The African Union and Subregional Security Mechanisms in Africa: Problems and Prospects

Professor Margaret Vogt,
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary – General, 
United Nations Department of Political Affairs, New York

In a 1990 Declaration, the OAU Heads of State and Government recognized that the prevalence of conflicts in Africa was seriously impeding their collective and individual efforts to deal with the continent’s economic problems. Consequently, they resolved to work together toward the peaceful and rapid resolution of conflicts. During the OAU summit held in Cairo in 1993, African leaders established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR).[1] In doing so, they recognized that the resolution of conflicts is a precondition for the creation of peace and stability, and a necessary precondition for social and economic development. 

From the outset, the issue of peacekeeping on which the OAU Mechanism was predicated, was controversial. It was widely felt within the OAU political leadership that peace and security were the preserve of the United Nations, which is mandated to keep peace globally and which possesses more resources than the OAU. The OAU defined its objective narrowly as that of primarily anticipating and preventing conflicts and left large-scale peacekeeping to the UN and Africa’s subregional organizations. Specifically, the continental body identified three aims: first, to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars; second, to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts if full-blown conflicts should arise; and third, to carry out peacemaking and peacebuilding activities in post-conflict situations. While this initiative thrust the OAU into the center of conflict management efforts in Africa, the reality is that the pan-African organization never became a principal player in peace processes in Africa. Despite its deficiencies, the OAU has the potential to coordinate the evolving early warning systems in Africa’s various subregions. It also has the potential to act as an information bank with subregional desks or other alternative systems where information about the activities of each subregion and its organizations can be coordinated. 

On 9 July 2001, the OAU took the decision to transform itself into a continental African Union, following the signing and ratification by fifty Heads of State and Government, of the constitutive act of the Africa Union in Lusaka, Zambia. However, it remains to be seen whether the AU will build on the capacity of its predecessor in the area of conflict management, resolution, and prevention. Unlike the OAU Charter, the constitutive act of the AU allows for interference in the internal affairs of member states in cases of unconstitutional changes of governments, genocide, and conflicts that threaten regional stability. The act also provides for the participation of  African civil society actors  in the activities of the organization, calls for a Pan-African Parliament, and provides for an Economic and Cultural Commission. Revitalizing the OAU/AU will require political will and commitment to address conflicts in Africa. A strong institutional structure and more financial and logistical resources will also be needed to facilitate decision-making. One year after the establishment of the new Union, African Heads of State and Government adopted a protocol relating to the establishment of a Peace and Security Council in Durban, South Africa. The Council will replace the former OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, incorporating relevant structures and methods in order to serve as the continent’s collective security and early-warning arrangement.

This paper will also assess the relationship between the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development[2] (NEPAD). While NEPAD is ostensibly a program of the AU, the different approaches taken by AU and NEPAD leaders and officials in presenting the initiatives to African governments and civil society groups have led to an impression that both are competing for preeminence in promoting democratization and  economic integration in Africa. If perceptions of divisions between NEPAD and the AU persist, this is only likely to undermine both initiatives and could lead to the division of the continent into separate regional blocs as seen in the 1960s.