

Editorial

Crisis and Innovation

Africa has been given different derogatory names by the West. It was at one time called the Dark Continent! In the year 2000, the *Economist* in a major article came out screaming “Hopeless Africa”. It had its own motivations and evidence: “At the start of the 19th century, Freetown was remote and malarial, but also a place of hope. This settlement for destitute Africans from England and former slaves from the Americas had become the main base in West Africa for enforcing the British Act that abolished the slave trade. At the onset of the 21st century, Freetown symbolises failure and despair. The capital of Sierra Leone may be less brutalised than some other parts of the country, but its people are nonetheless physically and psychologically scarred by years of warfare... Indeed, since the difficulties of helping Sierra Leone seemed so intractable, and since Sierra Leone seemed to epitomise so much of the rest of Africa, it began to look as though the world might just give up on the entire continent.”

Really? This was ‘afro-pessimism’ at its worst, when most reports on Africa published in the Western media were very gloomy, to say the least. These days, it is not unusual for one to read articles in leading European and North American newspapers and magazines, as Martin Hall has shown, that depict Africa as *the* continent of the future. The question as to how Africa ended up in what was said to be a “hopeless” situation a decade or two ago (with civil wars raging in several countries) is ignored. Yet that is one of the questions that CODESRIA has attempted to answer through its research programmes and its Policy Dialogue Series. In one such dialogue held in Abuja in October 2005, One of the main questions posed to participants was: “How did Africa divert itself from its noble ambitions and its societal projects of yesterday to arrive at a situation where more than half of Africans live amidst violence (physical, structural and symbolic) and poverty?... The list of actors and factors responsible for Africa’s misfortune is long, very long, and goes from imperialism that manifested itself recently in structural adjustment programme, to bad governance.”* The truth, however, is that Africa has been and still is a continent of hope.

In the lead article of this issue, Martin Hall of the University of Salford, UK demonstrates that far from being “a hopeless continent”, Africa is resourceful, resilient and creative. In fact, the current tide in the global economic wind is a clear indication that the continent’s future is far brighter than that of the West. This is evidence that some commendable steps have been taken towards improving people’s lives, and taking advantage of the diverse business opportunities that abound in Africa. However, the hope of the continent lies on incremental innovation, one that drives economic growth and breaks existing monopolies. Such an effective innovation, according to Hall, is often a

long series of small advances that together constitute a pathway which will eventually triumph over spectacular assertions, whether in the form of new paradigms such as the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid or summary dismissals of an entire continent by an ‘outsider’ like the *Economist*. We now need to consolidate the gains, and put Africa firmly on the road to peace and prosperity.

Helmi Sharawy, in his article on Nasser and African Liberation, shows the importance and the need for oral history through his personal narratives on the actual actors in the history of African liberation movements, thus helping to fill some of the gaps in the written history of Africa. Oral history is also important in capturing social and cultural histories of societies in periods of social transformation because there are many stories going on at the same time to the extent that many might be left unrecorded. The complete history is thus eventually told by a combined effort of those who were involved. The personal narratives fill the many gaps that are sure to occur within official documents that may be biased by the interests and policies of the people in power. Going by his own experience in Egyptian politics, Sharawy shows that official history is often subjected to processes of de-construction and re-construction of facts to suit the changing moods of the main actors in power, or those who follow them. Thus, the multiplicity of narratives and personal recollections may help in putting certain events in broader perspectives, rather than a cause for confusion as some may think.

Ali El-Kenz, in his piece on the Algerian War and the independence of the country, reminisces on the struggle that gave birth to the independent nation, a struggle that took a historic turn on 1st November 1954, when the Algerian national liberation movement launched an armed struggle against the French colonial administration. In a juxtaposition of the paradoxical significance of November 1 for France and Algeria, he salutes the courage of those who dared to break all limits of negative predictions and pessimism to give Algeria a new birth, a new beginning, filled with hope and endless possibilities. He invokes the spirit of November, the month of Algeria’s independence, as that of a bright new horizon that will unfold more clearly with time.

Another very interesting contribution to this issue is that of Craig M. Calhoun, President of the Social Science Research Council, New York. In his article on the contemporary global crises and future transformations, he predicts an eventual total collapse of US hegemony. He is of the view that the US is likely to be the most powerful country in the world for some time but weakening gradually; and a key question is how the US will respond to this gradually weakening grip, especially with the emergence of China as a potential world power, possibly over-

taking the US very soon. Nations do not progress by chance but rather by careful planning. The reality of the world today, Calhoun argues, is that there are shifts in power and influence, and the major shifts are towards a number of different countries which will not be capable of monopolizing it; countries such as China and India, Iran and Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, might soon join Europe and the United States as world powers. As the world realigns itself, we in Africa need to reaffirm our commitment to our continent and people, and confront the bitter truth of our time in which the foundations of many of our states are shaky and the dignity of our people is barely guaranteed in the face of ferocious global competition for resources – including our own. That is the condition for Africa to take its rightful place in the international community.

When a great scholar decides to get involved in armed struggle, especially in present-day Africa, it must surely raise some questions in the academic community. This was the case when Professor Wamba dia Wamba, who decided to dump the gown for the gun when he decided to get involved in the Congo crisis. In an interview with CODESRIA, Professor Wamba hinged his dabbling in politics on the civic obligation that academics owe society, which makes it imperative for them to go beyond theoretical analyses to actually getting involved in the dynamics of implementation of those analyses. To him, this is the only way through which scholars can influence policymakers. It is also a good way to mobilize for development. This, of course, is debatable. But it helps in explaining why a high profile academic decided to lead an armed struggle.

In the last issue, we reported briefly on the 2010 Distinguished Africanist Awards won by N'Dri Assie-Lumumba and Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, both professors at Cornell University, USA and committed members of CODESRIA. N'Dri Assie-Lumumba is a member of the Scientific Committee of CODESRIA and Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo is one of the managing editors of *the African Journal of International Affairs*, a CODESRIA publication. Above and beyond that, every time an African scholar is honored, the entire African scholarly community should celebrate with him/her.

Also reported in the last issue of this Bulletin was that former CODESRIA president and currently Director of the Makerere Institute of Social Research, Professor Mahmood Mamdani, had been honored by both Addis Ababa University and the University of Johannesburg which conferred on him honorary doctorates. Included in this issue are full texts of the speeches of the three eminent professors delivered after the awards by New York State African Studies Association, and the University of Johannesburg, respectively. Mamdani's speech at Addis Ababa was published in the last issue of the Bulletin (pages 48-49).

Concluding this issue, as usual, are echoes of the activities of CODESRIA Programmes at the Secretariat during the second half of the year 2010.

*See Olukoshi, A., Ouedraogo, J.-B. & Sall, E., 2009, *Africa: Reaffirming our Commitment*, Dakar: CODESRIA.

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Innovation Africa

It is now ten years since the *Economist* newspaper declared Africa to be “the hopeless continent”. Today, the same magazine offers a different prognosis, building on the World Bank’s prediction of growth rates for sub-Saharan African economies that will be twice those of Europe. This is in the context of a severe and prolonged recession in North America and Europe and a growing realization that the epicentres of development are shifting eastwards, and southwards. Today, I will reflect on what this may mean for some aspects of a small part of innovation. The qualifiers are deliberate; predicting the future in our complex, interconnected world in hubris.

My case will be in three parts. First, that sustainable economic growth depends on myriad “innovation pathways”, rather than on discrete, spectacular events. Second, that there is nothing inherently ethical about innovation, economic growth or markets, and that beneficence comes from organizational context. Third, that the “Third Sector” has a key role – NGOs, civil society bodies, Trusts and the like that work in the space between the private sector and government.

One evocative instance of these shifting forces and opportunities is film and Manthia Diawara’s wonderful new book, *African Film: New Forms of Aesthetics and Politics*, published earlier this year. I read this in Manchester, thinking what to say in Dakar. Diawara, born in Mali, writes from New York, thinking what to say about African film in Berlin. The thread that runs through his essays is that world cinema – including African cinema – has been appropriated by Europe as a weapon in its cultural war with Hollywood. By valorizing African cinema, French producers (the particular focus of Diawara’s work) have continued to appropriate Africans’ creativity and imagination. Instead, Diawara wants recognition of the “value and specificity of African cinema in both contemporary and aesthetic terms, as well as in terms of the visions of the world from a continent that has been silenced for a long time”. He stresses “the value in Africans owning their own aesthetics and vision of the world in cinema ... a dialogue of equal partnership between

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North and South” (Diawara 2010:73). I will return to Diawara’s analysis of current trends in Africa’s film industry later.

Cinema leads into the question of economic growth and development in a second useful way. Film production, in common with other digital commodities and services, makes money from the marginal costs of reproduction and distribution. The main, and often very substantial, investment is upfront and the return lies in selling access to a catalogue of material that can be distributed very cheaply on DVDs (or, increasingly, on-line). This applies as much to aging Hollywood blockbusters, music and course materials for universities. The business model was perhaps best refined by the Disney Corporation, which polices its copyrights mercilessly, tracking down anyone who reproduces the ageless Mickey Mouse without payment of a royalty. Diawara’s critique is directed against a future for cinema in Africa in which old hits from the USA or Europe swamp out opportunities for African producers and directors.

Indeed, one strongly promoted vision for Africa’s post-hopeless era is exactly this – a vast sea of new consumers. This paradigm achieved wild popularity in books such as C.K. Prahalad’s *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid* (2004) and Stuart Hart’s *Capitalism at the Crossroads: the Unlimited Business Opportunities in Solving the World’s Most Difficult Problems* (2005). Prahalad, Hart and others noted that, by the turn of the millennium, large, often trans-national corporations appeared to have saturated their markets for products and services in Europe, North America and Japan. But a very large number of people – notionally, one billion – were outside established consumer markets. If companies could change their marketing strategies, they

could penetrate these new markets and safely navigate the “crossroads” that capitalism was seen to face.

Favourite examples were repackaging detergent into small amounts and harnessing large numbers of women entrepreneurs to sell the product across rural villages, opening up new markets for cellular phones, and developing new models for selling and financing building products. A matching enthusiasm for microcredit, best represented by Mohammed Yunus’ Grameen Bank, suggested ways in which these new consumers could be financed. And Diawara, despite his enthusiasm for the genre, shows how Nollywood movies play to these forms of consumerism: “One of the main goals of Nollywood is to make available, in the films, the entirety of consumer objects that the spectator desires. Thus, Nollywood enables Nigerians to enter the capitalist system of consumption and erases the difference between the West and Africa.”

Of course, Bottom-of-the-Pyramid enthusiasm was fostered by the prevailing belief that economic cycles were a thing of the past and that the new millennium would be characterized by endless growth – a dream shattered by the collapse of world financial markets in 2008. But perceptive critics pointed at the time to the basic unsoundness of a model that assumed that economic development could be driven by consumption alone. Aneel Karnani, for example, branded the Bottom of the Pyramid model as “a harmless illusion and potentially a dangerous delusion”. While the link between micro-packaged detergent and movies such as “Blood Diamonds” may be unusual, Karnani, Diawara and others show that one image of Africa’s post-hopeless future is of a massive, cut-price hypermarket that enables unprecedented volumes for sales of products and services.

This brings us to the question of innovation. In the Base-of-the-Pyramid world, innovation happened in the north. Africa was without hope because it was without the capacity to consume.

And what is innovation? It shares with many key concepts the paradox that once its importance is recognized, its meaning

seems to drain away. This is because valuable concepts are invariably over-used to the point that they become signifiers of nearly everything, and consequently of almost nothing. So, let's keep it straightforward: innovation is the process of turning ideas into useful outcomes. Innovation is a pathway, not an event. It includes big science – space travel, the human genome, digital technologies – and also small things such as paperclips and ballpoint pens. Far more often than not, sustainable innovation comes from the cumulative effects of implementing small scale, useful ideas over quite long periods of time.

The importance and potential of what we could perhaps call “incremental innovation” was evident in the first round of proposals to the newly-established Investment Climate and Business Environment Research Fund. It was both a privilege and a particular opportunity for me to be invited to take part in the award of the first set of grants when we met here in Dakar in January 2007. For, although numerous reports had been written about development and opportunity in Africa, there were, and are, remarkably few collections of case studies of what has happened, what works and what does not.

The ICBE project offered support for work that would improve opportunities for investment and business in Africa; in other words, that would advance conditions that enable and support the innovation that drives economic growth. Some 250 applications came in from a swathe of Francophone and Anglophone countries, clearly showing that this was something that a lot of people had been thinking about. Many of the projects could be mapped as clear “innovation pathways”.

For example, in both Benin and Nigeria, the poor quality of seed stock was identified as a critical limitation on the productivity of smallholdings in semi-urban areas. This was exacerbated by weak links between private sector importers and distributors and inadequate public sector infrastructure. In Uganda, the fisheries industry is booming, with inward investment over ten years up to 2005 estimated at \$10m and exports growing from 4,751 tons worth \$5.3m in 1991 to 36,600 tons (\$143m) in 2005. Fisheries exports now contribute about 12% of Uganda's GDP. About a million people are involved in fishing and fish processing but, despite the growth in the value of the industry

and government policies, most live at or below the poverty line. The research supported by the ICBE fund was for a close investigation of the full supply chain to identify why this successful export industry was not resulting in sustainable development. In Cameroon, electricity supply was privatized in 2001; the University of Yaoundé has been finding out whether this has been promoting economic development, as was intended. In Mali, Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal and Zambia, the UN's Rural Energy Enterprise Development initiative promotes and supports clean energy technology and services; the ICBE project has been finding out how this has benefited rural and peri-urban customers. These projects combine a focus on product innovation (new varieties of seed stock, fishing technologies, energy production) with a recognition of the significance of process innovation (marketing and distribution systems, supply chains, energy sales and distribution). A common theme is the need for innovative public policy that connects small-scale rural and peri-urban livelihoods with successful large businesses such as electricity supply, commercial farming and fish production and export.

The Ugandan fisheries case, however, serves to remind us that neither measures of economic growth such as Gross Domestic Product nor the concept and practices of innovation are inherently benign. For the *Economist* newspaper, the World Bank's prediction that sub-Saharan Africa's GDP will increase by 5.1% in 2011 (in contrast to Europe's 1.3%) signals a shift in the centre of economic gravity. But this does not in itself indicate sustainable, broad-based economic development, since all GDP as a measure does is to add up all products and services bought and sold, regardless of what they are. The success of commercial fish exports in Uganda is very good for the country's GDP but has previously brought little benefit to the million or so people working in fishing and processing. Famously, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted in extensive damage to Alaska's environment and local livelihoods, but contributed to an increase in the USA's GDP because of the expenditure on products and services to clean up the mess; this year's Deepwater Horizon disaster may well have the same effect.

Most books on innovation celebrate it as the key component in creativity and entrepreneurship. But, again, innovation is

not inherently beneficial. For example, fast food franchises have been highly innovative in developing cheap products that are high in carbohydrates and unsaturated fats and which are marketed through carefully researched and original campaigns. Their success has been widely imitated; an entrepreneurial take-away near where I live successfully offers battered and deep-fried chocolate bars. However, these successful business practices place a direct burden on public health systems and reduce life expectancy, requiring in turn effective innovation in health services. Criminals innovate. Auschwitz was a model of both product and process innovation.

It is not coincidental that the enthusiasm for Bottom-of-the-Pyramid approaches came at the zenith of the case against the role of the state. The argument – explicitly made – was that the state had failed across the developing world, and that its role should diminish in favour of multinational corporations competing for market share and to the benefit of the new “bottom billion” segment of consumers. This now seems very dated, but it is sobering that it was an orthodox view less than five years ago. And, of course, there is nothing benign about the market either. Following the 2008 banking crisis and the collapse in property markets, substantial amounts of speculative investment moved into commodities derivatives, including world food supplies. There is increasing evidence that this speculation contributed to sharp increases in food prices, with disastrous consequences in poorer countries. The World Development Movement estimates that, by 2008, speculators held long positions (which depend on price rises for their financial return) on 65% of the world's contracts for maize supply, 68% for soybean supply and 80% of the world's wheat production. As Jayati Ghosh, professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, puts it, “from about late 2006, a lot of financial firms – banks and hedge funds and others – realized that there was really no more profit to be made in US housing market, and they were looking for new avenues of investment. Commodities became one of the big ones – food, minerals, gold, oil. And so you had more and more of this financial activity entering these activities, and you find that the price then starts rising. And once, of course, the price starts rising a little bit, then it becomes more and more profitable for

others to enter. So, what was a trickle in late 2006 becomes a flood from early 2007” (quoted in “The Great Hunger Lottery”, World Development Movement, 2010).

Economic growth measures such as GDP, innovation processes and the market are, then, amoral in the true sense of the term; as concepts, they do not incorporate any specific ethical position or purpose. Any ethical direction that they do have is provided by their context. For example, a government may have a policy position that GDP should have broad and sustainable benefits (the position that the ICBE support project for the Uganda fishing industry sought to advance). Innovation pathways may be directed to a common good, such as improved seed stock for small scale farmers. Markets may be regulated to limit perverse outcomes, as the World Development Movement advocates for food supply derivatives.

