United States Congress that his organization planned to establish a United States of Africa. Consequently, Pan Africanists convened their own Congress on Africa in Chicago in 1893. In 1900, the first Pan-African Conference was convened in London by Henry Sylvester Williams, a lawyer from Trinidad. In the first half of the 20th, the twin giants of Pan-African Movement were Marcus Garvey and W.E.D. Dubois. Dubois organised another Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919 to coincide with the Versailles Peace Conference, hoping to persuade the world leaders especially the American President that the principle of self-determination should be applied to Africa as well.
In the 1920s Dubois organised three more Pan-African Congress but the main impetus of Pan-Africanism by the 1930s in America was cultural. In 1945, the fifth Pan-African Congress was held under Dubois. The most fundamental change at that time was that the torch of Pan-Africanism had in reality passed on to a new generation of Pan-Africanists from the continent of Africa itself – to men like Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyetta. Nkrumah became the voice and organising force of Pan-Africanism and in the 1940s and 1950s he promoted the idea of an independent West African federation, as first step towards a united states of Africa.
When Kwameh Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in 1957, he inspired Africans resisting colonialism and seeking freedom all over the continent. His firm conviction, as analysts have come to agree, was that national independence was not enough and he spent much of his energy pursuing the possibility of a united Africa. In April 1958, he organised the first Conference of Independent African States-attended by Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan. The Conference declared a policy of non- alignment in world affairs and decided to coordinate African policies on international political questions.
The second conference of Independent African States was attended by 13 countries and they included the Provisional Government of Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAR, and Cameroon. Participants expressed deep-seated ideological differences regarding the form African Unity was to take15. However, despite the basic disagreements and numerous inter-state squabbles, independent African States maintained a façade of unity until the last half of 1960 when a number of unrelated events led to the formation of competing political alliances. Some of the glaring developments included Nigeria’s attainment of independence, which challenged Ghana claim to leadership, Morocco’s quarrel with Tunisia over Mauritania’s right to exist as a separate sovereignty state, the accession of thirteen francophone African states to independence and their being accorded of failing to appose France’s policy or Algeria; of sending African troops to combat FLN in Algeria; then unobtrusive support for western policies, the signing of defence pacts with France and their opposition to Patrice Lumumba in the Congo16. The most fundamental and contemptuous development which widened the emerging rift among African States was the Congo problem and the rise of competing alliances. These include the conference of Fraench speaking West African States in October 1960 in Ivory Coast Abidjan, (although Guinea, Togo, and Mali were absent). The conference tried to formulate direct negotiation between Algeria and France and recognised the right of Mauritania to full independence. In 1961 (March and September) they established the Africa and Malagasy Union (UAM).
The formation of UAM led to the establishment of a radical alliance at Casablanca in January 1961 where Ghana, Guinea and Mali sought to escape isolation in the face of moderate alliance. It held a conference, supported Lumumba and enunciated its radical proposals for African unity on a ‘Casablanca Charter’. 17 As a countervailing force the moderate alliance was enlarged at a meeting held in Monrovia in May 1961. They were Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and 12 UAM members. By the time of the summit Conference in Addis Ababa in 1963, where the organization of African Unity (OAU) was created, the Casablanca Group had relatively became weak, while the moderates were clearly in the majority to push their agenda. A preparatory Conference of African Foreign members held in May 15 – 23 was charged with the formulation of plans for the establishment of the OAU. A Committee constituted for this purpose studied a variety of proposals including the Casablanca Charter, the Lagos Charter, Nkrumah’s’ plan and a draft charter prepared by the Ethiopian government, the host country. The Committee encountered great difficulty in effecting a compromise because the Casablanca charter reflected on ideal of political union while the Monrovia group advocated a more conservative policy.
While Nkrumah could obtain support for his radical position from the Casablanca Group, there was strong opposition to the idea of African Union from the Monrovia Group, which including the Francophone bloc, led by imperialists propaganda insinuated that the radical Casablanca group was communists inspired. Unfortunately, the fear of opposition in various African countries had helped its capitalists to play up the crises of subversion as the instruments of the radical group. This division placed serious obstacles on the path of African cooperation. However, the heads of African States were determined to approve a charter, which became a compromise charter signed on May 5, 1963. At this time hard-core radical states were Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and UAR. There after, it was clear that the composition of the ideological blocs was not stable. Some governments managed to maintain two foreign policy positions simultaneously.
