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Abstract

Policymaking is no longer exclusively a national affair. Due to globalisation, global agendas easily influence and permeate national plans through policy transfer, diffusion and learning. One such recent global agenda is social protection policies in the form of cash transfers. Studies examining the process of adoption and making of such policies portray a benign learning approach. However, these approaches represent an incomplete view of the dynamics that characterise the adoption of policies. Social protection policymaking arenas are sites of power and resistance which are mutually constituted and exhibited through various forms. Drawing from the nexus of policy transfer and power, this article investigates the forms of power and resistance in the social protection policymaking space by examining the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya. The findings indicate that, as international actors attempted to impose their agendas, political elites resisted in two ways: firstly, by suppressing the action of other actors, and secondly, by asserting alternatives in the policy process. The findings suggest that even in enduring asymmetrical social relations, ‘subordinate’ actors in policy development arenas find space to exercise power through resistance, and exhibit the capacity to influence processes.

Keywords: resistance, power, transnational actors, social protection, policymaking, politics, Kenya

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Résumé

L’élaboration de politiques n’est plus une affaire exclusivement nationale. En raison de la mondialisation, les agendas mondiaux influencent et imprègnent facilement les plans nationaux grâce au transfert, à la diffusion et à l’apprentissage de politiques. L’un de ces récents programmes mondiaux concerne les politiques de protection sociale dans la forme de transferts monétaires. Les études examinant le processus d’adoption et d’élaboration de telles politiques décrivent une approche d’apprentissage bénigne. Cependant, ces approches présentent une vision incomplète de la dynamique qui caractérise l’adoption de politiques. Les lieux d’élaboration des politiques de protection sociale sont des sites de pouvoir et de résistance qui se renforcent mutuellement et se manifestent sous diverses formes. S’appuyant sur le lien transfert de politique/pouvoir, cet article examine les formes de pouvoir et de résistance dans l’espace d’élaboration des politiques de protection sociale en examinant le transfert d’argent au profit d’orphelins et d’enfants vulnérables (CT-OVC) et le programme de protection sociale contre la faim (HSNP) au Kenya. Les résultats indiquent que, alors que les acteurs internationaux tentent d’imposer leurs agendas, les élites politiques résistent de deux manières : premièrement, en supprimant l’action des autres acteurs, et deuxièmement, en affirmant des alternatives dans le processus politique. Ces résultats suggèrent que même dans de persistantes relations sociales asymétriques, les acteurs « subordonnés » dans les lieux de développement de politiques continuent de trouver, par la résistance, un espace d’exercice de leur pouvoir, et ainsi démontrent leur capacité à influencer les processus.

Mots-clés : résistance, pouvoir, acteurs transnationaux, protection sociale, élaboration de politiques, politique, Kenya

Introduction

Policymaking is no longer exclusively a national affair. Due to globalisation, global agendas easily influence and permeate national plans through policy transfer, diffusion and policy learning. Moreover, countries actively borrow and seek to learn from outside their jurisdictions from frontrunners and adopt policies that have worked. In other instances, other actors and agencies, particularly those with great influence, may directly influence policymaking processes through voluntary or coercive mechanisms. While globalisation and its effects have mostly been evident in the financial and the economic sectors through such processes as trade and liberalisation, and movement of goods and people, social policymaking is increasingly becoming an arena of global focus and interest. International actors and bodies of epistemic communities are increasingly playing a major role in
social policymaking processes. Global and transnational actors have become involved in policymaking, including social protection and cash transfer policies. Couched as global social policies whose governance comprises international organisations like United Nations bodies, the Bretton Woods group, and European multilateral organisations (Gough 2013; Kaasch 2013), cash transfers and social protection are now considered to be the new frontier in the global search for solutions to poverty (Peck 2011).

Social protection is a component of social policy. Social policy is defined as ‘collective public efforts aimed at affecting and protecting the social wellbeing of people in a given territory’ (Adésinà 2009:38). Social policy plays a wide range of roles in development, ranging from poverty reduction and redistribution to enhancement of national cohesion and building solidarity (Aina 2004; Mkandawire 2004; Adésinà 2007). Social policy therefore comprises policies related to housing, health care, employment policies, income maintenance and social security. Cash transfers are part of social protection programmes which include financial payments made to older persons, persons with disability, or children deemed vulnerable, to enable individuals and household meet their basic needs and cope with social risks. International organisations have been in the forefront of promoting cash transfer as the new development paradigm in Africa, leading to a proliferation of such schemes across the continent.