Making this rather obvious distinction between instruments and their contexts directs attention to the role played by institutions and, in particular, what is now generally known as the Third Sector; organizations that work between, and interact with, the private and state sectors. For cinema in Africa, one such Third Sector is FESPACO – the Pan-African film festival held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. By using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus*, Diawara shows how film genres emerged and are shaped, here around the seminal influence of Ousmane Sembène. In the case of the ICBE Research Fund, the Third Sector organization is TrustAfrica, which is focused on securing the right conditions for democracy, developing African resources and fostering enterprise that will result in broadly shared prosperity. In turn, all ICBE supported projects, as is commonly the case, are grounded in universities, research institutes or similar organizations, which validate and situated the work through their own reputations, resources and governance structures. This network of interlinked organizations has a key role in ensuring the value of the outcomes of the innovation pathways that drive economic development.

The role of context in effective innovation is strikingly evident in the four-decade history of BRAC, one of the world’s largest and most effective Third Sector organizations. Founded in 1971 as the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (and renamed the next year as

the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), BRAC started work in Tanzania and Uganda in 2006, and then in Southern Sudan in 2007. This organization has set up microfinance, education and health programmes that support and enable innovation in agriculture, livestock and poultry production, and plans to work in up to fifteen sub-Saharan African countries. BRAC’s approach is to set in place the conditions necessary for effective innovation through education programmes that enable people to use microfinance effectively in adopting and pursuing innovation.

Long-term Bangladeshi cases have shown how innovation pathways can be built step-by-step, providing people with small but critical economic margins that enable further investment in development. Here, for example, is the twenty year track of cumulative actions that have enabled the growth of broad-based poultry and maize industries in Bangladesh. In working with the poorest village communities to find viable ways in which microfinance could be coupled with food production that would give small but consistent surpluses, it was clear that poultry production could be improved. From 1975 to 1978, experimentation with cross-bred chickens and imported high-yield eggs and chicks resulted in multiple failures due to local environments, disease and poor feed quality. Out of this first phase of consultation, research and reflection came a poultry farm for breeding stock appropriate to Bangladeshi needs and a vaccination programme to counter disease.

By 1979, BRAC had a small but comprehensive poultry industry in place, with a model farm, trainers, vaccines, stocks of hens, cocks and fertile eggs, and microfinance to enable expansion through networks of rural villages. But this first set of innovations led to further barriers. Poor, slow road systems resulted in damage to eggs and incubation failures. This was countered by training a network of specialist chick rearers and a dedicated transport network. As improved poultry production began to expand through networks of villages, though, available stocks of chicken feed proved inadequate. This impelled the next set of innovations: experimentation and development of new breeds of maize, the development commercial maize production, and the training and financing of feed merchants. By 1991, BRAC had trained and financed 95 feed merchants and 11,000 chick rearers

who supplied 750,000 high-yield chicks to 3,500 villages. They were supported by some 9,000 trained vaccinators, who vaccinated 12.6m chicks and mature birds in that year. Some fifteen years after its launch, more than 200,000 women were involved in the poultry programme, supported by US \$8m in microfinance.

BRAC has moved on again from this broad platform of engagement to establish a commercial maize and milling industry, which results in income that reduces dependency on international aid funding. What the story of poultry farming in Bangladesh shows is scores of ideas, experiments, failures and eventual successes over more than fifteen years. The germ of this innovation pathway lay in what people in the most economically marginalized villages already knew – that they couldn’t improve the yield of their existing resources within the constraints of their circumstances. And the role of the organization – in this case BRAC – in providing direction and what can be termed network benefits is crucial. The outcome of this innovation pathway is a viable market economy in eggs, poultry and maize, broad-based economic development and a significant contribution to Bangladesh’s headline GDP through commercial production. In many respects, ICBE-supported work in Uganda is seeking to reverse-engineer the fisheries industry to achieve development benefits similar to poultry farming in Bangladesh. We need more case studies such as these that reach beyond the quick and easy headlines and their assumption, to discern the deeper, longer-term conditions for success.

It has been a long and perhaps tenuous chain of association from film in Berlin and Ouagadougou to fisheries in Uganda and poultry farming in rural Bangladesh. What I hope I have shown is that effective innovation is often a long series of small advances that, together, constitute a pathway; that there is little real value in spectacular assertions, whether new paradigms such as the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid or summary dismissals of an entire continent by the *Economist*; and that purpose and direction, ethics, is provided by the context of organizations, whether the state or the Third Sector.

It is appropriate that Manthia Diawara’s examination of African cinema is framed as a travelogue, moving from New York to Burkina Faso, to Berlin, and from Ghana

by road to Nigeria. For Diawara, the key to the future of cinema in Africa is its struggle to break the West's monopoly "by stealing from Hollywood the star system, the dress style, the music, by remaking Western genre films, and by appropriating the digital video camera as an African storytelling instrument. Nollywood is, in a sense, a copy of a copy that has become original through the embrace of its spectators". The corollary of breaking existing monopolies over this and any other form of innovation will be to shatter the assumption of a unitary "Africa" that can be written off a decade ago with a single word – "hopeless" – and then rehabilitated ten years later with a single editorial reversal.

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Egyptian Nasserite Memories on African Liberation (1956 – 1975) A Personal Experience*

Introduction

The need for oral history as exemplified in personal narratives of the actual actors, in the history of Africa in particular, is obvious in view of the scarcity of authentic sources for that history. The same is true for social and cultural histories of societies in periods of social transformation. Thus, these personal narratives fill the many gaps that are sure to occur if we rely solely on official documents that may be biased by the interests and policies of the people in power. My own experience in Egyptian politics – and probably in others – shows that official history is often subjected to processes of deconstruction and reconstruction of the facts to suit the changing moods of the main actors in power, or those who follow them. Thus, the multiplicity of narratives may be a source of better control rather than cause for confusion as some may think.

The relations between Egypt and the rest of Africa after the 23rd July 1952 Revolution, are a model for the importance of

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oral history of those relations, whether in the fields of political and economic development or in the common struggle against foreign domination. The radical change of policy of the Sadat regime in 1971, immediately after the death of President Nasser, resulted in an obvious lack of adequate documentation of the Nasser regime and hence the need for the contributions of oral history. My present recollection in this area is a modest addition that needs to be complemented by contributions of other actors in this field, either from Egypt or the of Africa. Indeed, I have had the chance to record the memories of Mohammad Fayek, the assistant to President Nasser on African Affairs (2002). I also had a long interview with the late Kwame Nkrumah in Conakry (1970)

after he was ousted from power, and with former President Ben Bella in Bamako. Added to this is my direct personal relationship with a number of the leaders of African liberation movements that are mentioned in this article, or were referred to in my previous contributions.

The scope of this article will not allow a detailed expose of all the events that took place after the end of the Second World War that led to the involvement of Egypt of the Nasser Regime (1952–1970) in the process of national liberation. I believe this was prompted more by the course of events rather than by any prior belief that nationalist leader as expressed in his booklet: "Philosophy of the Revolution" published in 1955, where he mentioned three spheres of interest of Egypt's foreign policy.

After the end of World War II, the nationalist fervor in Egypt was very high, while at the same time there kept cropping up imperialist projects of alliances in the Middle East trying to include our countries in anti-Soviet blocs, and creating imperialist

military bases. Confronting the popular attempt to gain full independence from Britain, we were faced with the occupying British troops in the Suez Canal Zone, and the attempts to lure Egypt into the membership of the Baghdad, then the Cento pacts. We also had to face imperialist bases in Tripoli in Libya and Canio Station in Ethiopia, apart from direct colonial rule in Africa. At the same time, Sudan was nominally under joint Anglo-Egyptian rule but it was in fact a simple British colony. The new “revolutionary” regime had to face such a situation, so it allowed forms of resistance against British troops, while going into negotiations for the evacuation of those troops from both Egypt and the Sudan. However, it was careful to keep away from all imperialist military pacts in the region, not to become implicated in the cold war, taking into consideration that Israel was one of the foremost bases of imperialism in that war.

Joining Up

One may consider the effects of this atmosphere on a young man born in 1935, and joining Cairo University with his background of Wafdist and Muslim Brotherhood influences, and beginning his studies of philosophy and sociology in a leftist atmosphere at the university. Amid the wide nationalist propaganda of the Free Officers, he started frequenting the African Association in Zamalek in 1956 where he met young African students of Islamic Studies, many of whom had rallied to the popular defense of Egypt against the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression that year. That aggression was to punish Egypt for its nationalist spirit in the Arab world and Africa (including Algeria), and its insistence on getting rid of all occupation troops, and breaking the monopoly of the West for arms’ supply, and its nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

In long sessions of dialogue in 2002 with Fayek I got to learn of Nasser’s instructions during the Sudan negotiations with Britain in 1953, to deploy much effort against the British and American influence and to gain the support of the Peoples of Sudan’s neighbors in Ethiopia and East Africa after relinquishing the old slogan of Egypt-Sudan unity, under the Egyptian crown. At the time, the Egyptian Broadcasting System started its dedicated transmissions in Tigrean (for Ethiopia and Eritrea), and in Swahili (for East Africa). By the 1960s, these transmissions were extended to cover 30 African languages.

The central pole of attraction for those youth was the late Mohammad Abdel Aziz Ishak, the well known intellectual. They also met Mohammad Fayek who was keen to keep in touch with African youth, mostly Azhar students with a few from Cairo University. For me, this experience of getting acquainted with these youth, full of enthusiasm to go back to their respective countries to help in their liberation and development efforts, was very instructive and eye opening on a new world and cultures; needless to point out that their activities were much influenced by the fervor of the Nasserist media.

I have always pointed out that Nasser’s mention in his booklet “Philosophy of the Revolution” of the three spheres of interest in Egyptian politics (Arab, African and Islamic, in this order) did not indicate the real priority given to our relations with Africa. Indeed, in 1955, Nasser was exploring the Asian experience when he met in Bandung with the leaders of China, India and Indonesia (as well as Ethiopian and Ghanaian representatives).

Until that time, his interest in Africa was mainly concerned with securing the situation of the newly independent Sudan; and hence, he deemed it fit to support the independence efforts of the Nile basin countries: Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea and Congo. The regime had created the Tahrir Publishing House to publish its own newspapers: *Al Gomhouria* daily and the weekly *Al Tahrir Liberation*. In this latter, we read about American military bases, and the Kenyan revolution “Mau Mau” under Jomo Kenyatta. Between 1956 and 1958, there were many African and Asian developments that were followed by the Syrians asking for unity with Egypt and thus shifting our priority, once more, to the Arab sphere.

Thus, the interaction with the Nile countries and the rest of Africa came before this talk about the three circles of interest. It seems to me that this latter theory was the brain child of some petty bourgeois intellectuals who were obsessed with the role of Egypt and its influence in this or that region, while the feudal land owners considered the right of self determination for Sudan to be a huge surrender to British colonialism.

It was a period of rich experiences for Egypt and for a youthful student of Cairo University, who witnessed, among his newly acquired African friends (many of whom undertook military training with the

Egyptian National Guard) the defeat of the imperialist aggression of 1956. Soon after came the first “Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference” (December 1957/ January 1958) where scores of young delegates from African and Asian countries thronged the halls of Cairo University.

Together with my African friends, I accompanied many of those delegates and thus improved my previous superfluous information about their countries (despite my studies on sociology and anthropology). Such contacts prompted my increased interest in the African Association, and acceptance to contribute some modest articles to the new periodical “African Renaissance” about African journalism as well as African music and sculpture. This periodical (1957) was the best known about Africa at the time, and an issue in English soon followed to make it more accessible to a wider audience. At the time, I was also a researcher at the Egyptian Folklore Institute.

The period 1956 – 1960 was rich in nationalist fervor, both in Egypt and Africa where the struggle for independence was the first priority. Contacts with the socialist powers (The Soviet Union and China) were needed in the struggle against colonialism in its various manifestations. Thus, the Youth Festival in Tashkent saw many participants from African countries, but many of them were among the students in Cairo because of the obstacles put up by the colonial powers against travel to the Soviet Union. So, it was decided to hold the Afro-Asian Peoples Conference in Cairo, and it was attended by hundreds of young delegates, although many of them also came from countries of voluntary exile. Some of these extended their stay in Cairo, while many more left permanent representatives to found their offices, their best opening to the outer World. The rule was for the leader to hold a personal meeting with Nasser before leaving the country, and he would obtain Nasser’s instructions for founding that new office, and allotting time on the Broadcasting System. Some other members of the office would be posted at the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Thus, Zamalek was crowded with many black Africans such that we nicknamed it « The African Colony! » It became a refuge for revolutionaries and a venue for many students in Egypt, and even for Egyptian students and journalists, and sometimes some nationalist leaders such as Fathi

Radwan, Helmi Murad, friends of our delegate assassinated in Somalia Kamal Ed Dine Salah. Their presence introduced me also to Egyptian political life.

Involvement

Among the leaders received early by Nasser (1957/58) was Sheikh Ali Mohsen Al Berwani, the leader of the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) who pointed out his dilemma as a nationalist leader but was accused by the Africans as being an Arabist. Nasser rallied to his support by allotting a special guest house named "The East Africa House" to accommodate some forty students from all East African countries (including Zanzibar). I was appointed as supervisor of this group in 1958, after graduating from university. My background as a frequenter of the African Association must have been taken into account for this appointment. I spent two years in this job that were to prove very useful to my later work (1958/1960).

The declarations of self rule or independence came one after the other from the African French colonies that eventually led to their independence, while the Algerians kept up their armed struggle against France with full Egyptian support. It looked as if Egypt was getting back on France's part in the Suez aggression of 1956, but it was the natural reaction to its arrogant claim that Algeria was a province of France. The same attitude, with regard to Britain, meant that we support the struggle for independence by their colonies in Africa. Our support for the Somalis and Eritreans was easier to explain because of their strong Arab connections. This support was crowned by Nasser joining other leaders of the World in New York to promulgate the "Declaration of Decolonization of All Colonized Peoples", a declaration that we continued to celebrate for many years.

The peoples' opposition to French and British colonialism flared up by the end of 1958, such that within a few months we saw Felix Moumie the leader of "Union du Peuple du Cameroun (UPC) visit the African Association, followed immediately by Musazi the leader of the Ugandan National Congress (UNC) who left the brilliant John Kalekezi (Kaley) to manage their office in Cairo. Then came Oginga Odinga to start the office of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), followed by Oliver Tambo to open the office of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.

At the same time or a little earlier, came Wold Ab Wold Mariam who directed the Tigrean Broadcasting, followed by Adam Mohammad Adam and Sheikh Ibrahim Soltan the leaders of the Eritrean Liberation Front before they fired their first shot. They had come to present their demand for self determination for Eritrea to the United Nations. As for Haj Mohammad Hussein who belonged to the Ogaden (part of Ethiopia populated by ethnic Somalis), he led the Somalian LIGA that called for grouping all Somalis in Greater Somalia. He solicited Egypt's support for this cause in view of the assassination of Kamal Ed Dine Salah Egypt's representative in the Somali Council of Trustees. We also received Harbi and his comrades in Djibouti, Joshua Nkomo and his comrades in Southern Rhodesia, and Kenneth Kaunda and his comrades of UNIP from Northern Rhodesia. As a young man, I was really overworked by my duties in the East Africa House and the African Association with all these leaders to look after and help solve problems (appended at the end of this article is the list of the African Liberation Movements coordinated in Cairo).

The sources of information about the rest of Africa were very scarce in Egypt at the time, and Fayek, in his reminiscences, told me his only source of information in the fifties was John Gunther's book, *Inside Africa* and a few booklets in Arabic. Thus, I was happy when he instructed me to translate certain articles in some African newspapers he managed to subscribe to. So I could read papers from Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Rhodesia and Uganda (all of them not available in Egypt today!). I was also happy to lay hands on Lord Healy's book *Survey of Africa* (1958) that was later updated in Colin Legum's treaties in the 1960s. Afterwards, the Information Authority translated books by Kenyatta and Nkrumah among others. The Sudanese Studies Research Institute was also transformed to become the African Research Institute.

We had the feeling that Israel was trying hard to circumscribe Egypt's role in the Nile Basin and we countered this by deep solidarity with all liberation movements in the region. The close alliance between Israel and the racist segregation regime in South Africa was a clear warning to Egypt of the similarity between the settlers colonization systems in both Palestine and Southern Africa. This was a

lesson for me about the various systems of colonization.

At the time I was getting involved with the leftist trend in Egypt, and I knew from our friends in the African Association that most African Liberation Movements were also leftist. Thus, it was an unpleasant surprise when George Padmore visited Egypt as an advisor to President Nkrumah. This author of *Pan Africanism or Communism* whose anti-communist trends were very pronounced did not fit in the guise of advisor to Nkrumah who championed the liberation movement and the unity of all African peoples. Indeed, Padmore met with little welcome among the delegations in Egypt, especially as the Soviets and the Chinese had established friendly relations of cooperation with all these movements, and had their representatives in the secretariat of AAPSO in Cairo. I shall touch later on the problems caused by the competition between the Soviets and the Chinese over their support to the different liberation movements.

Later on, I understood why our government concentrated such great efforts on the liberation movements in Zamalek to stress the difference of the Egyptian support for these movements from that accorded by the communist states. However, my role in this direction was negatively assessed by those Egyptians who were aware of my leftist tendencies but that did not reduce my enthusiasm for the Nasserist leadership. I overcame this ambiguous feeling only after coming into close contact with David Dubois and his mother Shirley Dubois who explained the leftist content of the Nkrumah concepts. They had come to Egypt after the great Pan-Africanist William Dubois had passed away in Accra in 1963, and we read together the poem where that great man had celebrated the "Triumph of the Nile Pharaoh (Nasser) over the British Lion" in 1956. We also reviewed William Dubois' concept of African unity and his influence on President Nkrumah who considered him the father and teacher of all African nationalists. Strange to note that few African intellectuals give much attention nowadays to this internationalist Marxist thinker. I also noted how George Padmore tried to eradicate the influence of Dubois on Nkrumah, and even tried to sow discord between Nkrumah and Nasser over the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity by holding the All African Peoples Conference in Accra only one year after the AAPSO Conference in Cairo (1958).