Interestingly, the purposes and objectives of the OAU, as stated in Article 11 of the charter, include the following:
To this end, the member states shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies especially in the following fields: political and diplomatic cooperation, economic cooperation including transport and communication, health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation and defence and security cooperation. Among the cardinal principles of the OAU, an aspect which has allowed for uncomplimentary remarks on the OAU in the last four decades, were the issues of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states (which is most un-African), and the inherited colonial borders remaining sacrosanct.
In the OAU, as analysts observed, several groups of states sharing similar values on a wide range of issues interacted with one another along the lines of a classical multipolar balance-of-power type of international system. Equally, the organization could be likened to the post Napoleonic concert of Europe in some respects as it worked for the preservation of existing political systems and border in Africa either by direct action or inaction. At independence the leaders were in no position to undertake serious development initiatives because they were too engrossed, as observed previously, in the struggle for survival and the need to cope with the many problems threatening their countries and their power. The states were also fundamentally structurally disarticulated because they were developed as aggregation of enclaves, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another.
The OAU became a painfully ineffectual regional body, too often presided over by dictators who made a mockery of paper concern for human rights and social justice. National leaders stoutly defended the colonial borders they had inherited and, as Chris Brazier puts it, "there was a fear that if these borders were dissolved, all hell might let loose". 18 As individual nation-states within artificial borders they could too easily be picked off or played against each other by the imperialists in a post-colonial version of divide and rule.19 The idea of a united Africa then became visibly consigned to the past and the notion of Pan-Africanism was anathema to some leaders. Sustaining the OAU, even in the basis of the regular budget was very difficult. And much of what dominated the media about Africa and the inability of the OAU to come to grips with the African problems include: -
The political, economic and social environment in which African states found themselves since 1960 have not altered much on a favourable plane and Africa’s current problems seem to resist every attempt to transform. This myriad of problems arose geometrical from a group, or all, of the following:
The frustration of African leaders on the OAU was clearly recognised in the need for progress in Cairo Declaration at the 29th Summit of Heads of State and Governments of OAU in Cairo which states, among other things:
Despite the fundamental changes which have taken place in the post independence era and more particularly since the end of the Cold War, there is still the need for establishing a close link between development, democracy, security and stability in the years ahead as the most ideal fomular for fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa to a descent life, progress and social justice. This fomular will enable us to solve gradually the acute socio-economic and political problems facing the African continent. It will also serve as a proper framework for the preservation of the diverse nature of our nations and societies and further enhancement of the fraternal ties that exist between our states.21
These words sounded no different from innumerable similar declaration of intent emiting from the OAU in the past; and this is because the environment has not altered remarkably for a new breathe of air of progress, peace and prosperity.
The Emergence of the AU and the Challenges Ahead
Novelty, they say has its attractiveness and, as Cameron Duodu sarcastically inputs, in News-Africa July 29, 2002, "who would blame an organization with a record of poor performance if it wishes to take a leaf out of the book of a corporate boardroom and ‘rebrand’ itself?" Kwameh Nkrumah had set the stage a long time ago but the actors were acting out other scripts which they could not discard. Nkrumah sounded it clear then, that:
We cant afford to place our needs, our development, our security, to the gait of camels and donkeys. We cannot afford not to cut down the overgrown bush of outmoded attitudes that obstruct our path to the modern open road of the widest and earliest achievement of economic independence and the raising up of the lives of our people to the highest level.22
The flame of unity and freedom lit in the sixties has continued to glow, though dimly, to illuminate the path of the transition from OAU to Africa Union (AU). The AU can be said not to be a child of an impetuous inspiration but the offspring of a gradual but dedicated progression of ideals and commitments. The continent has remained in dire need of solutions to its critical problems: it this very condition that propels the need for change and progress.
Consequently, in the 1990s the notion of Pan- African Union was born again and it was the liberation of South Africa from apartheid that helped it back to life. Equally, the main influence propelling Africans towards greater economic and political unity is globalization. Faced with a trading system which insists on transnational capital having carte blanche, and employing the philosophy of imperialism in its all time best, Africans became increasingly aware that they will have to stand together if they are to defend or advance their own cause. But even as they favoured unity in principle, they could not necessarily agree on how closely united they should be and what forms their unity should take.
Several years back the OAU Summit had set up a 14 member committee to review its charter. By 1996 when the Yaounde Declaration was issued, the Charter Review Committee had held six sessions and submitted, on an annual basis, a report to the OAU summit. As Jakkie Cilliers notes, not dissimilar to the impasse within which the UN finds itself, the review of the OAU Charter remained the captive of the competing national interests of a number of member states.23 However, for a number of important countries, such as South Africa, the initiative towards the establishment of the AU provided a way out of this impasse.