Following vigorous promotion by international actors over the past two decades, almost all countries in Africa have some sort of cash transfer under implementation (World Bank 2018). Borrowed from Latin American countries like Mexico and Brazil, the current wave of cash transfer programmes was developed through home-grown responses to growing poverty and inequality. Coupled with labour reforms, cash transfers became tools for tackling social ills and attempts to improve welfare. The same concept, albeit without significant aspects like labour reforms, have been transferred to African countries through a top-down approach. International forces, working together with a growing body of epistemic communities made up of consultancies and academics, comprise the key drivers of the promotion and adoption process, both at global and national level.

Recent research on the study of social protection goes beyond the impact of the programmes and pays attention to the politics and processes of the adoption of such policies in developing countries. Explanatory variables to the adoption process vary from political settlement to ideational approaches with emphasis on national politics and social learning processes (Foli 2015; Chinyo-ka and Seekings 2016; Hickey and Bukenya 2016; Siachiwena 2016; Hickey and Seekings 2018). However, these approaches represent an incomplete view
of the dynamics that characterise the adoption of policies. Social protection policymaking arenas are sites of power and resistance which are mutually constituted and exhibited through various forms. Policymaking processes of global nature often involve asymmetrical social relations laden with power. In policymaking processes involving policy transfer, transfer agents are often the most powerful actors, deriving dominance from the knowledge they bring to the policy site. Transfer agents use other resources including finance as incentives to motivate policy uptake in resource-scarce countries.

Drawing from the nexus of policy transfer and power as the theoretical framework, this article discusses the forms of power and resistance within the social protection policymaking space. To do this, the article examines the process of transfer and adoption of social protection policies and programmes in Kenya as a case study. The study specifically focuses on two cash transfer programmes: the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and the Hunger Safety Net Programme. The methodology comprises a qualitative research design based on in-depth interviews conducted in Kenya between January to August 2016, a review of relevant documents, and participant observation.

The next section discusses the theoretical perspective on which the article draws. The section which follows then provides a brief overview of social protection policies in Kenya. This is followed by an illustration and discussion on influences of globalisation on policymaking in Africa, and a discussion on resistance to coercion. The overall findings of the article are consolidated before the conclusion.

**Policy Transfer and Power**

The article draws from policy transfer as the theoretical framework. In their seminal work, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:5) define policy transfer as the

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\text{... process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system.}
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Policy transfer encompasses ideas of policy diffusion, lesson drawing and policy learning, with forms of transfer ranging from voluntary transfer to direct coercion (Evans 2009; Benson and Jordan 2011). Policy transfer is multi-sited and multi-actor, making the already dynamic social policymaking environment even more complex (Marsh and Sharman 2009). The transfer of social protection to Africa has opened the policymaking process to an array of actors, both domestic and international. Peck and Theodore (2020:170) describe the
policymaking environment as ‘associated with the anointment of favoured “models”…entailing the enrolment of advocates and followers, the construction of pro-policy movements and the consolidation of norms and paradigms’.

In the process of transfer of a policy, there are borrowers and lenders; however, this relationship hardly changes (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). The article adopts a policy transfer and power analysis as the theoretical approach. Following a review of existing literature on the subject under study, policy transfer alone was insufficient in explaining policy change, and therefore a power analysis approach was incorporated to bring about an empirically grounded analysis.

Different scholars conceptualise power differently. On one end of the spectrum, power is conceived as ‘domination over’ – a situation in which power is exercised through structures of authority arising out of economic strength and control (Dahl 1957; Weber 1986). Power is conceived as an imposition through which one’s actions cause the action of another. However, policy processes, even when they involve powerful players, are often devoid of such direct control. Yet there is still domination in policy transfer mechanisms. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, governments in developing countries were compelled by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adopt structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to secure grants and loans (Mkandawire and Soludo 2002). The recent financial bailout of Greece suggests that international organisations continue to be high-handed in policymaking processes. In the context of Kenya’s uptake of social protection programmes, social relations between international and national actors were not egalitarian, and they were asymmetrical. International agents were able to strategically exercise control and dominance over the transfer process through the knowledge and resources they brought to the policy arena.

