Libya's Africa Policy: What does it mean for South Africa and NEPAD?

Sanusha Naidu (Ms)
Research Specialist
Integrated Rural and Regional Development
Human Sciences Research Council
Durban South Africa
Tel.: 27 (0)31 273 1400 (switchboard), 27 (0)31 273 1406 (direct line) 083 637 0903 (mobile)
Fax No.  27 (0)31 273 1403

Abstract

Africa's  claim  that the 21st century belongs to the continent has already been  realised. The African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have become cornerstones of this realisation since both  initiatives  are  at  the  heart of the continent's political, economic and  social  rejuvenation  within  the  global  setting. While the latter may be  spirited  as  the  blue  print  for  putting  people  first, within certain political  circles there are doubts over whether such initiatives can reach  their  expected  outcomes.  At  one level the initiatives appear ambitious,  especially  on  the  issue of good governance where it is expected that the  practice  of self-policing/appraisal should be carried out by member states  (through  the peer review mechanism) on their performance. At a substantive  level,  however,  two interrelated questions stand out, namely: does Africa have  the  capacity  to execute such plans, and if so, who will be the main  drivers of them?

So  far  South  Africa has been identified as the principal country to lead  both  initiatives.  This  was demonstrated in the way SA has eclipsed other  countries  to  play  a leading role in the AU and NEPAD. On the one hand SA  hosts  the  NEPAD  Secretariat,  headed  by Prof. Wiseman Nhkulu (President  Mbeki's  economic  adviser)  and  housed  in Midrand (Johannesburg). On the  other  hand,  SA  is  the  first  chair  of the newly constituted AU, which  formally  replaced  the  OAU  at  an  inaugural summit, hosted by the South African  authorities  in  July  2002. Such responsibility places an onerous  task  on  the  shoulders of the South African government toward harmonising  political relations and fostering unity across the continent, especially if  one considers that Africa has another major player in the form of Libya.

Conversely  Libya's  movement  and behaviour on the continent indicates the  leadership's  geo-political  interest  is informed by two factors. Firstly,  Gaddafi  has  limited  capacity to influence leaders within the Arab world. And  secondly,  like  apartheid  SA,  Libya  is struggling to overcome it's  pariah  image.  Therefore  in the face of such odds it seems plausible that  Col.  Gaddafi  would  want  to carve out strategic areas of interest on the  African continent. As a result in the last two years Libya has demonstrated  a  propensity  to  use petro-dollars to initiate and consolidate diplomatic  relations  with  other  African  countries. This was clearly evident in the early  deliberations  on the African Union (AU) and at the recent launch of  the AU.

But  Libya's  Africa  Policy holds serious policy implications for Pretoria  and  more  importantly  for  President  Mbeki's  NEPAD vision. This becomes  increasingly  apparent  when  the  role  of  these respective states on the  Continent  are  disaggregated. SA's role as intermediate between Africa and  the  resourced  North openly clashes with Libya's role of expelling Western  imperialism  from  the  continent.  The immediate result is a fracturing of unity across the Continent and a serious attempt by the Libyan leader to be  the elder Statesman of Africa. The case of Zimbabwe provides an apt example  of  such behaviour, especially in light of the support that Libya has shown  Mugabe for the land redistribution policy.

Therefore,  the  proposed  article  would survey Libya's Africa policy, but  more  importantly  assess  the  implications  this  has  for South Africa's  foreign  policy  to  the continent. It will highlight that the ambiquity of the  latter  has  undoubtedly  found  the  south  African  authorities in a  quandary  over  their  relationship  with  the  rest  of the continent, and moreover  set  at  risk  the  idea  of  NEPAD or financing of it by donors. Zimbabwe  provides a useful case study in this regard. Finally, the article  will  demonstrate  that  if  South  Africa is serious about its role on the  Continent,  then  it  needs to take  a more leadership in Africa (this does  not  mean that it must become a hegemon but rather be willing to underwrite  stability on the Continent).