I was surprised when the delegates returning from Accra told me of the non-violence policy announced in that conference, that Fanon had opposed. I decided to study the effect of Fanon's teachings in Africa and whether the presence of Asian citizens there had spread some of Gandhi's non-violence policies. Indeed, we were concerned in Egypt that some of Nkrumah's advisors may have made him believe that Nasser was competing with his policy of African unity in favor of Arab leadership. Such ideas were manifested by Padmore's concept of "Black Zionism" (when talking about the return of the American Blacks to Africa), and Kojo Botsio, Nkrumah's advisor disapproving the so-called Arab influence. Indeed, we always suspected in that atmosphere that any anti-Arab policies in Africa were the outcome of Israeli instigation.

Yet, we were all pleasantly surprised when President Nkrumah asked President Nasser to help him marry an Egyptian lady. As Fayek told me, this was done in a very friendly manner, and disproved all rumors about competition for influence between the two men. Indeed, we jokingly called this marriage a marriage of pan-Africanism with pan-Arabism! Later Mrs Dubois chose, in 1966, to stay in Cairo after the coup against Nkrumah, and I found her a nice flat overlooking the Nile that Dr Dubois had been fond of during his stay in Cairo in 1958. She was so happy with that flat and treated me as a close member of the family. Her son, David Dubois, lived in that flat until his death in 2006 when he bequeathed it to an Egyptian friend.

During the Nasser era, the political culture of liberation did not have the monopoly of the arena as some may believe, but the conservative cultures also flourished because of the depth of religious feelings among the people. The big changes Nasser applied to the scope of study at Azhar by introducing secular and scientific curricula did not alter significantly this situation, but on the contrary increased its role in the higher education system. Thus, the number of African students seeking education at AlAzhar in the mid-1960s exceeded twenty thousand. The non-Muslim African countries complained that their students could not easily follow studies in other branches of higher education, and Nasser decided to remedy this shortcoming by founding new institutes of higher education where

tuition was carried out in English and French.

Bureaucracy too was an obstacle for any insertion of the representatives of liberation movements into Egyptian society despite their acceptance by some responsible people. Indeed, the efforts of our Bureau of African Affairs were decisive in this direction, and it did not suffer from the internal political strife within other offices such as those concerned with Arab or Sudanese affairs. The different members of the Free Officers Movement sometimes competed for influence in such a way as to adversely affect the various spheres of activity. African affairs sometimes suffered when we had to solve some problems involving a myriad of centers of influence which included the centers in charge of foreign students (at Azhar or elsewhere), the Secretariat of AAPSO, the Federation of Labor, the Nasr Company for Export and Import, the Higher Islamic Council, the Parliament, the Socialist Union, the the President's assistants, etc. The young responsible that I was, would sometimes feel dizzy trying to unravel all such entangled connections. Even the African Affairs Bureau sometimes suffered from internal differences of opinion that needed a Presidential decision.

The above is some sort of auto-criticism of a period rich in movement where the objectives were always greater than the movement itself. This criticism was directed at the Egyptian system, but it also applied to many of the representatives of the African movements themselves. Indeed, few of them were ambitious enough to study the Egyptian society, or even raise their own political consciousness to make known their society in revolution against colonialism. Only a few, among them Archie Mafeje, John Kaley (Kalekezi) and Belesso were those with whom I managed to make rich intellectual dialogue. However, my personal and human relations were very fruitful with many of those leaders as my home was always a welcoming venue, and my wife and children were familiar with many of those friends. It seems to me that this lack of political culture among many of those cadres of the liberation movements may explain many of the setbacks that befell some of the countries liberated through the struggle led by well established movements. In many cases, internal ethnic or communal strife wasted much of the gains of independence and hampered development

efforts, such as to cause the perplexity of some observers such as Basil Davidson or Gerard Chaliand. Such reflections may need a detailed study well outside the scope of these memories, and may explain the preponderance of the military over political action during the liberation struggle.

We could assess the effectiveness of a particular liberation movement by the activity of its office in Cairo and the effectiveness of its representation. Thus, Moumie, the president of the UPC of Cameroun headed in person their office in Cairo, and he was a well known opponent of the French colonial policies, such that his assassination was obviously imputed to the French Secret Service. John Kaley (Kalekezi) was the deputy president of the Uganda Congress Party, and Robin Kamanga was elected as deputy president of the Zambia Independence Party while resident in Cairo. Similarly, Alfred Nzo was elected Secretary General of the ANC while resident in Cairo, and later appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mandela's administration after apartheid. Also, Mokhehle, the president of Basoto Congress Party and its representative Shakila were often seen in Cairo, then their party won a great majority and they were recalled to form government. These close political – and personal – relations with accredited leaders of their countries were a cause for pride to all of us in the African Affairs Bureau, and to me in particular.

All these leaders occupied modest offices at the African Association, but they were all a model of activity and vitality. The financial help given to such powerful parties in their respective countries was generally modest. (I remember that Kaunda was given only 25,000 dollars to carry out a country-wide election campaign in Zambia). Other cases were not so brilliant, e.g. Nquqo the leader of the Swaziland Congress was a frequent visitor to Cairo, and was vocal in his denunciation of British imperialism and the king in his country, but his party did not win one seat in parliament. In answer, he held a press conference where he claimed that he was the strongest opponent of colonialism and as such was ferociously opposed by the colonialists and their lackeys!

As for the defeat of Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPO Party by ZANU Party led by Sithole and Mugabe, we find it hard to explain unless it is related to tribal loyalties, an explanation I find very unpleasant.

The concept of National Liberation at that moment immediately after independence still needs some deep thought. Indeed, I never attended any real debate during those two decades (1955–1975) about the real content of Fanonism, Guevarism, or even Nasserism or Nkrumism that were coined rather lately. We were all the time taken up by the day-to-day events and the progress of this insurgency or revolt in this colony or the other, but we never had the leisure to debate the theoretical or social content in a methodical fashion. We might have discussed the actions of the different leaders and the rivalries or cooperation that affected their action, or invoked the memories of Fanon or Guevara as nationalist leaders to be emulated, but we never debated their political or social thought in order to follow their example or otherwise. We shall discuss the Sino-Soviet differences and their negative effects on the liberation movements later.

Thus, the armed struggle as the sole means for political liberation, and the rivalries that sometimes led to fratricidal strife in pursuit of supremacy after independence was the salient facet of the picture. However, there were exceptions where some leaders had enough social and class consciousness as in the case of South Africa, and the thinking of Amilcar Cabral and a few other leaders. Indeed, it is hard to expect that the concepts of the necessary social transformations not developed during the period of national unity, during the liberation struggle, can be addressed seriously during the less exacting situations after independence. I recall that when I met Nkrumah in Conakry on 20/12/1970 after his ouster, he explained at length his views about such matters in retrospect, and about which he wrote in his book: *The Class Struggle in Africa*. He gave me a copy of that valuable book explaining the state of classes and the role of intellectuals, and even the conditions for a successful guerilla warfare in Africa and the social background for such success.

Getting into the Framework

The year 1960 was of crucial importance to the National Liberation of Africa, not only because the “Declaration of Independence of All Colonized Peoples” was adopted by the United Nations on the 14th of December, but also because it was the year in which much was achieved by way of clarifying the difference between the

concepts of formal independence and real national liberation.

In 1960, the Algerian revolution was advancing despite the fierce repression of the French colonialists after their recent defeat in Vietnam. The Algerians had created their government in exile, and that government had a strong representation in Egypt, and was recognized by Nasser as a legitimate government of an independent country. Before that, France had maintained that Algeria was simply a province of France, and tried to gain as many votes as possible in the UN to corroborate its claim. Then, all of a sudden, it “granted independence” to ten French colonies in Africa, hoping to muster their votes in the General Assembly, together with some other British colonies granted independence that year. All these newly independent African countries had to decide their position towards the French claim about Algeria, but only a few of them rallied to the strong stand of Egypt that year, despite the fact that world public opinion was slowly accepting the principle of independence for Algeria.

France had taken a violent attitude towards Guinea two years earlier when Sekou Toure rejected the constitution proposed by France and unilaterally declared his country’s independence. I now recall the great impact of the articles published by Ahmed Baha Ed Dine on his return from the celebrations of Guinea’s independence that year. Sekou Toure was a trade union leader, and his clear understanding of colonialism as system of exploitation and class struggle was an eye opener for our generation on the essence of liberation from colonialism. This differed greatly from our attitude towards “Mau-Mau” resistance of the Kikuyu in Kenya, under Kenyatta, which bore a folkloric guise.

The national liberation countries were limited to three: Ghana, Guinea and Mali in sub-Sahara Africa, and the Algerian Government in exile and Egypt in the Maghreb, together called the Casablanca Group. This small group took a distinctive attitude in supporting the popular regime of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo against the imperialist supported Kasavubu and Moise Tchombe. I remember the workers and students’ demonstrations in Cairo against the Belgian Embassy. The name of Tchombe was considered an insult in Egypt at the time, while Lumumba had the same esteem as Ben

Bella and his comrades after their abduction by France.

I must stress here that Egypt’s role in this liberation struggle was not just some fiery speeches of the type common in the Arab world, but a serious sense of national responsibility that led to the mobilization of the military forces during the Congolese crisis, and the involvement of Egyptian diplomatic personnel. I remember how Mohammad Abdel Aziz Ishak accompanied Lumumba’s widow and children who were smuggled out of Congo by our diplomatic staff after his assassination by Mobutu and Tchombe in defiance of world public opinion. They were given the full support of the President, and I was detached to arrange for their accommodation in Cairo, and proper schooling for the children. Nasser always cited the example of the Congo to stress Egypt’s commitment of support to all liberation struggles on the continent and to make sacrifices if necessary, and the Casablanca group mentioned above supported his position. This was the main topic among the Egyptian public opinion that made fun of Tchombe being “sequestered” in the Republican Palace when he came to attend the African Unity Summit in 1964. I found a comparison for this nationalistic position of the Egyptian public opinion of those years with the public craze about the football “Mondial” in the years 2009/10!

Here, I must show the parallel between the struggle of Lumumba and his comrades in defense of the mineral riches of their country coveted by imperialism, and the defense of the Egyptian people of their Suez Canal, also coveted by the same imperialism. Indeed, the picture of the assassinated Lumumba and his family as refugees in Egypt had an impact on our public opinion far in excess of any enthusiastic speeches.

The Congolese crisis led to a situation where the newly independent African States fell into two clear cut camps: the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group. The first took its name from the meeting held in that city in January 1961 when it was decided to support the legitimate government of Lumumba, even by military action; by sending armed forces. The second grouped made up of mostly new francophone states but took its name from an old conservative states: (OCAM) in Liberia. The Casablanca Group had a special significance for our generation as

it included the Arab North Africa with various progressive countries both Francophone and Anglophone. It also had the revolutionaries Nasser and Ben Bella with the nationalist King Mohammad V, and favored the policies of revolutionary struggle advocated by Fanon, and where President Nkrumah advanced his old policy of "Positive Action". Indeed, I was told that when Fanon attended the first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Accra in 1958, he was offended when he saw the slogans containing quotations by Nkrumah extolling positive action and non-violence and insisted they be removed.

At the time, we were impressed by reading the Arabic translation of Fanon's books, and thrilled by the revolt of the Angolan political prisoners on a Portuguese ship. We were also dismayed by the abduction by France of the Algerian leaders, but happy for the liberation of Kenyatta, the leader of Kenya.

I had the privilege of attending the Uhuru celebrations of Tanganyika's independence on 9/12/1961 (and later attended the celebration of Kenya and Zanzibar's independence in January 1963). On such occasions I would wonder at the significance of the independence of this or that country for the peoples of the continent, or the role of this or that leader. At the time, Julius Nyerere was intent on the Union of East Africa only, while President Nkrumah was campaigning for the United States of Africa, and Tanganyika was somewhat worried by his support for the various liberation movements, many of which were neighbors to Dar es Salaam. President Nyerere was also worried about Nasser's influence on Zanzibar and the Arabs of East Africa. Thus, we were not very happy in Cairo with his policies until the social changes of Tanzania and the Arusha Declaration in 1966.

The representatives of most liberation movements were unhappy about the policies of Nyerere that did not seem revolutionary enough and in opposition to Nkrumah's call for African Unity. I was acquainted with Abdel Rahman Babu, the progressive from Zanzibar who maintained the necessity for change, and also with Ali Mohsen who was accused of being an advocate of Arabism there. I was not surprised when Babu, with Salim Ahmed Salim, led a secession in the Nationalist Party that led to the bloody events on that island. I was dismayed by

those events as I had personally known the families of the forty Zanzibari students in the East Africa House. I recall meeting Babu in a café in Dar es Salam in 1964 and he was frustrated after being ousted by the new regime in Zanzibar, and expected little good from Dar es Salam, such that he chose self exile in Britain as an internationalist who wrote about socialism in Africa.

I must admit how I was thrilled when witnessing the British flag being brought down to be replaced by that of Kenya or Tanganyika and thought it was a huge step forward, surely to be followed by other social advances. However, I soon found Nyerere's policies to be not so progressive and in collision with Nkrumah's policy of United Africa.

The leaders of the Casablanca Group were also frustrated because of their failure in the events of Congo and the triumph of Tchombe and Mobutu and the fleeing of Gizinga and his colleagues to eastern Congo. Finally, Nkrumah accepted a compromise policy to succeed in gathering both progressive and moderate leaders, and with Nasser called for a summit in Addis Ababa where they declared the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Thus, 25th May 1963 was celebrated as the birth of African Unity that concentrates political efforts against imperialism while putting off any social progress to a later stage.

In Egypt, we had to face the problem of countering the role of Israel as an imperialist agent in Africa, and in the face of the support it got from the former colonial states. We were pained in particular by the relation of Israel with Ghana of Nkrumah, while Israel boasted of relations with Ethiopia and Tanzania as well. Israel at the time, tried to present itself as a developing country, while the statements of the Afro-Asian conferences as well as the Casablanca Group exposed it as an advanced base of "new colonialism".

At the OAU conference, Nasser declared that he would not ask the African leaders present to state their standpoint against Israel, but asked them to find out for themselves its reality as an agent of imperialism. He succeeded in leading the conference to a moderate policy and struck the correct balance between Nkrumah and Nyerere, on the one hand, and Cote d'Ivoire as three distinct trends in the meeting. Thus, Nasser and Emperor

Haile Selassie assumed the role of the Big Brother to all their colleagues.

Many were those who came to Cairo after the conference, asking for support, especially as Cairo was chosen as the venue for the next meeting in May 1964, supposed to be the first summit of the OAU. As a token of the organization's role in liquidating colonialism, the "Coordination Committee for Liberation of the Colonies" was created. Thus, Cairo took a position on the leaders of Ghana and Tanzania, as well as on Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, competing among the OCAM Group of francophone countries. The tendency among the participants was to liquidate all regional groupings and the Casablanca Group did so while the OCAM Group continued as such.

Those were glorious days for African activity in Cairo where Egyptian media showed great interest in the activities of the liberation movement's offices in Zamalek. Liberation activity including armed struggle was acclaimed by everybody without fear of talk about "intervention". A positive factor in this connection was the anecdote of sequestering Tchombe in one of Cairo's presidential palaces with the group of Belgian Belles who accompanied him to prevent him from attending the OAU Conference of 1964, which caused much fun for the public in Cairo, and compromised the francophone group that arranged for his uninvited visit to Cairo.

The new liberation movements kept coming to Cairo, especially from the Portuguese colonies, looking for support which they readily got from Nasser, and I watched their happiness after such audiences. Indeed, Fayek and our group of his assistants did a good job in accommodating some twenty such offices. The big number was partly due to receiving more than one delegation from one country, and this was my personal dilemma as I had to coordinate their demands such as to render them acceptable to Fayek's Presidential Bureau. Those demands included scholarships for students, military training, allotted time for broadcasting, etc. I was sometimes torn up by my happiness that Cairo was helpful to these young revolutionaries and having to decide who were worthy of that help and who were not, who were "authentic" and who were not. The legitimacy of different levels of liberation struggle was a good reason for such variety, and Cairo was one of the few capitals to accept this

diversity. I eventually, in good time, got to understand the deep reasons for such an attitude.

At times, there were three movements from one country such as the case of South Africa and Angola. Sometimes, we accepted movements that were the outcome of a secession from another, as in the case of ZAPO and ZANU, or SWAPO and SWANU, or even movements that had no weight at all such as COREMU in Mozambique. Thus, some movements would group together as authentic, such as ZAPO, PAIGE, FRELIMO, SWAPO, MPLA and ANC. The others could not meet as authentic, and we labeled them pro-China! There was a real “cold war” waged at the African Association where the socialist states were competing for adherence to the different movements in a manner more open than that between the respective embassies.

This cold war would become quite hot when the AAPSO conferences were held, the Soviets would provide air tickets and accommodation for everybody at the conference held in a friendly city. In such cases, the friends of the Soviets seemed to be in a strong position and posed as the only “authentic”.