Social Protection in Kenya

Kenya is one of the early adopters of cash transfer schemes in Africa, having adopted four cash transfer schemes since 2003 through influence from donors, primarily the World Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF). The four cash transfers are the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT), the Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer Programme (PWSD-CT) and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). For coordination purposes, the four cash transfer schemes fall under one umbrella, the National Safety Net Programme (NSNP) to improve and enhance these interventions.
Set out as a coordination body, the NSNP aims to harmonise and bring coherence to the programmes to ‘increase efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes under one common framework’ (Government of Kenya 2016:iii). Except for the HSNP, whose transfer amount is indexed on drought-related indicators, the programmes each provide KES2,000 per month per household with payments made bi-monthly. The current reach of the programmes is estimated at 1.2 million households across the country.

The HSNP and the CT-OVC were initiated with financial support of DFID, UNICEF and the World Bank. The CT-OVC aims at providing financial support to households with orphaned children. The programme was initiated following the pandemic brought about by HIV and AIDS and aims to provide income support to enable the families to cope with the loss of breadwinners (Bosworth et al. 2016). Government of Kenya financing comprises the largest portion of the CT-CVC, with financing from international organisations now reserved for technical support. The HSNP is implemented in four counties: Mandera, Marsabit, Wajir and Turkana, and aims to provide income support to households the arid and semi-arid parts of the country to cushion individuals from hunger resulting from cyclic and perennial drought in the area (Government of Kenya 2012). Since the inception of the HSNP in 2012, DFID has been the primary financier, with government financing an increasing proportion of the cost over the years.

**Policymaking in Africa in a Globalised World**

Globalisation has enabled the easy movement of policies, values, principles and norms across regions and continents. Nation-states are no longer insulated from influence from other jurisdictions and policymaking sites are spaces of greater participation, interference and infusion of ideas by multiple actors and agencies.

Due to advances in travel and communication, policies, programmes and norms are able to move with speed and ease from country to another by travelling groups of international organisations, consultants and various epistemic communities (Peck 2011). Policies are therefore easily diffused into national programmes. Policymaking sites therefore inhere multiple interests and ideas with national and international actors seeking to advance their preferences by influencing others. Relationships between international and national actors continue to be asymmetrically inclined towards international organisations, since they possess the necessary material resources to advance their interests. Policymaking is an important aspect of sovereignty, but something which the state in Africa has had little control
of in the face of powerful international actors (Shivji 2009). Owing to a powerful international presence in policymaking, Africa has been left with little choice but to integrate into the globalised world.

The recent history of policymaking processes in Africa has shed light on the role of globalised forces in shaping national agendas. Studies on SAPs imposed by international agencies like the IMF and World Bank show policymaking processes as spaces of asymmetrical power relations. Through SAPs, governments were coerced into cost-cutting measures and adopting stringent financial constraints, particularly in the area of social spending (Adésínà 2014). These cutbacks in social spending resulted in a rollback of post-independence social policy gains with the adoption of user fees at points of service and the introduction of school fees.

The catastrophic failure of these measures prompted an outcry, and even the World Bank and the IMF reluctantly acknowledged the negative impacts of SAP austerity measures on the lives of ordinary citizens. Social safety nets were then recommended as measures to provide relief from the impact of SAPs. In promoting SAPs, international organisations perpetuated a discourse that African states and bureaucracies were corrupt, incapable and unable of learning; a discourse which endured in legitimising the need for globalised foreign advisors and consultants in national policymaking processes (Adésínà 2009).

Global policymaking process involves the adoption of internationally determined agendas and policies. Like other development models before it, social protection policies as global social policy models have always come from outside.

A major irony of Africa’s development history is that the theories and models employed have largely come from outside the continent. No other region of the world has been so dominated by external idea and models (Mkandawire and Soludo 2001:vi).