A major problem, indicative of the ideological divide of the ‘60s, was the vision of a single federal African states that inspired leaders like Muomar Gaddafi, a vision which many of the states did not share but which they were careful of criticizing. The Libyan initiative it was interpreted, was intended to enable the North African leader to break out of the prolonged diplomatic insulation brought about by its poor relations with the US, the UK and some of the Arab States. Notwithstanding the misgiving, the declaration adopted by the 4th Extra-ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sytre, Libya, in September 1999 set the fast track to the Constitutive Act of the AU that emerged. In July 2000 African Heads of State met in Lome, Togo for the 36 Ordinary Summit of the OAU and at the end of that Summit they came out with a draft treaty for an African union which will replace the OAU. Incidentally, that came 100 years since the first ever. Pan-African Conference was held in London.
The OAU Lusaka Summit meeting of July 2001 mandated the Secretary-General to proceed, in consultation with member states, with a process to work out the rules of procedure to launch the key structures within the AU; such as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Executive Council of Foreign Ministers, the Commission (including its structures, functions and powers) and the Permanent Representatives Committee of Ambassadors. The Lusaka Summit also agreed to incorporate the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution as an organ of the AU after a review of its structure, procedures and working method. In a typically uncertain manner, the first draft text provided for the AU to co-exist with the OAU and AEC rather than serving the purpose of rationalization and consolidation.
The seminal assembly of the African Union held in July 2002 in South Africa ‘closed the shop’ on the OAU which had been in existence since 1963. Much hope was raised by this development as manifested in Sule Lamido’s (Nigerian Foreign Minister) statement:
Arising from the realization that in today’s world order we Africans are essentially on our own, the leaders had to re-think. We have to look inwards to try to create a stronger, more effective process of continental interaction, something more integrative, merging our economies, markets and capacity. We have to bring our potentials so that our partners will be forced to engage us.24
Such moving statements have not been lacking in Africa but the AU, like OAU, is an inter-governmental organization and the pace of change is therefore still likely to be determined by what cynics refer to as ‘lowest common denominator politics.’25 The Constitutive Act of the AU envisages the establishment of a supranational type of executive body that can promote integration and sustainable human development more effectively than the OAU. The Act has the following bodies as a principal organs:
Among the AU’s major objectives, as stated in Article 3 of the Act, are:
Keeping in mind the challenges of globalization and marginalisation there was a consensus, even if only for public consumption, that the aim of the union would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in 37 years and to advance from there to chart a new dynamic vision of collective continental action and cohesion for Africa.
The big question, however, is – will the re-launch or rebranding of the OAU achieve the desired objectives? Can the AU stop the ‘yawning and the tightening of the stomach muscles that used to accompany the mention of the name of the OAU?’26 Would a United Africa benefit the ordinary people and can African leaders sustain the organization through a corporate agenda?
Critics have been quick to dismiss the constitutive Act as Utopian, while some believe that the treaty does not present any new agenda for Africa as the whole thing appears not be only a declaration of intention which do not respond tot he realities and aspirations of Africans. Although reinforcing stereotypes of "backwardness" and ‘hopelessness’ is not conducive to finding solution to any of Africa’s problems, old habits die hard and persisting hostile environments do not fade quickly. Though the post Cold war ideological schisms are eroded, the contentious matters of colonial background which hamstrung the OAU in several witness persist. A union that must last cannot be driven by distrust which is pervading in several circles of collective effort in Africa. The state-centric approach to international affairs makes the states to think of sovereignty from an exclusive angle. Many leaders do not share, like in OAU, the vision of a single Federal African state.