Such situations were somewhat embarrassing to me. I was a reader of Fanon and Mao Ze Tung and Lin Piao’s article on the center and the peripheries where the countryside rejects the influence of the cities. In this context, the countryside stands for China and the Third World, and the cities stand for the Western bourgeoisies and the imperialist socialists who emulated them!

To a “Fanonist”, this was an attractive representation, but the pro-China group in Cairo presented little thought of value, and had little to boast of in the way of active struggle at home. On the other hand, the discussions with the authentic group were always deep and reflected clear cut concepts, and concrete political and diplomatic action. Also, the leftist movement in Egypt had not given much attention to the Chinese Revolution and its Asiatic neighbors, and the Cultural Revolution and the Red Book were rather scorned. The Nasser regime and most Egyptian intellectuals accepted the Soviet concepts, including the non-capitalist road to development, the democratic revolutionaries and the countries on the road to liberation. All such concepts were welcomed by the Nasser regime and other

leaders of the Third World, but rather frustrating to any radical trends, and to radical youth, including myself.

The Sino-Soviet conflict was not the only cause for our concern in Cairo during the 1960s, as the Maoist Group soon began to lose ground as they failed to consolidate their organizations. They looked like a group of unruly persons whose main task was to oppose their competitors in the authentic group, in the public meetings, while they showed no progress in their respective fields of struggle. On the other hand, the influence of the “authentics” was on the rise as their liberation struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, and this gave them better ground to counter those “Maoists”.

I recall that President Agostinho Neto of Angola would not accept my invitation to the premises of the African Association because UNITA and GRAI had offices there, and he had his office and the lodging of his men outside that building. This position seemed more significant when he insisted on not signing the cease fire agreement with Portugal in Lisbon but at the point of the struggle in Angola. President Sam Nujoma was more tolerant as he was bolstered by a UN resolution in favor of SWAPO, and the UN Namibia Institute in Lusaka gave him moral support, such that the competing SWANU was soon liquidated as its leaders were not worthy of respect.

It seemed to me that there was some sort of competition between Cairo and Algiers over our relations with liberation movements. Cairo seemed more intent on national liberation policies in general, and providing diplomatic contacts and media coverage. Algeria, on the other hand, was more intent on military training and providing arms for the armed struggle through the Committee for the Liberation of Colonies.

I asked Ben Bella about this in Bamako in 2003, and he confirmed that there had been a sort of gentleman’s agreement with President Nasser over a difference in the role played by each country.

I felt that creating the OAU had set aside the liberation activity to the benefit of the ruling bureaucracies, some of which were openly despotic. This was noticed in many cases, such as Ethiopia’s position towards Eritrea, or in the conflicts in Somalia and the Comoros. As regards France’s treatment of its former colonies,

we reduced our former level of criticism as a token of our regard for Gaullist France. Indeed, we gave a warm welcome to Senghor in 1966, while neglecting the progressive Cheikh Anta Diop who extolled the ancient Egyptian civilization in his book. Indeed, I did not fully accept Senghor’s claims except after naming Dakar University after Diop, to whom I extended my apologies when I met him in the early 1980s in his laboratory at Dakar University. Zambia was oscillating between the role of a confrontation state, and some sort of acceptance of the racist regimes southern Africa, while Egypt respected Kaunda’s nationalism and considered his dilemma with the racist South that seemed somewhat similar to our dilemma with Israel. Thus, Cairo welcomed Kaunda warmly and omitted taking issue with him as Ghana did, despite the decline of its influence in the OAU embraced by Haile Selassie, and the Committee for the Liberation of Colonies embraced by Nyerere. The liberation movements responded to Cairo’s moderation by deepening their direct ties with the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries. This policy of moderation was strengthened by the series of military coups that took place in the Congo, then Ghana, and some other Francophone countries.

The moderate national regimes were weakened by this succession of setbacks during the 1960s, while the liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies was getting tougher under leaders such as Amilcar Cabral, Neto and Eduardo Mondlane who got active support from socialist countries. I recall that the late great leader Cabral told me in Accra (January 1973), only two weeks before his assassination, that they were at the point of getting anti-aircraft guns from the Soviets, and that would send a message to the Atlantic powers that Bissau would thus become a new Vietnam. I remembered this when only a short time later, these powers decided to get rid of the Salazar Regime, when Spínola took over in a coup and decided to start negotiations with their colonies in the mid-1970s.

Sam Nujoma took advantage of this change and took a tougher stand towards the UN and consolidated his ties with Angola to provide his guerillas with arms. He was also strengthened by the presence of Cuban forces in the region, but he complained to me that the authorities in Angola sometimes treated him with some reservation, as they suspected that he had some contacts with UNITA. When

I met President Neto during the independence anniversary in 1976, he explained to me much of the machinations of the racist regime in South Africa and their trying to sow differences between the nationalist forces in the southern Africa whose only support came from the socialist countries. Indeed, even the Soviets were not so forthcoming in their aid and had to be urged by threats to shift to the Chinese for help to make good their deficiency!

The 1970s were very frustrating, both for my personal duties and for my feelings towards Egypt's position, with regard to supporting liberation movements. At the time Sadat went hand-in-hand with the Americans in confronting what he called the communist influence in Africa, he stigmatized the Cuban presence in countries such as Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.

All progressive forces in Egypt and most national liberation countries faced an impasse, and we would recall the atmosphere of the 1960s that we used to criticize as moderate! In those days, the liberation movements in the progressive countries were supported by popular forces, but the successive military coups changed the situation. The popular bases included the trade unionists in Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania, Sudan and Kenya. At times, there was competition that obstructed the smooth cooperation between Ahmed Fahim in Egypt, Al Sediky in Maghreb, Tettegah in Accra, Kambona in Dar es Salaam and Shafii in Sudan against the moderates such as Mboya in Kenya, Aashour in Tunis and others. The first group would ask the leader for help to liberation movements, and sometimes other forces, such as the students in Dar es Salam University campus or the October Revolution intellectuals in Sudan, but it was always the leader who took the decision. After the successive coups and the transformations of the 1970s, these popular forces lost their influence.

To illustrate the contrast between the two situations, let us compare the reaction to the colonial action in Rhodesia in 1965, and the position towards the racist regime in South Africa in the late 1970s. I recall that when we heard about the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia in November 1965, Egypt was intent on socialist transformation, Ghana was actively developing by building the Volta Dam, in Tanzania there was the euphoria of the Committee for the Libera-

tion of Colonies, and we all considered UDI as a serious challenge to the liberation of the colonies.

I recall that, in my position as a researcher in an important institution, I received urgent instructions to gather all pertinent information about the event, and in particular the role of Britain as protector and instigator. The same day, I felt similar fervor in the President's Bureau and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the next day a memorandum prepared by Mohammad Fayek on the President's instructions, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explore with Ghana, Algeria, the Casablanca Group and others the possibility of freezing political relations with Britain as being responsible for its colony, Rhodesia. It was thought that the new independent state would bolster a similar type of colonization of Palestine by foreign settlers, and that at a time of the rise of nationalist resistance in Palestine at the hands of the PLO and support from the Arab liberation countries (Egypt, Syria and Algeria), a strong and effective action will surely be taken within days.

Indeed, certain agreement was reached and, within two weeks, Britain found its relations with eleven African countries severed. That action was the cause for great celebration at the African Association for all representatives of the liberation movements. It was also remarked by diplomatic observers who noted that at the time when Britain was actively attacking the nationalist activists in Aden, and Egypt's armed forces engaged supporting the republic in Yemen, Egypt did not take such a step.

Indeed, I felt the deep contrast between such reactions and the very limited reaction of the African states at the General Assembly of the UN when trying to pass a strong resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian and Arab occupied territories after the Israeli aggression of 1967, and Guinea was the only African country to sever its relations with Israel. Of course, there was much American pressure on these African countries, but no doubt the main reason for such behavior was the attitudes of the new regimes towards the liberation movement. This was a cause of great shame to us of the African Affair after all the support given to the liberation movement, that seemed to us as a lost cause to crown our failure to eradicate colonialism.

I remember that Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war with Israel came as the high point in the series of military coups in Africa that included Ghana, Mali, Uganda, Congo and some francophone countries and seemed to seal the demise of the national liberation movements on the continent, and the end of the Committee for the Liberation of Colonies. I felt miserable when meeting our Egyptian nationalist forces insisting on fighting a popular war till the full liberation of Egyptian territories. Our only solace was to repeat the slogan coined by some leaders of the Portuguese colonies: *A Lutta Continua, Victoria Certe* (The Struggle Continue, and Victory is Certain).

However, the armed struggle was progressing, especially in the Portuguese colonies, and eventually the Polisario Movement started in the Spanish colony of the Rio de Oro in the western desert of North Africa. At the same time, the Palestinians started some forms of liberation struggle, including armed resistance, and these advances gave us new hope. I recall that the discourse around democracy and social transformations in these struggling colonies was reminiscent of our discourse about the democratization of the Nasser Regime. I would discuss with leftist friends, with a sense of pride as a protagonist of the African liberation movements, about the continuing national struggle, or defend Soviet-Egyptian cooperation. Some of these friends would argue that Nasser was unrealistic in trying to go back to war with such a defeated army, but it was those same efforts that resulted in the successful war of 1973. It seems to me that Nasser at last understood the necessity of democratic freedoms as a basis for effective defense of the homeland, and he tried to remedy some shortcomings of his regime by appointing some leftist cadres at the head of some media institutions, and gave more latitude to democratic and leftist trends in theatre, the cinema and some publications. This meant a more balanced attitude both in the internal situation and the military position as well.

Soon, the armed struggle in the colonies began to show positive results with active support from the Committee for the Liberation of Colonies, and we began to hear of "liberated territories", and I felt great happiness on meeting some African activists who had visited these liberated territories. I was happy when I was nominated as Egypt's representative on that

committee, but “somebody” intervened to block that nomination. I hoped this participation would give me the chance to visit some of these liberated territories, and that was eventually fulfilled when I visited some liberated areas in Eritrea in the company of some Eritrean revolutionaries in the late 1970s.

I recall that we, the nationalist youth, were frustrated by our defeat in the 1967 war by Israel, while we got some relief from the presence of many delegations that came to Cairo from many liberation movements including Palestine, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique and even Vietnam. The slogan coined by Nasser said: “What was taken by force can only be retrieved by force” had an encouraging significance, and it meant strengthening the ties with the Soviet Union, as China was largely preoccupied with the consequences of the Cultural Revolution.

I could not overlook the fact that some liberation forces were not completely routed as was generally thought. I thought the explanation was that such countries had some nearby focus of armed liberation struggle, what I called a supporting “Hanoi”. Of course, this did not mean the same staunchness as exhibited by the Vietnamese, for after all, Vietnam had China and the USSR supporting it. Such cases of support from adjacent revolutions showed in the case of Guinea adjacent to Guinea Bissau, and Tanzania neighbor of Mozambique, or Congo Brazaville (or even the revolutionaries in Congo-Kinshasa) near Angola. It seemed the social relations as the basis of armed struggle had a positive effect on the social relations in their independent neighbor being more progressive.

I must state here that we sometimes overestimated the social progress in the liberated territories, and the possibility that such transformations would make a solid base for the regime after independence. I had little theoretical knowledge at the time, except my readings of Cabral and cultural liberation, but I also heard some negative information about what took place in Mozambique, or in South Africa despite the high theoretical background of the revolutionaries there.

In Egypt, we were dismayed by the rejection by the Nasser regime of the idea of the popular resistance to the benefit of the regular army fighting to regain our lost territories. This meant relying on the Soviets supplying Egypt with advanced

weapons, but this retained the supremacy of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie instead of developing the social action of the popular masses. However, Nasser’s personal leadership compensated for the great shortcomings arising from his compromises with the religious trends on one hand and the military hierarchy on the other hand.

A sudden end was put to this debate in the cultural and democratic circles by the sudden death of Gamal Abdel Nasser on 28th September 1970. His successor, Anwar Sadat, made a complete turn around of all Nasser’s policies under the slogan that 99 per cent of the playing cards were held by the United States.

After relying on the Soviets to supply the advanced weapons that eventually helped secure the 1973 victory over Israel, he sent back the Soviet military mission that was training our soldiers on the use of such weapons; he used the limited success of this war to prepare the ground for a peace agreement with Israel; he even threatened to wage war against the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia with the pretext that it threatened the supply of the Nile water; he supported Mobutu against the revolutionaries in eastern Congo; he supported UNITA and Savimbi in Angola; he imported tobacco from the UDI regime in Southern Rhodesia; finally he replaced the Nasser planned development economy by an open capitalist liberal policy. All these policies were the exact opposite of the policies adopted by the previous Nasser regime.

The Bureau of African Affairs of the Presidency was dissolved after the arrest of its leader, Mohammad Fayek, and sentencing him to ten years imprisonment for allegedly plotting against Sadat. All members of the bureau were scattered across various government departments. After the 1973 war, I was put on pension (after only 15 years of service) in a move to get rid of all Nasserists and Marxists from office!

After 1975, I embarked on a personal tour of the realm of culture that took me successively to the Committee for the Defense of National Culture, the African Association of Political Sciences, the Council for Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), teaching at Juba University in southern Sudan, the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) in Tunis and, lastly, founding the Arab and African Research Center (AARC) in Cairo in 1987.

Note

* This preliminary study of the role of Nasser’s Egypt in the process of African Liberation stems from the author’s personal experience when he was attached to the Bureau of African Affairs of the Presidency (Nasser’s) at a crucial period (1956–1975). His duties included the coordination of the offices of the various liberation movements that proliferated in Cairo during that period, and acting as liaison officer between them and the state and other public institutions. The man in charge of African Affairs from 23rd July 1952 was the Assistant to the President, Mohammad Fayek until he was imprisoned by President Sadat in 1971. After that, the support for liberation movements went on the decline until Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1975.

Annex

Cairo Offices of African Liberation Movements

1. African National Congress (ANC), South Africa
2. Basoto People’s Congress (BPC), Lesotho
3. Djibouti Liberation Movement (DLM), Djibouti
4. Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Eritrea
5. Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Eritrea
6. Etudiants de Tchad (ET) Tchad
7. Front do Liberacion do Mozambique (FRELIMO), Mozambique
8. Governamento do Angola Independente (GRAI), Angola
9. Kenya African National Union (KANU), Kenya
10. League for Liberation of Somalia (LIGA), Somalia
11. Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC), Congo
12. Movimento Popular do Liberacion do Angola (MPLA), Angola
13. Parti Africaine do Independance do Guinee, Capo Verde (PAIGC), Guinee and Cape Verde
14. Swaziland Peoples Party (SPP), Swaziland
15. South West Africa National Union (SWANU), Namibia
16. South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), Namibia
17. Uganda National Congress (UNC), Uganda
18. Union do Independente Angola (UNITA), Angola
19. United Northern Rhodesia Independence Party (UNRIP), Zambia
20. Zanzibar National Union (ZNU), Zanzibar
21. Zimbabwe African People’s Organization (ZAPO), Zimbabwe
22. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Zimbabwe
23. Arab Maghreb Office, Maghreb
24. Provisional Algerian Government, Algeria

N.B.

The last two offices were not affiliated to the African Association.

Algeria: November, or the Principle of Hope (On the Algerian Liberation Struggle)

On 1st November, 1954, the Algerian national liberation movement got into the phase of armed struggle. A series of bombings in major cities across the country triggered what would become the longest and deadliest war of liberation in the continent. But this passage also marked an unprecedented “break” in history that has become the “tradition” of modern colonization: it injected into the consciences of the indigenous populations of Algeria and Africa, burdened by two centuries of European domination, a scheme perception of new the historical time. History was no longer a fate burdened by the past of defeats and closed to the future, but a collective construction of the future, even though it sometimes required the use of violence and sacrifice. This movement was initiated in the thirties by the Algerian People’s Party (PPA) then led by the charismatic Messali Hadj. For more than twenty years, he had been committed to the “political”, legal and peaceful claim for equality of all citizens first, then independence. For such a break, he was cornered by the vicious and arrogant refusal of the colonists in Algeria and the metropolitan State in France and their blindness vis-à-vis the future. These were in the rear of historical time, preserving and safeguarding the established privileges of the colonial conquest when the initiators of 1st November had turned their eyes toward the future to escape the “asthenizing” weightiness of the past. This turnaround look by the temerity of the first group, the FLN, will then be gradually adopted by the large majority of the indigenous population. It became “a people” while it engaged in the new historical dynamics, that of liberation. It is this infinite dose of energy than 1st November, 1954 set in motion and it managed to achieve this transformation by substituting the fate of the dominated for the hope and optimism of the rebels’ will.

Writing these words, I am thinking of the sinister concept of “Afro-pessimism” created a few years ago to remove “the pes-

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simism of the intellect”, carried by theoretical research, from the “optimism of the will”, without which it would sink into resentment, guilt and the determinism of accumulated failures, and without which it would especially close its perspective to what “may” happen, to time then, as history and not as fatality. And I think of Francis Fanon, this man from afar geographically, the Caribbean, but from so close given his condition as a dominated, and who managed to give to this political reversal conducted by 1st November, the theory it needed. The *Wretched of the Earth* remains one of the philosophical underpinnings of the revolution taking place, but also of the revolutions to come.

This text was written for Algerian readers on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the war of liberation in response to the pervading “Algerian-pessimism”, a local form of the work of despair that affects many African intellectuals.