Policies of this sort often fail to take cognisance of the African context and the specific national context, and may flop, or easily be abandoned after the funding runs out (Deacon and Stubbs 2013; Preece 2013). Moreover, at times, globalised policymaking processes exclude the participation of citizens, local community leaders and politicians, thus undermining national democracy. Such exclusion is sometimes deliberate or it may be the result of neglecting to include powerful veto actors like national politicians in the policymaking process until after the policies have been formulated or when budgetary allocations are needed to scale up programmes. While acknowledging that global social policy has been mainly shaped by scholars and practitioners in the North, Deacon and Stubbs 2013 dispute that has been based entirely on a top-down paternalistic model.
In those African countries that still depend on donor funding for the implementation of development programmes, foreign countries and donor agencies play a great role in policymaking. In those environments, international organisations define what development is, and the policy choices needed to get there. Emboldened by their increasing domination of policymaking, transnational organisations not only finance programmes, but increasingly act as implementers, excluding bureaucrats from direct programme implementation. This form of interference undermines national states’ ownership of programmes as the process often professes to define countries' development agendas. A lack of ownership can be reflected in the poor quality of what is undertaken and delays in government implementation (Tambulasi 2013), which can be construed as forms of covert resistance.

The exercise of power in national and global policymaking spaces has been discussed elsewhere, especially when it involves asymmetrical relations (Abdulai 2019; Ouma and Adésínà 2019). Policy resistance on the other hand is not well theorised and explained. Even in spaces of coercion by powerful actors in the policymaking space, subordinate actors often have avenues through which to express their agency. In policymaking networks, actors who are able to resist the action of others often derive their power from their legitimacy in the policy process.

The three forms of resistance identified in literature are modification, rejection or outward refusal by actors (Prior and Barnes 2011). Politicians derive their power as veto players who have been elected as representatives of the people. Resistance may be expressed covertly or openly (Scott 1992). In the case of powerful actors like members of parliament (MPs) who vote for budget allocation toward programmes, their acts of resistance and agency is often open and clearly demonstrated, unlike those of the bureaucracy. Resistance can be shown by bureaucrats in covert and subtle ways, and may manifest in reluctance or slowness in the implementation of a policy (Tambulasi 2013).

Even within asymmetrical relations of policymaking, Africa and its national states have often exercised resistance to policies that have been imposed by others. Resistance is often a way in which societies seek to maintain their independence and identity. Julius Nyerere, one of Africa’s leading nationalists is quoted by Shivji (2005) as follows:

Africa’s history is not only one of slavery, exploitation and colonialism; it is also a story of struggle against these evil, and of battles won after many setbacks and much suffering (Nyerere in Adefeji 1993:xv)

It is clear that Africans have not blindly taken on solutions prescribed by others without resistance. African scholars were in the forefront of bringing criticisms to SAPs – (see Mkandawire and Soludo 2001). States and
bureaucracies also levelled criticisms of the imposition of SAPs. Other areas of resistance have included attempts to provide alternative frameworks, plans and programmes which take on a broader holistic approach to Africa’s development and are sensitive to national and continental context like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Shivji 2009).

When pressure from globalised forces imposes change, sometimes it may seem that a policy has been adopted, but it may not necessarily be implemented, as was the case of health reforms in Malawi (Tambulasi 2015). International organisations view national resistance against social protection prescriptions as a lack of political will. Compliance with donor prescriptions is achieved through threats to withdraw funds, or actual withdrawal of funds (Hickey and Bukenya 2016).

**Findings: Power and Political Resistance in Social Policymaking in Kenya**

Due to conflicting interests, and as an attempt to push for cash transfer schemes, transfer agents sought to limit the influence of the political elite in the policymaking arena in Kenya. This exclusion and depoliticisation process and the ensuing resistance can be viewed in two phases: the agenda-setting phase at the beginning of the policy transfer process between 2004 to 2010, and the phase after 2010, when government provided an increased proportion of financing for the scheme.

**Political Rejection and Agency as Resistance**

Bache and Taylor (2003) suggest there is the possibility of a two-stage game in the policymaking arena. In the first phase, the process of policy transfer is a largely coercive expression of hegemony as recipients accept donor conditions in order to receive benefits. In the second phase, the process is more voluntaristic, as recipient nations can decide whether to accept, resist or subvert the conditions agreed to in the first phase. In the case of Kenya, the second phase also involved the modification of programmes and conditions to fit into the political economy.

The first phase involved selling the idea of cash transfers to the Government of Kenya, and the role of politicians was limited as international organisations sought to set the policy agenda. Meanwhile, other domestic actors, specifically bureaucrats from government ministries and civil society organisations, resisted the actions of international organisations.