Under the terms of the Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4 lists 16 principles which contains an ambitious wish list, including, for example, the establishment of a common defense policy and it articulates the "right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of the union in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"" As Michael Mulikita rightly observes, the Act makes no reference to the UNSC which is the primary instrument for dealing with the type of emergencies referred to in Article 4(h) of the Act.27 More worrisome, and in a classic manner of state-centric organizations, Article 4(g) effectively disempowers Article 4(h) by affirming "non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another". Hence, as Mulikita concludes, under the non-interference clause, a regime guilty of the type of gross human rights violations outlined Article 3 (on Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights) and Article 4(h) can legally obstruct union intervention. This confirms the old habits, the old fears and the old traits since the ‘60s. The Act does not provide for the tools or mechanisms with which to implement, monitor or advance these lofty ideals. It is recalled that the OAU Charter, Article 3(2) on non-interference in internal affairs of member states led to serious drawbacks and had negative implications on the activities of the organization for several decades. Over the decades ruthless, corrupt and unaccountable leaders emerged across the continent without African states or leaders confronting them. Along with other factors, it led OAU to degenerate to what Kenyan statesman, Oginga Odinga called "a Trade Union of African Heads of State".28
In the same vein, Article 30 states that governments that come to power in future through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union. Jakkie Cilliers believes that the Act does not incorporate the extensive principles for democratic governance, the definition of unconstitutional changes or the measures that the AU would take in response to such development and the establishment of a central organizations sub-committee to monitor compliance with decisions taken on situations of unconstitutional change on a regular basis.29
These apparent contradiction, admittedly, provide an example of the ambivalent attitude of African states towards the sensitive issue of national sovereignty. It strengthens the impression that the AU amounts to merely giving the OAU a "fresh coat of paints" without the inner structures undergoing any renovations.30 This paper, without the least strand of unprofitable pessimism, notes that the AU project is going to be a much more expensive undertaking than the regular amount of $31 million annual budget of the OAU. Quite clearly, little thought is devoted to how the union will be funded, especially the Pan-African Parliament. The doubts emerge against the background of the fact that by mid 2000 only 17 of the 53 member states of the OAU were up to date in the settlement of their financial obligations to the regular budget.31 The question is how will the additional obligation be met?
The establishment of a union as contained in the Constitutive Act presupposes a high degree of social and political integration of member states. It remains unclear whether a union modeled along the example of European integration can be successfully established in Africa. This is all the more problematic in the sense that intra-African trade, notwithstanding the existence of sub-regional economic arrangements as ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, has persistently remained below the 5% mark calculated as a fraction of the continent’s total external trade.32 The overlapping membership of several regional groupings with duplicating mandates and structures leading to inadequate financing of the integration process, poses serious threat to continental union. Ironically, African leaders refer to their sub-regional efforts, especially in security arrangements but they are not, as expected, ready, openly, to chastise their colleagues on undemocratic tendencies in their subregions.
Some noticeable habits of the African leaders which have not altered dramatically over the decades are obstacles to any genuine union on the continent. These include: penchant for luxury items like expensive official vehicles, presidential jets and the expending of inordinate amounts on running public offices; foreign travels and diplomatic representation which cannot be sustained, instead of engaging in pooling or coordinating representation; military spending in excess of 2% of the GNP (any success achieved in reducing military spending translates into an expansion of public domestic savings) corruption which is widely recognized as a serious obstacle to development; ethnic and communal conflicts most fueled by elite struggle and the debt trap.
Finally, the AU is an ambitious undertaking but despite the change in name, many of the institutions that have been created as part of the OAU and the African Economic Community will continue unchanged for the foreseeable future. However, in spite of the identifiable features, it is necessary to provide clarity on whether the Union is a replacement or a continuation of the AEC and whether the Union aims at both economic and political integration.
CONCLUSION
It has been stated that there has been a consensus that the aim of the AU would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in its 37 years of existence and to advance the cause of collective action to African affairs, but the paper also acknowledges that against the backdrop of OAU’s history and the general African condition, the new union project fits into a prevailing condition which does not portend radical transformation due to obvious difficulties posed by internal and external constraints. New institutions and frameworks, themselves, will do little to rectify the situation described in the Yaounde Declaration of 1996 on Africa:
…At the close of the 20th century… of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed the most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed, and the most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are concerned.
Although this paper in conclusion would rather err on the side of hope than of despair, unity may not make Africa suddenly rich but it can make it difficult for Africa to be disregarded and humiliated. Perhaps marginalisation, so often decried, is what Africa needs right now. For one thing, it will help the evolution of an endogenous development agenda, an agenda which express the aspirations of the people and can therefore elicit their support.
The fundamental issue is really not that of recounting the benefits but that of developing the political will among African statesmen and their readiness to bear the costs that is required to produce and sustain an effective union. This demands equitable burden-sharing in matters affecting the continent and the administration of the Union. It also requires an appropriate institutional framework with sufficient authority and capacity for implementing agreed decisions. The creation of a necessary democratic environment rather than mere summit diplomatic rhetoric and the involvement of civil society in order to ensure the building of integrated production capacities are immeasurable requirements for a solid union.
The success of the AU would require mature African statesmanship that strikes a balance between the desire of member states to pursue their individual interest and the political will to forego certain aspects of national sovereignty and independence for the common interest of the continent.
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