November or the Principle of Hope

It was on 1st November, 2009. I was 8 years old when it began, now I am 63. I was in Skikda, today I’m in Nantes. Here, it is raining like in the song of Barbara. From the window of my office overlooking La Loire, the rain is pouring down in rustling droplets on misted-up window panes. It makes a background like a choir and a veil, on the voice of Fairouz coming out of the computer. She is singing Kifak Anta.

In the city, almost everything is closed. People are in cemeteries to honor the memories of their deceased folks. “Here”, in France, 1st November is the day of the “dead”, All Saints’ Day. But “there” in Algeria, it must be beautiful, sunny, warm,

a different memory, that of the birth of hope that will take over seven years and claim hundreds of thousands of deaths later, not to subside, because a hope that subsides dies, but to embody the immense and Homeric joy of July 62.

Well, I read the Algerian press on the Internet this morning. Guess what, I found no trace of this hope. Has 1st November become by mimicry a day for the dead, a local “All Saints’ Day”. Hence these remarks, “my” untimely remarks that El Watan’s editorial staff will enable me to publish in my column.

Officials, the first as always, monopolize the event and as ever and everywhere, in every 1st November of each country, they weigh it down with protocols, rhetoric, “chrysanthemums” and end up erasing in the boredom the memories whose “spirit” they pretended to revive. For, what is November, apart from the factual events of a few “attacks” that the colonial press also hastened to inflame to legitimize retaliations in return? And why November instead of December, why the 1st of the month and not the third, why 1954 and not 1955? Of course, historians have much to do to follow in the infinitely small and infinitely complex this small segment of time which inaugurates a new period. It’s their job, that is not simple and which nobody can dispute, and it is not in such a pattern that I am writing these lines.

1st November, 1954 is a “limit” in the mathematical sense of the word, one that puts a quantity of a sign into the other, liquid to gas or inversely to solid, fetus to baby, life to death. It is inscribed in the continuity of time and at the same time, which is rather no longer the same time, produces a “break” in this continuity. But this is not as visible as water when it becomes ice, because it is located mainly in the consciences of actors first, then of populations. For the former, the irreversible has been done, we can no longer get back, we “dared”, time is now arrowed. For the latter, ordinary people, we remain

enthralled by the recklessness of action, even if we remain fearful, anxious about its results: retaliation, for sure, but especially failure once again in the face of the disproportionate strength of the opponent. The father of Belaïd Abdessalam (former Prime Minister) said to his son: “*how you and your friends can imagine that you are going to fight and vanquish France, are you crazy!*” And they were crazy indeed, those “imaginative” adolescents who had thought the unthinkable? But is it not the peculiarity of any invention, new creation, “*Ijtihad*” (invention, a new creation in Arabic) to go beyond the visible limits that the routine of an orthodoxy, a tradition, a rule has set forever. Here, we are in the colonial “tradition”, but this is valid in all fields: science, arts, politics always refer to “events” of this kind. I can hear Pope Urban VIII say to his friend and protégé Galileo who presented his findings to him: “But it’s sheer folly!

For Algeria, 1st November means the birth of a new imagination, a new possible world, because, through this break, it inaugurated a new period in the country’s history, a new possible world in the age-old routine of the colonial times, a new life, this time drawn by hope. I dream of an anthropological survey that would study changes in people’s posture: probably, straightening shoulders, eyes no longer looking down when they meet those of colonists, a more assured, less furtive gait. Because “the spirit of November” certainly had an impact on people’s bodies, dreams, emotions, for sure. It gave birth to a new society and a new form of individuals. In each slave, who had been submissive to their all-powerful masters since time immemorial, the same metamorphosis must have occurred at the moment they decided to free themselves, for they become free from the moment they decide to. Thus, they freed themselves from their

own selves, their own fears, their self-submission.

This discontinuity and the openness to the possibilities it introduced makes this event yet factually less dense than 8 May, 1945 or 20 August, 1955, the “founder” of the new Algeria. And my thinking goes far beyond the fact itself. For what is November, if not the Algerian form of what all philosophers have tried to understand: the irruption into the consciences of the “principle of hope”, of the “power within and not outside the human being” which Avicenna, the leftist in medieval Aristotelianism, had opposed to his master Aristotle, who thought it was external to him. “Power is within us”, seemed to say that disciple to his master. As a philosopher, this is the message that I have grasped from the anniversary of 1st November. And it is towards “the principle of hope” that my eyes turn when I try to understand this strange alchemy that transforms and mutates, often against all predictions, human organizations of which Algeria is not the least.

Yet, Algerians, now exhausted by the chaotic pace of society, are transposing their pessimism to the anniversary day of their current existence as a free and independent society. And here they are, clumsily gone in search of anything that might bring back “the spirit of November”, its “principle of hope” therefore, its exact opposite. To this end, everything is sought: amateur historians who are eyeing in keyholes to track down the intimate talks for, as Hegel said, “No man is a hero to his valet”; novelists who are unable or unwilling to write “pure novels”, as Yasmina Khadra was able to do in his first phase, and who lean, like against a crutch, their fiction against historical facts quickly skimmed over; and finally policies which repeat ad nauseam the non-repetitive event on 1st November and

invent or recreate on occasions, more than fifty years after, opponents who are “their size”. I mean the “Blackfeet” (*pieds noirs*)* who are agitating in the South of France and causing in each of their seasonal agitations disproportionate reactions they use to increase their sphere of influence. Who are they and what is left? A small minority, often elderly, who live with their memories no longer shared even by their children who were born and grew up in France, a small group that has not aged well in its resentments and regrets towards a country where they used to be the dominants. And because they have lost everything in this story, they are the losers, the vanquished.

But for Algerians, the winners then, what is the interest in reacting so quickly and strongly to the agitation of the vanquished. The liberation war is far back, Algeria is independent. The senile “coloniality” of small agitated groups of Blackfeet, finding an echo in the strong reactivity of those who vanquished them, is anachronous: there is no more “War in Algeria”, and coming back to it, we may fabricate small symbolic battles, we believe to gain in continuity (we hold the torch as they say) but we muddle the “spirit of hope” of the great battle, the founder of November 54. This goes on because, unlike the old Blackfeet whose eyes are riveted on their past, the eyes of young Algerians are riveted on the future.

1st November is a date in time, but the spirit of November is the horizon of time.

31 August, 2010

* The *pieds noirs* are French people who were born in Algeria before independence, but left the country to settle in France after the Algeria National Liberation Front (FLN) won the liberation struggle.

The Contemporary Crisis and Future Transformations: From 1970s to the Decline of US Hegemony

I am very grateful to Dr Sene Ousmane and the staff of West Africa Research Centre for welcoming me and agreeing to host me this afternoon. I would also like to thank CODESRIA and its Executive Secretary, Dr Ebrima Sall, for arranging this meeting. I am greatly honoured that all of you have put aside all your usual activities to come and listen to me.

My reason for coming to Dakar was to meet with Dr Sall and his colleagues at CODESRIA to discuss possible collaborations and a series of new initiatives to strengthen social science research in Africa. And so far, I think, we have had useful conversations which have given us an assurance of the way forward.

CODESRIA is in a sense like family friend to the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). We have interacted in many ways. Some of the people involved in CODESRIA activities have been part of our engagements. Ebrima, who now leads CODESRIA, has been part of our programmes, and Professor Mahmood Mamdani, former CODESRIA president, has for a number of years been a member of some of our boards and has been active in our programmes. We have also shared a number of other colleagues in various research activities.

The SSRC, like CODESRIA, is a distinctive kind of institution. It is only one of its kind and I am sure that Ebrima also has the problem of people saying: "Oh, would you explain what it's like?" and they are serious with this kind of question. But CODESRIA is not like anything else, it is just CODESRIA; and the same is true with the Social Science Research Council. It was founded in 1923, and its founding had one major impact: it invented the word "interdisciplinary".

Already in 1923, a group of professors mainly from Chicago and Columbia universities in the US were worried that the disciplines were organising conversations inwardly; about their problems and not outwardly about the world's problems. The founders of the SSRC basically said that, left to them, academic research-

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ers will talk only to one another in ever specialised ways and this would lead to a crisis for the public because public problems do not come organised in those specialised compartments. And so, the idea was to try to find ways to talk about what they were trying to create. They wanted to raise standards, to invigorate research, and to support young researchers. But then they said: "We want to get the researchers in different disciplines and different universities collaborating and talking to one another." And they coined the term "interdisciplinary" to talk about this.

Now, I would like to tell you that in its 87 years of existence, the SSRC has been trying to solve this problem but, unfortunately, we are a failure. It is still true that, left to themselves, professors will talk to their colleagues within their specialty in ephemeral groups and sometimes neglect the public problems. So, even though we have been working on this for 87 years, we still have a lot of work to do.

The early years of the SSRC focused on the United States. So it was bringing people together in interdisciplinary ways from different institutions, but initially overwhelmingly Americans. When it did international work, it meant training American specialists on foreign places. And Americans came to Africa, they went to Asia and they studied other parts of the world. The SSRC played the central role in the creation of what (in US) are called area-studies programmes, such as African studies. These flourished for a long time and I am not going into a long history about them. But that is not what we do now, at least not in the same way, and this is relevant because the change is that our concern is first not simply with strengthening American research on

other places, but strengthening research and the networks of researchers in those places. So as we strengthen and try to contribute, with CODESRIA, to strengthening opportunities for research on Africa, it is not just for American researchers, it is for African researchers, it is for researchers who are in the Diaspora but doing research on Africa and it is knitting together researchers around the world and about Africa, it is in part about Africa in a global context. The same goes for Asia or the Middle-East or other agendas.

The second thing that is different about the way in which we have conceived these programmes now is that we do not think of these regions as containers. When these programmes were formulated 60-70 years ago and flourished through the 1960s, the primary idea was that there was something inside those places – inside China, inside Africa, inside Europe, inside each society – that was the whole focus of attention, so that the continent in the case of Africa was a sort of container, a network of African civilisations, African languages, African literatures, and African political problems. There might be some comparative research but there was a strong sense of boundary. As we look at the world now, we do not see such a strong sense of boundaries and we should not have seen them all along. It is not only that globalisation has changed the world, it is that we have begun to change how we think about the way in which Africa is knit together with the Caribbean and with other societies and what Paul Gilroy called the Black Atlantic; about the way in which Africa today is knit together with China and in relationships involving natural resources that are sold around the world and projects – building roads and other infrastructure in Africa which are in part based on technical systems and sometimes financial systems from outside. It is about the ways in which something like global capitalism was affected by and affected Africa at many different points. But let me just hold one example out to make the point. You

cannot give an account of the fate of Tanzania in the world economy, and of what happened to the model of African socialism in Tanzania just inside Africa, because what happened had to do with the terms of trade with the rest of the world, what happened had to do with the opportunities for integration and the sometimes unequal terms of that integration in the rest of the world. It is the totality of all these that shaped the fate of Tanzania.

My point in giving such an example is to demonstrate that once you begin to look at it a little bit differently, you see a wide variety of interconnections; and although it is still important to study Africa, it is not simply a matter of looking inside a container for things that are only there; it is a matter of studying processes that also connect Africa to the rest of the world, that fall across borders.

The same is true in other parts of the world. English is an Indian language. The first professorship of English in the world was in India, not England, in the colonial era. It is a language widely spoken in India, and you do not understand how Indian politics work if you do not realize that the discovery of India the great block by Jawaharlal Nehru – which is in many ways the founding national story of modern India – is written in English by somebody who spoke a bit of his native Hindi but did not write easily in Hindi. And again, my point is that there were intertwined stories. Indian nationalism is something built in an international context and the same is true of nationalisms in Africa, the same was true of Pan-Africanism. It was not something contained in a narrow sense but something related in a broader sense to the rest of the world.

So, the SSRC is still engaged in research all over the world. About three quarters of our work is now outside the United States, some of it still involves American researchers who go to other places, some of it involves supporting students doing PhDs (students coming from all over the world to do PhDs in North American universities), some of it involves projects like the one that we hope to start with CODESRIA – that is designed to strengthen institutions and research opportunities in other places in the world. We do not think it is our role to be simply a national institution. That is partly because the SSRC is not a government institution. It is an

independent foundation, a non-profit organisation (call it an NGO if you like). It was founded by the Rockefeller family and it is funded by a wide variety of foundations and indeed various governments. Our largest government funder is actually Japan, not the United States.

Now, I am happy to answer more questions about the SSRC but I am not going to make this a speech about the SSRC. I mention all of this partly to say where I am coming from but also because I think this sort of transformation of an organisation founded in the United States, with mainly United States interests at heart, into a more global organisation is related to a larger body of social affairs which I want to talk about.

As Ebrima mentioned in his introduction, we at the SSRC have taken on the agenda of trying to nurture a more public social science. By that I do not just mean that we hire publicists to try to call attention to our publications; I mean that we try to study things that are important to public affairs, public discourse and identification of the public good. We have a range of different thematic projects and agendas and we work largely by identifying lines of work which seem important, which have some people working on them, but which have not received the resources and the backing they need. Whether it was work on HIV/AIDS a decade ago or it is work on issues of post-conflict recovery or issues like gender as they appear today.

So, we have several different thematic projects. They range from migration and global conflict issues to issues of digital media and learning. So, lots of different projects that I will not try to detail. But in all of them, we try to bring together empirical research to identify knowledge by research, critical perspectives, critical theory in the specific sense but not in the narrow sense that says just what some people in Frankfurt called critical theory, but the idea of looking critically and recognizing that the facts that we find are not always the final answer, because there is the history before and there is a future after and there are possibilities for making the world differently. So, I do not mean that we ignore the facts, or that we do not try to have the highest quality of empirical research. I mean that we try never to say that what happens to be on the ground today is the way things always have to be. And therefore we are

concerned, as I will be in a couple of moments, to identify possible futures as well: to bring together the empirical knowledge with critical inquiry that asks what are the reasons why the facts are what they are today, how does power influence them, how do economic interests influence them, how does history influence them, and so on. And we also hope that this will contribute to making social science useful in practice. But by ‘practice’, we do not mean only government policy. We include government policy, but we include social movements that are trying to change government policy or change the attitudes of people and society. So, being practical to us does not mean only giving policy advice to governments or business leaders. It is a wider notion of the ways in which knowledge can really change society.

Now, I turn to my topic, to which I only gave this title when Ebrima wrote to me just a day ago but which notwithstanding is actually part of what we have always discussed about. We have been looking through a crisis. Africans are well aware that the crisis that has been in the news called ‘the financial crisis of 2008-2009’ is for one thing a sort of tip of an iceberg; it’s a part sticking out of a bigger story. But it also comes on the heels of a series of other crises. The first thing that I want to emphasise therefore is that despite the fact that I think you all know this, and I know this and most of the people I talked to know this, most of the media, most of the policy leaders, especially in the Global North, talk as though that were not the case, as though this was a shocking, unpredictable event. Unprecedented really? There was the Great Depression back in 1929 that had something similar, but in fact there have been recurrent crises. Now we can analyze the recurrent crises in Marxist terms and identify the underpinnings of capitalist economies that make for economic crises. But also, we can look historically at the way each specific crisis influences other ones. And I want to take the crisis of the 1970s because I think the crisis of the last couple of years is closely related to it, about 35 years earlier. This is a crisis that had particular effects in Africa and African universities.

I used to teach at Khartoum University in the 1980s and one of the distinctive features of the university was that it had a wonderful library as long as you did

not want to read a book published after 1974. Why 1974? Because, after 1974, there was no hard currency to buy books. This is tied to the OPEC boycott and the rising oil prices which in the case of Sudan, as in many other African countries, meant rising oil prices and rising prices for other goods that had to be imported and books getting pushed to the backburner and the lower priorities of the state budgets. But it was not just the OPEC crisis. What went on in the 1970s in part was a crisis that capped an era of rising demand. We can see this in African terms, but it is also something that was true in US and European terms, in each case somewhat different but with a common patron.

The common patron was that there had been expanding demand through the 1960s. In the case of Africa this was for the most part the post-independence boom. The rising demand, the prosperity, the hope of African countries after independence that they would be able to rapidly develop, to improve the living conditions of their peoples and join the larger world in one or another economic position. There were those who approached the larger world mainly with reference to the Soviet Union, and those who approached it with reference to the United States. And the newly independent countries were not only seeking wealth, but also seeking greater say over their destinies, a bigger share of all that was produced in the world because Africa, Asia and Latin America were producing more than they were able to consume. They were sending the extras to the Global North and so this effort was not just an effort to grow but an effort to redistribute. And the crisis that took place in the 1970s was, among other things, a part to that redistribution. That crisis had various other features. There was the new phenomenon of the oil producing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America and so forth, but it tilted the balance of this so that some profits went to the hands of those who controlled these natural resources. Sometimes, that meant that whole countries did not benefit often, that only rulers benefited, and that increased corruption. But this is also an issue in the United States and Europe, where a growing middle class sought a change, demanding a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. So, in the United States for example, during the whole post-

World War II period until 1973 or so, there was more and more equality every year. After 1973, inequality grows every year. The United States was then becoming more equal in its distribution of incoming wealth among citizens until the 1970s. The civil rights movement on the part of African Americans was a big part of that but not the only part, and it began to be reversed in the 1970s. The aspirations of people who had less but worked more to have a bigger share were again blocked as they were in Africa and the Caribbean, and military dictatorships came up in Latin America and other places.