Using their expertise, ideas and knowledge, international organisations had control over the policy space and enough leeway to leverage the idea of cash transfers as ‘the solution’. Knowledge regarding the design and
implementation of cash transfers was limited to international agents. However, policy transfer agents’ expertise and resources are not enough to bring about policy change, so they require the cooperation of the bureaucratic class and civil society organisations, and they are heavily reliant on such cooperation (Adésinì and others 2020). As domestic actors had little knowledge of cash transfer programmes, international organisations deployed their expertise in the policymaking process with little resistance.

To keep the attention of politicians away from the policymaking process, international organisations often invoked the need to prevent political interference. This strategy is not new as international organisations often invoke neopatrimonialism to depoliticise policy processes, thereby legitimising their participation in what they consider to be a technical process (Mkandawire 2015). Policy transfer agents feared that politics and politicians would derail the policymaking process and believed it was therefore imperative to keep them out of the arena. This refrain was echoed by domestic actors, particularly government officials who formed the first points of contact with international organisations. Depoliticising the policy space also depoliticised the policy problem, rendering the policymaking process a technical rather than a political one.

Depoliticisation is an anti-statist mechanism which legitimises direct intervention by international organisations in policymaking but, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) affirms, this takes away African peoples’ control over policy. Politicians also stayed away from the programme because they had no knowledge of social protection. In addition, the programmes were small and, at this stage, donor funds comprised the major proportion of funding with minimal amounts from the government exchequer. This gave international organisations and a small group of government bureaucrats a lot of control over the programme.

Following increased government funding after 2010, political interest in, and influence over, the programmes rose. In this second phase, politicians became interested in the policy process and in social protection in general. Furthermore, due to political activity, especially following the 2007 elections, each political party had included social protection in its manifestos (Wanyama and McCord 2017), thereby elevating social protection and cash transfers to a political agenda item.

Political agency increased as MPs progressively brought more questions related to welfare, social protection and, inadvertently, cash transfers for discussion in Parliament. In this way, political agency restructured power within the policy process as members of Parliament reclaimed a significant role in the policy process.
With increased political interest in the cash transfers schemes and drawing on their veto power, politicians overtly resisted attempts at imposition of a poverty targeting model for the HSNP. Donor agencies funding the HSNP – DFID, the World Bank and others – prescribed a poverty targeting model for selecting beneficiaries in the four counties. Previously, in the first phase of the programme (2007–2012), a mixed targeting method comprising proxy means testing, community-based targeting, and pension targeting had been employed. Attempts at adopting a poverty targeted model which would favour Turkana County, the poorest county in Kenya, were rejected by legislators. MPs threatened to refuse to vote for increased funding to the programme in Parliament. Their argument was that the proposed method of selection, based on poverty levels only, would undermine national cohesion as it favoured one part of the country over others. International organisations construed this resistance as efforts by politicians to protect their political terrain. International organisations’ insistence on poverty targeting points to the narrow vision of social policy that has been promoted by globalised actors. Poverty reduction is not the only purpose of social policy. A properly designed social policy instrument can play other roles, including promoting social cohesion and nation-building. Moreover, attempts at poverty targeting that may undermine social cohesion indicates how cash transfers are born out of neoliberal ideas that advance the notion of liberating individuals rather than promoting the broader social good.

The overt form of resistance that politicians displayed was only possible because they have veto power and are considered to be powerful actors in policymaking spaces. Facing this threat to defund their pet projects, international organisations re-evaluated the targeting model and a different agreement was reached. The new agreed formula provided an almost equal number of beneficiaries from the four counties.

In their resistance, politicians exploited the ideological competition among international organisations working on the promotion of social protection. While the World Bank was in the lead in promoting poverty-targeted cash transfers, other organisations, particularly DFID and UNICEF, based their advocacy on a rights discourse. Through their acts of resistance, politicians wanted to reconcile national interests, political interests and that of donors who were funding the programme. Unlike national bureaucrats, politicians can easily find space for resistance in asymmetrical relationships involving other powerful actors based on their political power. In addition, they easily adopt overt expressions of resistance as they derive their power from being elected representatives of people and are less dependent on international organisations for resources.
Asserting Alternatives in Political Spaces

In 2006, the Ministry of Social Development convened a multi-stakeholder consultative process for the development of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy with actors and agencies working on, and interested in, social protection. The multiplicity of actors, both international and domestic, complicated the policymaking process and slowed it down. Competing organisational interests and ideological differences played out openly in the design and development of the document. The political class was deliberately excluded, as mentioned above, and initially politicians lacked interest. However, as the proportion of programme funding from government increased, interest politicians became more interested. There was contestation between the Ministry of Social Development, supported by DFID, UNICEF and the World Bank, and the Ministry of Labour, supported by the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Competition between the two ministries centred on the ownership of social protection. National leadership of social protection was domiciled at the Ministry of Social Development. Having signed the ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation (ILO 2012) in 2012 on behalf of the Government of Kenya, the Ministry of Labour claimed ‘ownership and leadership’ over social protection. Another area of contention was the perceived lack of clout of the Ministry of Social Development in undertaking what was considered to be an important national process.

Officials in the Ministry of Labour considered their ministry to be more powerful than Social Development, owing to its financial and institutional resources. In an interview, one participant expressed the view that the Ministry of Social Development could not extend its mandate and oversight role over a much more powerful ministry. The Ministry of Social Development resisted attempts at limiting its control over the social protection mandate.

Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA), a caucus of women MPs, broke the deadlock by sponsoring a private members’ bill in Parliament in December 2012. The timing of this event, just before the dissolution of Parliament for general elections in 2013, ensured the Bill passed quickly through Parliament.

Other actors in the policy process, including bureaucrats, were not aware of the Bill until it had been passed by Parliament. The hurried process culminated in the Social Assistance Act of 2013. The Social Protection Policy was under discussion in Parliament at the same time. Though the Social Protection Policy was approved by Cabinet in the same year, the two
documents are not synchronised with regard to an institutional framework for implementing and managing the social protection programme. The Social Assistance Act provides for universal social welfare for all citizens, but certain actors say this is unachievable, and have proposed that the Act be repealed.

Politicians, especially MPs, found space within their mandate and in Parliament to participate in the policy process. In the first phase of the process, through excluding politicians and trying to depoliticise the policymaking space, bureaucrats and international organisations sought to reduce the influence of politicians. However as key agents of policymaking, the political elite resisted, based on their veto power. This finding resonates with sentiments by Tambulasi (2015) in Malawi where politicians were able to influence policymaking processes to a greater degree because they are veto players. Through sponsoring a private members’ Bill to Parliament, MPs in Kenya restructured the power dynamics within the social relations of the policy space, thereby asserting their authority. Politicians expressed their agency by subverting the actions of others and, acting within their mandate, forced a reconsideration of the prescriptions and processes of others.

Conclusion

Policy resistance has not previously been discussed at length in relation to social protection, particularly in respect of cash transfers in Africa and in Kenya. This empirical account of events in Kenya demonstrates political resistance even in the face of powerful actors with control over knowledge and financial resources. Within this set of social relations, MPs exercised their agency and showed resistance to policy prescriptions by other agents. Their resistance and agency rested on rational political and national interests.

Resistance can often arise as the ‘actions of individuals are shaped by the encounters between agent and of reflections on those relations in context of various structural factors that bear upon the policy situation’ (Prior and Barnes 2011:275). As is demonstrated in this article, even in top-down policy arenas, there is a need for a negotiated perspective where policy is mediated, contested, negotiated and modified during its formulation (Prior and Barnes 2011; Kaasch 2013). Resistance by politicians were not acts of emancipation (Prior and Barnes 2011) but reactions, practices, strategies and everyday routines of policy formulation processes.

In light of the above discussion, there is a need to study and understand the nature and intensity of domestic resistance to globalised policymaking. Globalisation processes in policymaking are facilitated and mediated by
hegemonising, universalising and homogenising intellection institutions and forms of knowledge (Jinadu 2010). As international organisations continue to dominate the discourse on development, there is little room for the theorising and imagination of Africa’s development (Mafeje 1992). Globalised policymaking spaces continue to perpetuate a relationship in which northern constructions of the South continue to promote colonisers’ viewpoints and claims of the North working on behalf of southern populations to benefit them (Preece 2013). Moreover, it is a relationship that indicates how only certain people are vested with the authority to know (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). As Fanon (2005) argued, remedies often recommended by international organisations like the World Bank and IMF still have the feel of colonialism.

References