There were other things going on. A peace movement was challenging a nearing querulous war, the Vietnam War that would end in 1975. So, for years, America's place in the world had been distorted, as France's was before it, by querulous wars. As France had fought in Algeria, so the US carried a certain kind of imperialist project forward, even though not in strict colonial form. And this came to a head with the Vietnam War, during which massive amounts of resources were consumed but this only helped to bruise the economy because we were producing aeroplanes and bombs and all other war materials.

There was also the Yom Kippur War, the Palestinian-Israeli war in 1973, which initiated the more or less continuous series of crises immediately in Palestine but also with violent replications around the world. The conflict which dates back to 1948, to the origins of Israel, took on a new form after 1973, exported outside that immediate region of Palestine to affect wider areas of Lebanon. But then also eventually September 11 and the continuing issue that is described as the issue of terrorism, though I think that is actually confused as a tactic with an underlying movement. In addition, what heralded the Israeli war and the Vietnam War was an issue of financial collapse. The United States pulled out of the Bretton Woods Accord in 1971 (I think now only history students know what the Bretton Woods Accord is about) but this was essentially an agreement among the world's rich countries that established the World Bank and the IMF (we all know what they are!) but also established an agreement about how to control currency prices and keep them backed against equal standards and so on.

There is a long history about it that I will not go into again, but the collapse of the

BW Accord, the pulling out of this global financial agreement changed a number of terms, and there is a lot more that came ahead in the 1970s. I am not going to say anything about it except that you all know I have described a crisis that could not be said to be just economic. It was military, it was political, it was social. It was a crisis that was shaped by changing gender relations and changing family relations. It was a crisis that was shaped by organisations, a crisis that was shaped by challenges to authority. Part of what happened in the 1970s was that those with the most influence over investments and structures of capitalistic accumulation recognized they were facing declining rates of profits, that investment in traditional industries was not as rewarding as it had been, and that after the collapse of Bretton Woods and with some other changes, there were opportunities for the deregulation of financial markets. They began an organised campaign to persuade the US Government, the British Government and others to lift government regulations that had previously limited financial markets. A simple example: since the Great Depression, the one that started in 1929 and extended into the 1930s in the United States, banks were not allowed to work across state lines in the US. In the 50 states of the United States, banks could only work in one state. That later changed as a result of the campaign that started in the 1970s. It enabled the establishment of bigger and bigger banks which include City Bank and Goldman Sachs – these famous banks that would eventually be judged to be too big to fail, so that the taxpayers would have to bail them out in the recovery package that even President Obama who was not in office when this all happened felt he had to pursue.

That has roots in the 1970s and more generally the roots reveal a picture in which there was a turn to "financialization", a decline in investment in industry in the rich countries of the world, the movement of industrial production just proportional to Asia, and to some extent elsewhere in the world, away from the United States, Europe and so forth. But there were lines on new financial mechanisms as the primary generators of capital and profit. This meant new occupations, investment bankers who were a smaller than usual occupation, moved into the forefront as a highly active career choice. So the best

and the brightest at Harvard and Princeton wanted to be investment bankers. They did not actually want to be sociologists, professors. But there was a move in occupations. Financial engineering, a term nobody had heard uttered before, came into existence with the development of derivatives and credit default swaps and new kinds of financial instruments. Financial engineering, a kind of meeting point of engineering and economics, aims not to study the economy, but to redesign it by using financial instruments.

That millions and millions, yes, billions and billions of dollars were made in this financialization of the economy created massive insolvent debts in many African countries in their bid to meet their obligations and execute development programmes, leading to the IMF's introduction of structural adjustment policies. This is all rooted in that transition that goes on in the middle 1970s and continues for some years; and it is not something that just happened, it is something that developed out of the decisions in the US of the 1970s. It is a future made to happen by people who campaign, who get the governments to change the regulations, who develop new financial instruments, who create new businesses like hedge funds.

A small side story, the hedge fund was invented by a sociologist. It was invented by a sociologist of Pakistani descent in England in the 1950s, as an alternative investment for social welfare precursors and to stabilize capitalist markets. The idea however was taken over in the creation of a number of new companies that were doing the speculative kind of investment called "hedge funds". I am not going to try to give you a detailed explanation of hedge funds, save to say that a key feature of hedge funds, whatever they use as their technical trading operations or whatever guides their investments, is that they were mostly opaque, they were not transparent. It was not visible to the outside world what they did. Unlike conventional operations, they were not required to disclose their investments. A general model is required to tell potential shareholders and the American public what it is spending its money on, how it is deriving its profits, hedge funds or not. So the distinctive feature about what came to be called alternative investments overwhelming financial market

investments is that they work outside the scope of state regulation. This was part of what has sometimes been called neoliberalism or the hollowing out of the state, the weakening of state capacity. This has had a nice face often, and there has been a kind of positive optimistic embrace of this in cosmopolitan democracy and thinking in political theory about how wonderful it is that we appreciate human rights, we are all in one world, we are all connected and we should look beyond the nation state. I said at the beginning, that that is what we are doing presently: we are looking beyond the nation state, we are part of a global trend. But sometimes that encouraged people to think that states do not matter. That states were all-authoritarian structures, that they were just those old men that you really did not want running anything anyway, and so it was better if you had NGOs, and if you had civil society, and if you had anything else including hedge funds and financial investments. Now, my point about this is not that I want to say let us all celebrate the state as the be-all and end-all, but rather that states play a very important enabling role. Even if you choose to support a capitalist economic model, the model depends on states that enable it through currency and money and other kinds of conditions, and one would have to rely on regulation to deal with some of the thorny internal issues. The IMF has just proposed a new global financial regulatory model, some version may eventually get adopted after it has been debated. One feature of this is a tax that has to be paid in anticipation of the next crisis. The IMF has predicted that there will be another crisis, and that it will be necessary to bail out firms; so, it is going to impose a tiny tax on financial transactions in order to accumulate reserves for that purpose. That might be a perfectly good idea but note that the crisis did not come out of unknowable factors. Who could possibly imagine a crisis in the US markets, US housing markets that would need more hedge back securities to get into trouble; no, it is much more knowable than that.

Now, let me situate what I have been saying, it is basically that much of what went on in 2008-2009 has *among* its historical roots, not its *only* historical roots, a set of events in the 1970s, in another capitalist crisis, but a crisis that was not only capitalist, not only economic but social; that this crisis

helped to bring about the era we called neoliberal, that it made possible this sort of pursuit which on the one hand was the celebration of individual freedom against the state, but on the other hand was a reduction in social and state capacities to organise life and help to produce this specific version of the crisis we saw in 2008-2009, and which we are still reeling from in various ways.

In conclusion, what I want to do is say something about possible futures. Because the world is not going back to what it was before 2008. It is not going back in the sense that there is not going to be the same employment patterns, there aren't going to be the same jobs in the same industries in the same countries that there were before.

US hegemony was already, probably declined, and it is going to be in continuous decline. I am not making a prediction for how fast or how slow. My friend Emmanuel Wallerstein thinks "We're gonna live to see it", and he says it to anyone. So who is going to live to see it? I think it is likely to take much longer. I think the US is likely to be the most powerful country in the world for some time but with a gradually weakening grip, and a key question is how will the US respond to this gradually weakening grip? Will it gracefully and constructively help to build a world order that is multilateral? May be. Or will it engage in a variety of projects that are attempts to show up its order to reassure itself that it is still the hedge man, to maintain its security and to maintain the capital accumulation capacity of its richest citizens and corporations? I don't know the answer. I think that is a pair of possible futures. I think that that is one very big factor that is reshaping the world, and I am just going to say two things because I don't want to take too much time. I do not want to pretend that there are only two big factors. Other big factors exist. One of them is a restructuring of global power and I think that it is a geopolitical restructuring, if you like that phrase. We had the cold war for a long time and two superpowers and other countries of varying power in an essentially nation state structure of the World. We have lost one of those superpowers into secondary power status. The United States briefly was the world's lone superpower and we are now seeing the rise of China, we are now seeing a variety of shifts.

Now those shifts could be the coming of chaos, a bunch of different countries pretty strong fighting with one another. They could be the coming of a multilateral system in which those countries cooperate with one another. If it is a multilateral system, it could be for their benefit and not everybody else's. Or it could be structured in a way that creates opportunities and rights for people who don't live in one of those countries. But it is very likely that however the future develops, China and India, Iran and Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Europe – in some sense more national, more integrated, and United States – will all be world powers.

They will not all be equals but they will all be pretty powerful. Powerful enough, that none of them can be relegated to entirely secondary status outside discussion. By itself England, by itself France, are not going to be powers of that kind. Possibly in an integrated Europe, they will have that kind of weight, but there is going to be a shift in the organisation of power on a global scale. There are various strategies being played out for dealing with this. So the Emirates (the Arab Emirates) are pursuing a strategy of essentially trying to become the Singapore of the Middle-East, building banking and financial institutions, trade institutions and information technology capacities.

Abu Dhabi has just given my university 500 million dollars to open a campus in Abu Dhabi. That is not because there were so many students unable to go to college in Abu Dhabi, but simply because

there was a project to position Abu Dhabi as a centre that would be of service to a global economy that was reorganising in a way such that it would not be equally dominated by the United States. So one big set of changes are that it is not clear how that will play out whether there will be rival blocks, whether the US and China will get together and essentially dominate in a condominium, whether there will be close cooperation through new institutions or whether there will be constant friction and problems as there are, say, between Iran and most of the other powers now. There could be a slightly longer list. May be Turkey is going to be one of these powers. We can begin to guess at which countries are or are not going to get on the list. But the point is, it is not going to be just the United States. Now, the second thing that I think is changing is a return of what we might call "social reproduction of social issues". Whether people have jobs, whether they can finance their families, whether they can support their children who go to school, whether there is the development of human capital, not only financial capital or industrial capital, whether there are educated populations in a country able to help it be a player in a global economy in the new context. So the institutions, precisely the institutions that are most important for the future, are those dealing with social reproduction and the reproduction of human beings, societies and communities. These are the ones that have been challenged most in the last 35 years by cuts in higher education spending and health care.


One of the basic stories that are never told about the AIDS crisis in Africa is that a significant part of that crisis was caused by the IMF. I don't mean some strange conspiracy but created out in the sense that when the IMF ran out, most infected people died. I mean that one of the consequences of Structural Adjustment policies was to deeply damage national healthcare systems, so that when AIDS became a crisis those national health care systems were not there to help deal with it and it became much worse, harder and more expensive to distribute antiretroviral drugs when they became available. Therefore, distribution depended more on the US Government and PEPFAR, on the Global Fund and the effort to finance from the UN.

But the point is, social reproduction matters and we have been hollowing out and undermining our institutions of social reproduction since I started, since the 1974 crisis, and the inability to find a book written after 1974 in university libraries. So I think, to deal with our possible futures, to create effective opportunities at the national, regional level and global levels depends on overcoming that patron of hollowing out; and to do that, we have to pay attention to the deeper historical roots of the crisis and the roots that shape the possible futures.

**Professor Craig M. Calhoun is the president of the Social Science Research Council based in New York. This article was extracted from the Public Lecture he delivered at the West Africa Research Centre, Dakar, during an official visit to CODESRIA on 30 April 2010.*

Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism?

Samir Amin



With his usual verve and sharpness Samir Amin examines the factors that brought about the 2008 financial collapse and explores the systemic crisis of capitalism after two decades of neoliberal globalisation. He lays bare the relationship between dominating oligopolies and the globalisation of the world economy. The current crisis, he argues, is a profound crisis of the capitalist system itself, bringing forward an era in which wars, and perhaps revolutions, will once again shake the world. Amin examines the threat to the plutocracies of the US, Europe and Japan from decisions of recent G20 meetings. He analyses the attempts by these powers to get back to the pre-2008 system, and to impose their domination on the peoples of the South through intensifying military intervention by using institutions such as NATO. Amin presents original proposals for the way forward: an alternative strategy which, by building on the advances made by progressive forces in Latin America, would allow for a more humane society through both the North and the South working together.

Interview: Professor Wamba dia Wamba

Professor Wamba dia Wamba (WdW) is a person well-known to CODESRIA, not only for having been the President of its Executive Committee from 1992 to 1995, but also for his scientific contributions. In recent years, several members of the African scientific community have been wondering about the motivations that encouraged this distinguished scholar to get involved in politics, and worse in rebellion. In the next few pages, we are reporting the interview that Professor Wamba dia Wamba, while very sick, granted us at his home in Kinshasa on 08 September, 2010. This interview was conducted by Noël Obotela Rashidi and Bernard Mumpasi Lututala.

In the interview, Professor Wamba dia Wamba defined the motivations that drove him to the rebellion, the role of the academic and researcher in African societies. He believes that beyond the analyses they make of society, the academic or the researcher has civic obligations. They should not be limited to describing, poverty for example, while watching helplessly the misery of the poor. Instead, they must engage in the dynamics of the movement, change, improvement of the situation. It is up to them to think about society and not politicians. And they must also convince policymakers of the necessity of the University and of Research in the governance of our states. Based on his experience in the rebellion, Wamba dia Wamba, noted that it is not by being involved in politics that a researcher could contribute to such a dynamics, but rather by creating structures that can influence politicians, including the university, think tanks, etc.

The key question was to know whether armed struggle was, for him, part of his “structures”! To this question, Professor Wamba responded that he had not ignited the rebellion and that with the agreement of people like Mwalimu Nyerere, he was rather seeking how to direct it to negotiations, the rebellion was a fact and it needed to be managed.

Interview conducted by
Noël Obotela Rashidi*
Bernard Mumpasi Lututala**

Question: *Professor, the African scientific community, that includes most of your friends and colleagues, has for long been raising questions about the reasons for your active involvement in the “rebellion” in Congo from 1998 to 2002. For the continent’s academia, an intellectual of your standard could not contribute to such an undertaking. Would you please enlighten us and thus dispel their worries?*

WdW: Thank you very much for the opportunity you have offered me to reconnect with the community of researchers who are members of CODESRIA and others through this discussion. It is true that I had actively taken part in the rebellion against the ruling regime in DR Congo. Before talking about it, I must express my reservations about the attitude of an organization like CODESRIA. I expected CODESRIA to send researchers into the field to conduct investigations on such an involvement and the motivations for that rebellion. This would have helped us. But this was not done and, frankly, I felt like there was some hostility towards me. Yet, scientists such as Herbert Weiss and many others came to conduct research on the movement while I was in the rebellion. Weiss stayed in my house in Bunia.

Now let us come back to the question regarding my involvement in the rebellion. Since high school, I have always had a sense of political organization. When I arrived in the United States for my university studies, I was an activist in such organizations. In 1981, I returned to Congo (then Zaire) to conduct research on opposition movements in the years after 1963. After searching my luggage at the Beach Ngobila, security services found a text that I had written on “The Authenticity of Neo-colonialism: Ideology and Class Struggle in the Congo - Kinshasa”.

For them, it was a dangerous document which proved that I wanted to found a political party; which was not compatible with the standards of monolithic power of Mobutu. I was immediately arrested and taken to the underground prison at Camp Tshatshi in Kinshasa where I spent three months. This is where I understood the violence of the Mobutu regime. Those arrested were treated like animals. The interrogations were unimaginable torture sessions.

A lot of pressure was exerted from abroad for my release. I would note pressure from the United States, Great Britain and Tanzania. One of my professors in the United States, Francis Peter Drucker, was a friend of President Reagan whom he would phone every week to remind him of my case. In addition, pressure was also exerted by President Julius Nyerere on Mobutu.

Released three months later, I was not allowed to leave the country and was constantly watched. In the face of such harassment, a Black American working in Zaire gave me the recipe for the noose to loosen around me. Despite this, I still could not leave the country. Taking advantage of Mobutu’s visit to Arusha, President Nyerere asked him why he had kept me under house arrest while exam papers were awaiting correction. On his return, he kept his pledge to Mzee Nyerere to let me go.

The day of departure, I experienced my last hindrance at the N’Djili International Airport. My papers were seized by security services that seemed to ignore the exit permit that was issued to me. Several interventions failed to resolve the problem. A Major in the Army who arrived at the scene snatched the papers, took my luggage and led me into the plane, recommending me to stay in Dar es Salaam without returning to Zaire. Now I regret I had not taken the identity of this major.

From 1982 to 1991, I could not return to my country. In 1991, I went to Brazzaville. Mrs Sophie Lihau Kanza (May her soul rest in peace!) sent me an invitation to join her in Kinshasa, reassuring me about my safety. Her goal was to entrust me with

the post of Secretary General of the Party she had just founded. I declined the offer for non-compliance of procedure.

I returned to Zaire in July 1992 and I remained there until December 1992 as guest of the scientific world at the National Sovereign Conference (CNS). I largely contributed, with other faculty colleagues, to the coherence, the drafting of the basic texts and I prepared three important documents, including those relating to national reconciliation, to secessions and to the rehabilitation of Pierre Mulele. The CNS failed. After this forum, I went back to Tanzania.

The Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994 and things began to move in the Great Lakes region. But I felt, for the first time, the irresponsibility of the academics that we are. Indeed, we hustled at the University of Dar Es Salaam (UDSM) to produce a statement on the genocide in Rwanda. Yet, this statement was made public not on behalf of a UDSM organization, such as UDASA, because then Tanzanian Prime Minister was reluctant to support such a statement, according to colleagues.

In 1996, I was in Denmark when the rebellion by Laurent Kabila began. The latter was not on good terms with President Julius Nyerere, for he kidnapped two American students and demanded ransom for their release. Nyerere believed he was not serious.

On 16th November, 1996, former Prime Minister of Tanzania, Rashidi Kawawa, the stepfather of Kazadi, an aide to Kabila, brought the latter to Butiama to meet President Nyerere. He needed the support of the latter. There, Kabila explained to President Nyerere that his struggle was aimed at chasing Mobutu from power. He gave the impression of being sincere, and Nyerere was impressed by his words, because the region was tired of the intrigues of President Mobutu.

Friends, at the request of Nyerere, asked me to write a paper on how to quickly reach a peace agreement so that there might be no bloodshed in Kinshasa. I asked them to tell Mwalimu to invite, through the person of a Tanzanian Cardinal, Msgr. Monsengwo, who understood the situation better. Yet, Kabila urged Mwalimu not to arguing that he was also a Mobutist. The course of events might have changed if this personality had come to discuss with him. And in December 1996, I returned to Dar es Salaam. There, I

often saw Mwalimu. He urged me to be a candidate.

In late June 1998, Jacques Depelchin, then Cabinet Director of Deogratias Bugera, Board Member of the ADFL, came to DSM, I introduced him to President Nyerere. He briefed him on the real situation on the ground. Following this briefing, he stressed the need for both of us to go to Kigali where opponents were gathering. We left and I was mandated to pass through Kampala to see President Museveni to obtain necessary regional involvement so as to avoid the mistakes of the first rebellion. I asked Jacques Depelchin to precede me in Kigali while I stayed in Kampala awaiting the meeting with President Museveni, then on tour in northern Uganda. I met his Minister of Security. Meanwhile, things moved quickly. And I soon got to Kigali, from where I was taken to Kabuga, where Congolese opponents were holding a meeting. From the first meeting, I was elected moderator. A memorandum of understanding had been developed. And on this basis, the board of RCD was to be elected. After withdrawing, I was elected unanimously by members present. Previously, Vice-President of Rwanda, Kagame had allegedly convened all his security staff in the presence of two Congolese, Kamanji Emmanuel and Bizima Karaha. During this meeting, he allegedly said that I was his candidate because I belonged to western Congo, and because of my academic reputation, my being married to an American woman and the support of former President Nyerere.

The first steps of the Movement were marked by several dealings. We had to go to Lusaka, via DSM Airport where we had to meet Mwalimu, because Zambia, which was assuming the vice-presidency of the Commission on Defense and Security in the SADC, objected to military intervention, while Zimbabwe, which held the presidency, was committed to it. It was also to discuss with the Secretary of SADC. From Lusaka, we went to Pretoria where I met with President Nelson Mandela for a one-hour tête-à-tête. His recommendation consisted in promptly ending the war.

In December 1998, at the OAU meeting held in Ouagadougou, I met several Heads of State. Then I went to Tripoli where I had two successful meetings with Khadafi and sought his intervention in order to urge Kabila to come. The latter arrived in Tripoli the next day with Yerodia. Kabila refused

to meet the rebels abroad, but asked Yerodia to meet me. In my turn, I refused this option. Finally, Bizima and Yerodia held a meeting that went wrong. Bizima adopted a haughty manner and expressed himself in English instead of French. The two weeks spent in Tripoli were unsuccessful.

The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was to experience an internal stir. I made an end of year speech which displeased those I called the people who ruined the country and it caused discomfort. To dispel this atmosphere of unease, we were asked to go to Kampala to reach a compromise. Reading the text of the speech translated into English, President Museveni found interesting elements in it. He decided to send us first to Kigali. Before going there, he addressed the leaders in these terms: "Do you think the region which made Mobutu quit will tolerate again another Mobutist in Kinshasa?"

Under the leadership of President Bizimungu, the Kigali meeting lasted from 2:30 pm to 7:00 am! Kagame attended it until midnight. I was reconfirmed in my position as chairman.

Back in Goma, at the meeting of the members emerged the idea of a possible transfer of the headquarters every time we advanced in the country and we thought of Kisangani. As Jean-Pierre Bemba wanted to settle there, I was sent to Kisangani to meet him to negotiate an agreement on compliance with occupied zones. From Kisangani, I made some decisions that displeased and fueled the tension in Goma. Indeed, after learning that some members had bought villas in Kampala and opened accounts in the US, I decided to ask members of the Movement to state their assets. I commissioned an international financial audit and informed Kampala and Kigali. I decided the retention in Kisangani of a percentage of the income raised from our territory instead of sending it to Goma. I also decided to transfer the headquarters of the movement to Kisangani, taking into account the sentiment expressed at the last meeting of the members that I chaired and which re-elected me unanimously. And I appointed an acting deputy Secretary General of the Movement.

Another point of contention was around my close guard. I wanted it to be made up only of Congolese. Bizima objected saying I had to consult James Kabarebe beforehand. Three options were proposed,

namely a guard made up only of Congolese, or Congolese and Rwandans, or Congolese, Rwandans and Ugandans. I chose the first option and it displeased Bizima who then recommended I ask James Kabarebe to help me. As I went to Kisangani on Kampala's proposal, I was to have a guard made up of three trends (Congolese, Rwandans, Ugandans, under the leadership of the latter). The guard that came with me, as it was composed of Tutsis, refused to be under the leadership of the others. They deserted, supposedly on the recommendation of Commander Buki. Following their departure, seen as a dismissal by myself, I was accused of being anti-Tutsi. I was strongly criticized by Nyarugabo. I had to go and explain the situation in Kigali, on Museveni's recommendation.

After being successively received by Kagame's Director of Cabinet, Wilson Mazimpaka and Patrick Nyanvumba, the head of military security, I was taken to Kagame. I remained steady and sincere, stressing the fact that criticizing a Tutsi did not mean criticizing the Tutsi community.

Question: *Ultimately, what was your mission within the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)?*

WdW: I found myself in the RCD with a regional mandate to promptly reach a peace agreement. This mission was supported by Nyerere, Mandela, Chiluba, Mkapa and Chissano. Unfortunately, within the Movement, there were some problems as a result of inadequate analysis by the political leadership. Politics was not perceived as a well thought out matter. We wanted to get to Kinshasa quickly and the rest would follow. I was for political rather than military victory at any cost.

Moreover, there was the problem with the Rwandans who actually intended to control the movement and did not seem to support separatist stances and later with some Ugandan officers, too interested in supporting not the movement as such, but selected Congolese; and they seemed to support the idea that the Congolese on borders (people from the east, Mbusa for instance) understood problems more than those coming from the interior. Some were interested in the resources. Congolese who could bribe them were more tenable. My group was opposed to that.

With a view to forming a national army, I wanted to prepare our soldiers at

Lumumba College in Kisangani. Without my knowledge but with the permission of Gen. Kazini of Uganda, Rwandans entered the college to find the so-called "genociders". This was aimed at incriminating me to be in cahoots with the Hutu genociders and find a reason to kill me. They could not prove it. In Bunia, I wanted to bring all former soldiers of Zairian Armed Forces scattered in the Ituri forest area and those who were in the gold mines to reintegrate into the army which was being trained. The Ugandans did not want this category of members.

In Kisangani, relationships with Goma had deteriorated. The Six Day War in 1999 had begun with the antagonism between the RCD/Goma (Rwanda) and RCD/Kisangani (Uganda). We must acknowledge that South Africa had played a dark role on this issue, especially by its Foreign Minister, Mrs Zuma, regarding for example the investigation report by Silwamba which claimed that RCD/Kisangani no longer had popular support.

Question: *As a scientist, what is your perception of such a situation?*

WdW: I believe that academics have civil obligations. In such a situation, when they see that they have the opportunity to help end the war, they must commit themselves. I thought, naively perhaps, that a region having a revolutionary tradition could have calibrated people on the ground. None of this happened. I thought there would still be people thinking beyond the war. From a cultural standpoint, there was an absence of structures capable of enabling people to organize themselves for society to cope with the crisis in time. I thought a lot about cultural traditions about how the "Justice and Peace Committees" set up to end the so-called ethnic war, should have operated.

Question: *Don't you think that you joined the rebellion with outdated ideas of 1960? Haven't these ideas failed because they are inappropriate today?*

WdW: While not in the same pattern, most people committed without a specific project and programme. Actually, we did not engage in rebellion with outdated ideas. Which one for example? Mulelism did not fail because it lacked political ideas, as he said, but a core military capable of confronting Mobutu's rabble army. People failed to take account of the experiences of the 1960 rebellions. I will give the example of Kabila who remained long

in the rebellion, but could not formulate a coherent vision. The Tanzanian security service put me together with him, with the idea to formulate something like a vision. We spent four hours together, with no output. Each time, he would reply: "This is a moment's notice." Maybe he did not want to do it at that time. Then Nyerere came to Congo, I had arranged the visit with the people of the ADFL, including Bugera. Once back, Mwalimu said that what they thought by supporting Kabila was not borne out. "Nobody was born a statesman. With the support of the region, we can help him become one." This was the basis of the support. I consider that our project to (1) bring Kinshasa to the negotiating table, and 2) organize an inter-Congolese dialogue to politically resolve the crisis, was successful.

Question: *How do you see the Congolese society today?*

WdW: The Congolese society must develop. Because of its potential, it must reach the top. Scientists should reflect on it. Intellectuals are the eyes of the Congo onto the world. It is through a *think-tank*, for example, that we can organize a concerted action of intellectuals to be able to exercise a beneficial influence on the country's management. In our country, the academics fail to help change the world because they fail to convince policymakers of the necessity of the University, for example; that is to say, the necessity of their intellectual work. Without a true and financially fed research program, what is the worth of a university? In a sense, too, a society that is unable to maintain an accumulated wisdom, because the elderly die early or are made homeless and do not write, will not go far. Today is it wisdom, rather than intelligence, that will help us solve global problems.

Question: *If so, how do we persuade politicians of the importance of research?*

WdW: It is not by doing old politics, but by creating structures that can influence politicians. However, with no voice within the system, nothing can work. Scholars pit their strengths against scholars, and politicians pit their strengths against politicians (*nganga na nganga; mfumu na mfumu*). However, it is necessary for the academic agenda to have an autonomy vis-à-vis that of politicians, without resulting in a situation where we do research in a boat that capsizes. The remaining question is: how to politically put science in power of society? A double

scientific supervision of the people and politicians. Scientists have the obligation to guide the Nation, and the society. To do this, they must be in the dynamics of change, make the national vision more contextual. They are expected to respond to the concerns of society and bring appropriate responses. In our country, the scientific considerations are not involved

in the structuring and organization of work, especially political work. And yet, it is necessary for the process to be influenced by scientists. Hence, the need to establish think-tanks, among other structures, which facilitate knowledgeable debates. The country is not out of the heart of darkness yet, alas!

Notes

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Africa-Asia Connection in the Global Context: The Pursuit of Solidarity for Peace and Social Progress¹

Introduction

In the first section of this address, I provide a background of my connection with Asia. The second section deals with the historical context of African-Asian collaborations in the global struggle for freedom. The third section focuses on the African-Asian connection as a global alliance for world peace and the development of African and Asian countries, with Pan-African perspectives and a special reference to W. E. B. DuBois and Kwame Nkrumah. Concluding remarks will follow.

I would like to first acknowledge Mzee Mwalimu Ali Mazrui whose Institute of Global Cultural Studies is hosting this Conference with the Department of African and African-American Studies at Penn State University and the Department of Africana Studies, Binghamton University; the Local Organizing Committee, co-chaired by Lisa Yun and Michael O. West; We thank Professor Edward Kannyo, NYASA President, Professor Seifudein Adem, NYASA President-Elect, the Members of the NYASA Board, including Mwalimu Abdul Nanji, Professor Locksley Edmondson, Professor Thomas Nyquist and Dr. Corinne Nyquist. Our appreciation goes to our Cornell colleagues of the Africana Studies and Research Center. Finally, we want to thank our children – Disashi, Enongo and Lushima who, through books, cartoons and art including “Animés” introduced us to a different side of the Japanese culture, and whose youthful innocence, intense curiosity,

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wondrous spirit and creativity made us appreciate many dimensions of the Japanese physical and social landscape, culture and specificities across the islands and various localities while we were traveling together in 2003 to give lectures and seminars at different institutions. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleagues and friends in Asia, especially Japan, who have provided us with spaces for critical reflection and interactions.

The Committee that made this decision clearly acknowledged that Professor Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo and I have autonomous voices as scholars. For this special occasion, we will complement each other in sharing reflective remarks that express our collective and profound gratitude to all of you.

I will be discussing Africa through a Pan-African perspective within a global context. My address is partially drawn from various talks that I gave on other occasions. The first one was my presentation in an Africana Studies Colloquium series.² The second was delivered at the Center for African Studies at the University of Ghana (Legon) on the invitation of Professor Anne Adams, who was the Director of

the Dubois Center in Accra at that time.³ Another presentation was made on the occasion of the Celebration of Ghana’s Independence (1957) organized by the Africana Studies and Research Center at Cornell in 2007.⁴ This topic is very much appropriate for this occasion as the theme of the Conference is: “Global-Africa, Global-Asia: Africa and Asia in the Age of Globalization”.

Personal and Professional Journey of my Asian Connection

My curiosity about Asia and its connection to Africa dates many years back. While I was a student in France in the 1970s, one of my favorite magazines was called *Afrique-Asie*, which was more progressive in comparison to *Jeune Afrique*, for instance. At the time, the historical context in Africa was characterized by post-independence aspirations, ongoing struggle for the liberation African countries still colonized by Portugal and generally in southern Africa, continued vigilant engagement of historic organizations such as *Federation des Étudiants d’Afrique Noire en France* (FEANF). In this context, global and historic figures such as Kwame Nkrumah, Ho Chi Min and Chairman Mao constituted references in any developing African critical mind because of their articulation of the fight for freedom against colonial and any form of imperial interests and domination.

Though I had Asian classmates, friends and students from different countries and

whom I met in North American institutions of higher learning, it was only about fifteen years ago that I had opportunities to have direct experience in Asia.

My first trip to Asia took place when I attended the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing (China) and the NGO Forum held in Wairau (China). With a more profound and sustained connection to an Asian context, I then developed an interest in Asian education in the late 1990s. In June 1998, I was invited “as an expert on restructuring and reforming of Higher Education” to participate in an “International Seminar on Higher Education Reform for China”. Although due to specific factors I did not pursue it, for me the invitation alone was significant.

A few months later in the same year (1998), at a time of global preparation for the 21st Century, I was invited, with the Honorable Harry Sawyer of Ghana, to serve on “the advisory panel of the Forum on ‘International Cooperation in Education for the 21st Century: Africa and Japan’” that was organized by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Center for the Study of International Cooperation in Education (CICE) at Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan. We had a responsibility to provide a critical assessment of Japanese educational assistance to Africa. While we were diplomatic and celebrated past successes regarding Japan-Africa cooperation, we also took our responsibility seriously toward the African countries and people by making constructive criticism of aspects that needed improvement or new forms and strategies for more productive cooperation between Japan and Africa in the specific education sector. In fact, we were expected to do exactly that.

In 2002, I was awarded a fellowship for foreign education experts by the Japanese Ministry of Education. Subsequently, in 2003 I was Visiting Professor at the Center for International Cooperation in Education (CICE) at Hiroshima University. Since then, I have also contributed to several projects and programs, serving, for instance, as a keynote speaker at the Japan Education Forum (JEF),⁵ seminars and lectures in various institutions of higher learning across Japan, and various meetings at the United Nations University in Tokyo.

Among many other activities in recent years, I have also served as an adviser to the ongoing “Africa-Asia University Dia-

logue for Basic Education Development” project. Through this project, I have had the opportunity to meet and fruitfully interact with Asians from various countries and institutions that have been working with African counterparts. For instance, the first phase of this project⁶ included African participants from: University of Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia), Bahir Dar University (Ethiopia), University of Cape Coast (Ghana), University of Education, Winneba (Ghana), Kenyatta University (Kenya), University of Antananarivo (Madagascar), University of Malawi (Malawi), Abdou Moumouni University (Niger), University of Lagos (Nigeria), Bayero University (Nigeria), University of Pretoria (South Africa), University of Dar es Salam (Tanzania), Mzumbe University (Tanzania), Makerere University (Uganda), Kyambogo University (Uganda), University of Zambia (Zambia). The Asian participants in different capacities were from: National University of Educational Planning and Administration (India), Indonesia University of Education (Indonesia), Hiroshima University (Japan), Kobe University (Japan), Nagoya University (Japan), Naruto University of Education (Japan), Osaka University (Japan), Tokyo Gakugei University (Japan), Waseda University (Japan), Universiti Sains Malaysia (Malaysia), Chiang Mai University (Thailand), Vietnam National University, Hanoi (Vietnam). I served as co-guest editor, with Professor Jandhyala Tilak (Head of the Department of Educational Finance at the National University of Educational Planning and Administration-NUEPA) in New Delhi (India), for the special issues of the *Journal of International Cooperation in Education*, published by CICE, that were devoted to the first series of publication of the studies conducted in the first phase of this project.

As a member of the World Academy of Art and Science, I attended its 2008 General Assembly that was held in Hyderabad (India) on the theme “Anthropocene Crisis: Perils and Possibilities of the 21st Century” during which I presented a paper entitled “Higher Knowledge and Global Good: Reconceptualizing and Envisioning Higher Education in Africa for Shared and Enhanced Humanity”. This gave me another opportunity for enriching interaction in an Asian context.

These engagements with Asians and in Asian contexts have provided me an opportunity to enrich my general under-

standing of Asia and new perspectives with a focus on education, in my humble efforts to contribute, through scholarly and policy works, to social progress in Africa. The next section of my address deals with the broader African engagement in world politics and the synergy of efforts toward the establishment of African-Asian peace and development front.

African-Asian Solidarity Efforts in the First Half of the 20th Century

In recent history, Asian countries and people were the object of conquest and domination by the same Western European countries that oppressed people of Africa and the African forced into the historic Diaspora of the Trans-Atlantic enslavement.

The Afro-Asian relationship started to take shape between the two World Wars. In 1924, a group of Africans and Asians called the Anti-Imperialist League was formed in Europe and became the Association of Oppressed Peoples (AOP), which met in Brussels in February 1927. This brought together 175 delegates from 37 countries and territories of the times. Given its goal and the composition of the participants, it has been referred to as the precursor of “Afro-Asian solidarity, the forerunner of the conference at Bandung”. The participants included Nehru of India, Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, Muhammad Hatta of Indonesia, Madame Sun Yat-sen of China and Léopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal.

In the United States, debates in the same period, between the two World Wars, focused on two major dualist articulations: Orientalism and Eurocentric race theory, on the one hand, and Bolshevism and anticommunism on the other. In these polar representations of the world, actual and potential forces were driven by conflicts and wars. The Bandung Conference from the 18th to the 24th of April 1955 was appropriately characterized as “A Milestone in the Africa Asia alliance”.

In April 1954, an initial proposal was made by the Indonesian Government for the organization of an Asian-African conference. In December of the same year, Prime Ministers of five Asian countries: Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia and Pakistan held a conference in Bogor (Indonesia). At that meeting they reached an agreement to serve as co-conveners of an Asian-African conference. The consensus was to jointly call

the conference that the five countries had proposed. Following further discussions, a year later, the historic African-Asian meeting was held. In his address, Professor Lumumba-Kasongo extensively discusses the Bandung Conference. Given the focus of my address, it is important to note that for different reasons, neither DuBois nor Nkrumah, attended the Bandung Conference.

DuBois was prevented from attending the conference as his passport was confiscated by the government of the United States. However, he managed to have two powerful messages delivered: 1) a message of solidarity or “the Greetings” to the conference organizers and participants, and 2) a statement on “The Declaration of Independence” of African countries. Both messages were read to the conference and “were met with warm applause by the delegates” (DuBois 1982:236). In his Greetings, he stated:

We wish you well and bid you stand staunch and fast for peace and freedom, for an Africa and Asia equal with and independent of Europe and America, standing on its own feet, governing themselves as they decide, ... and establishing and conducting their own industrial systems as they see fit and not as British or American command (DuBois 1982:236).

In his Declaration of Independence of Africa, he wrote:

The people of Africa, black and white, brown and yellow, have the right to freedom and self-government, to food and shelter, education and health. ... Africa is for the Africans; its land and labor; its natural wealth and resources; its mountains, lakes and rivers; its cultures and its soul. ... Let the white world keep its missionaries at home to teach the Golden Rule to its corporate thieves. ... Peace on earth; no more war. ... All Hail Africa. (DuBois 1982:236-237).

As mentioned earlier, Nkrumah did not attend the Bandung Conference either; but in his case, it was because he could not travel as Head of State as the Gold Coast had not yet acquired its autonomy. However, the Gold Coast was represented by a three-member delegation headed by Kojo Botsio (member of Legislative Assembly). Despite its small size, the delegation of the Gold Coast, that stood just two years before the independence of the country, made a substantive contribution

and lasting impact. Indeed, in terms of the clarity and strength of the political position, Ghana was a key and powerful representative of Africa.

PanAfrican Foundation and Asian Connection

In the beginning of the 20th Century, the early years of organized efforts toward Afro-Asian collaboration coincided with the same period when the lives and histories of the two giants W. E. B. DuBois and Kwame Nkrumah started to converge. This convergence started from the United States to Europe and back to the African continent while they intensified their respective and collective struggle for freedom, justice and peace as a pre-requisite for social progress for the Africans and oppressed people everywhere.

In *The Souls of Black Folk* written in 1903, DuBois (1969) made one of his most famous observations: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line – the relation of the darker to lighter races of men [sic] in Asia and Africa, in America and the island sea” (DuBois 1969:54). This examination had a meaning not only in the context of the, then racially segregated, United States but also globally because colonialism was essentially built on racism. It became significant in the global context and the search for alliance among the African and Asian People. It was framed as an alliance of the Black/Brown and the Yellow (as the Asians were referred to at the time).

DuBois and Nkrumah met in the United States where Nkrumah spent ten years, from 1935 to 1945, primarily as a student. This period includes the entire duration of the World War II (WWII), an essentially European war for which Africans, African Americans, and the people of African descent elsewhere fought for liberty and freedom that they were not allowed to enjoy in Africa still firmly under colonial rule and the United States still governed by Jim Crow laws, and islands in the West Indies still controlled by European old slave and colonial powers. This experience also coincided with the organization of the 5th 1945 Pan-African Congress, which took place in Manchester (United Kingdom) and in which both DuBois and Nkrumah played prominent roles as President and Secretary, respectively. Given their respective ideologies and the actual power of the dominant system, they both strongly articulated the need for a global partnership that would

provide an alternative to the alliance of Western Europe and its extension in the Americas. Indeed, both DuBois and Nkrumah were seeking an alliance that could tilt the global system toward mutual respect, an appreciation of, and commitment to, justice and peace as *sine qua non* for social progress.

Among the numerous undertakings that DuBois either initiated, or to which he significantly contributed, in April 1950, five years after the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he established and was elected the chairperson of the Peace Information Center that was set up for the purpose of collecting and disseminating information on the international peace movement. One of the specific objectives of the center was to prevent any future use, by any nation in the world, of atomic weapons.

The goal and targeted beneficiaries of the work in which DuBois was engaged transcended ideological differences, ignored national borders and crossed color lines. His passion then, as before and later in his life journey, was to work toward a world of justice and peace. However, in the McCarthy era of terror, less than a year after the creation of the Peace Information Center, in February 1951, he was indicted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act that was adopted shortly before WWII, in 1938. He was tried as “an agent of a foreign principal”. This is the context in which he was prevented from attending the Bandung Conference. He was later acquitted.

DuBois travelled extensively across the globe. The Asian continent was one of the regions to which he traveled widely. However, he was not just an ordinary traveler. Indeed, he critically read during his voyages. Deliberately, but also pushed by the politics of the Cold War and the persistently racialized politics of increasingly conservative domination of the United States with far-reaching implications for the world, he became more and more a leftist radical. He intensified his travels to Asia, with a purpose, focusing on China where he observed the achievements and great potentials, at home and globally, and possibilities in cooperation with Africa. He argued that, given the global system of skewed power distribution along racial lines, the oppressed people must unite. He stated with great passion and hope: “Come to China, Africa, and look around” (DuBois 1968:407).

DuBois was still traveling to Asia in his 90s. As he recalled: "When in Peking, my 91st birthday was given national celebration. I pled for the unity of China and Africa ..." He went on to articulate some of the highlights of the day by adding that on this occasion, he was offered the opportunity "to speak to the people of China and Africa and, through them, to the world. Hail, then, and farewell, dwelling places of yellow and black races. Hail human kind" (DuBois 1968:405).

In a context when Nkrumah was discussing the Congo crisis, and the disposition of the East-West relations which were perceived as doomed and leading inevitably toward armed conflict, Nkrumah stated, as written in his book entitled *I Speak Freedom* (pp. 280-281): "The Afro-Asian nations, if they act together, might prove strong enough to be a decisive force for peace in the world."

Ghana under Nkrumah remained active in the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations. By a terrible irony, three years after DuBois' passing, Nkrumah was on his way to China when he lost power to the first Ghanaian military coup d'état that took place on February 24th 1966. During the journey and when he landed in Beijing, he was unaware of the coup. As a basic courtesy and sign of respect for his dignity, he was received on his arrival with full honors before the Chinese authorities brought the news to him. That was perhaps a sign of the changes to come in African and Asian countries internally, regionally and on the global scale and the promise of an alternative global alliance for peace and justice.

Concluding Remarks

Times have changed since the middle of 20th Century. Asian countries of yesterday and the confident and hopeful Africa at the time of the first independence celebrations, of which Ghana of Nkrumah had a particular Pan-African and global significance, have gone through different trajectories.

Had the Afro-Asian group been successful, what would the world be today and what would the state of African states and people be? No one will ever be able to answer these questions. The New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP),

reviving the spirit of African-Asian solidarity and cooperation, is being articulated in a fundamentally new era.

DuBois' life journey was linked to Africa within the global world. By accident, some of the dates in his long life coincided with some events of significance for the African people. Born in 1868, the year he graduated from high school in 1884 coincided with the beginning of the 1884/85 Berlin Conference at which the European partitioned Africa; he graduated with a BA from Fisk in 1888, the date when, finally, Brazil abolished slavery. In 1961, upon the invitation of Nkrumah, he moved to Ghana and in 1963 he became a citizen of Ghana. The same year, he passed away, at home on the African soil.

The year 1963 was also when the Pan-African vision and project vanished. Indeed, it was a turning point of missed opportunity in shaping Africa's fate and future, at the creation of OAU (Organization of African Unity). The progressive and Pan-African position that was promoted by the Casablanca group in which Nkrumah played a prominent role was defeated by the Monrovia group that opted for a conservative position that facilitated the continued neo-colonial framework in the relations between African states within the artificial borders and between Africa and the West and the rest of the world.

That turning point has had far-reaching and entrenched legacies on why, half a century after the process of independence started, African countries are still struggling amidst old and new development challenges, while their Asian counterparts have evolved into major regional and world political and/or economic powers to reckon with. The lack of progress since then has had implications in terms of the actual bargaining power that African countries have, and can create, in establishing their relationship with Asian countries of various sizes and power ranging from the emerging economies to the giant that is China.

With a renewed and clear vision along with the political will, African countries now have the possibility to guide in rekindling a version of the African-Asian alliance in a relatively strong position, and with bargaining power to move toward social progress.

Notes

1. This article is a text of the address I delivered as recipient of the 2010 Distinguished Africanist Award. Because of time factor, only a very brief summary of this address was actually delivered at the award ceremony on March 27, 2010, at SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton (New York).
2. "Fusionist Philosophy and Praxis in Japanese Education: A Basis for Reflection on a Pan-African Vision of Education for Social Progress", paper presented at Africana Studies Colloquium, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, October 2003.
3. Presentation on "DuBois, Nkrumah, and their Asian Connections in the Struggle for Global Justice and Peace" co-sponsored by the DuBois Center in Accra and the Center for African Studies of the University of Ghana at Legon, Accra, Ghana, and held at the Center for African Studies in March 2007.
4. My talk was entitled: "Kwame Nkrumah, W. E. B. DuBois, and the Africa-Asia Connections: In Search of Global Partnership for an Alternative World Vision, Peace, and Social Development", was given at the co-convened Symposium on "Stages in Black Emancipation and the Renewal of PanAfrican Consciousness: Abolition of "Slave Trade" (1807) and Celebration of Ghana's Independence (1957)" organized at the Africana Studies and Research Center, Cornell University, Africana Studies and research Center, November 2007.
5. Keynote address entitled "International Educational Cooperation and the Expectation for Japan's Contribution" presented at the annual conference of the Japan Education Forum JEF IV), jointly organized by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Center for the Study of International Cooperation in Education (CICE) of Hiroshima University and the Center for International Cooperation in Educational Development of the University of Tsukuba and co-sponsored by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Tokyo, Japan, February 2007.
6. The second phase with new sets of participants from African and Asian countries and institutions is underway.

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Freedom of Speech and Civil Peace: Times and Places when Humour Turns Deadly

Former President of CODESRIA and Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at the University of Columbia, Mahmood Mamdani won two Honorary Doctoral Awards this year, from both the University of Johannesburg (UJ) on 25 May 2010 and Addis Ababa University (AAU) on the 24 July 2010. The AAU award has been covered by the last issue of the CODESRIA Bulletin. In this issue, we present Mamdani's remarks after the UJ Award:

It warms my heart to see these flowing gowns. I congratulate you on work accomplished! For over a millennium, these gowns have been a symbol of high learning, from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. Should anyone ask you where they came from, tell them that the early universities of Europe – Oxford, Cambridge, la Sorbonne – borrowed them from the Islamic madressa of the Middle East. If they should seem incredulous, tell them that the gown did not come by itself: Because medieval European scholars borrowed from the madressa much of the curriculum, from Greek philosophy to Iranian astronomy, to Arab medicine and Indian mathematics, they had little difficulty in accepting this flowing gown, modelled after the dress of the desert nomad, as the symbol of high learning. Should they

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still express surprise, ask them to take a second look at the gowns of the ayatollahs in Iran and Iraq and elsewhere and they will see the resemblance. Education has no boundaries. Neither does it have an end. As the Waswahili in East Africa, where I come from, say: *Elimu haina muisho*.

Today, I want to talk to you about the core value of the liberal university; critical thought, not just any thought, but thought which dares to stand up to the dictates of power and to the embrace of wealth, even to the seduction of popular prejudice.

Yesterday, when I was in Cape Town, a friend gave me the week's edition of *Mail and Guardian*. I went straight for my favourite section, the cartoon by Zapiro. To my surprise, Zapiro featured a cartoon of Prophet Mohamed, agonising: 'OTHER Prophets have followers with a sense of humour! ...' I want to take this opportunity to reflect on times and places when humour turned deadly. Such a reflection

should allow us to think through the relationship between two great liberal objectives, freedom of speech and civil peace. Since Zapiro seems to present his series of cartoons as a second edition of the Danish cartoons, I shall begin with a reflection on the original.

When the Danish cartoon debate broke out, I was in Nigeria. If you stroll the streets of Kano, a Muslim-majority city in northern Nigeria, you will have no problem finding material caricaturing Christianity sold by street vendors. And if you go to the east of Nigeria, to Enugu for example, you will find a similar supply of materials caricaturing Islam. None of this is blasphemy; most of it is bigotry. It is well known that the Danish paper that published the offending cartoons was earlier offered cartoons of Jesus Christ. But the paper declined to print these on grounds that it would offend its Christian readers. Had the Danish paper published cartoons of Jesus Christ, that would have been blasphemy; the cartoons it did publish were evidence of bigotry, not blasphemy. Both blasphemy and bigotry belong to the larger tradition of free speech, but after a century of ethnic cleansing and genocide, we surely need to distinguish between the two strands of the same tradition. The language of

contemporary politics makes that distinction by referring to bigotry as hate speech.

Just a few weeks after the Danish cartoons were published, the German writer Gunter Grass was interviewed in a Portuguese weekly news magazine, *Visão*. In that interview, Gunter Grass said the Danish cartoons reminded him of anti-Semitic cartoons in a German magazine, *Der Stürmer*. The story was carried in a *New York Times* piece, which added that the publisher of *Der Stürmer* was tried at Nuremberg and executed. I am interested less in how close was the similarity between the Danish and the German cartoons, than in why a magazine publisher would be executed for publishing cartoons. One of the subjects I work on is the Rwanda genocide. Many of you would know that the International Tribunal in Arusha has pinned criminal responsibility for the genocide; not just on those who executed it but also on those who imagined it, including intellectuals, artists and journalists as in RTMC (Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines). The Rwandan trials are the latest to bring out the dark side of free speech, its underbelly: How power can instrumentalise free speech to frame a minority and present it for target practice.

To understand why courts committed to defending freedom of speech can hold cartoonists responsible for crimes against humanity, we need to distinguish between bigotry and blasphemy. Blasphemy is the practice of questioning a tradition from within. In contrast, bigotry is an assault on that tradition from the outside. If blasphemy is an attempt to speak truth to power, bigotry is the reverse: An attempt by power to instrumentalise truth. A defining feature of the cartoon debate is that bigotry is being mistaken for blasphemy. The history of blasphemy as a liberating force is particularly European, not even American. To understand the political role of blasphemy in Europe, we need to appreciate the organisation of the Church as an institutional power. Institutionalised religion in medieval Europe was organised as a form of hierarchical power, with an authority from the floor to the ceiling. Institutional Roman Catholicism mimicked the institutional organisation of the Roman empire, just as the institutional organisation of Protestant churches in Europe borrowed a leaf from the organisation of power in the nation states of Europe.

The European example was not emulated in the United States of America. Though blasphemy marked the moment of birth of the New World, the New World was not particularly receptive to blasphemy. The big change was political: Puritans and other Protestant denominations were organised more as congregations and sects, more like voluntary associations, than as hierarchical churches. There was also a change in religious practice: the puritans shifted the locus of individual morality from external constraint to internal discipline, displacing both the Pope and the Scriptures with inner conscience. Pioneered by the Quakers, the Christ of scriptures became the 'Christ within'. Unlike in Europe, religion in the rapidly developing settler democracy in the United States was very much a part of the language of the American Revolution and of the public sphere. The European experience has to be seen more as the exception than the rule.

And yet, the European experience is not without a lesson for the rest of us. It is precisely because of a history of opposition between organised religion and political society, and the consequent history of religious civil wars, that compromises have been worked out in Europe, both to protect the practice of free speech and to circumscribe it through laws that criminalise blasphemy. When internalised as civility, rather than when imposed by public power, these compromises have been key to keeping social peace in European societies. Let me give two examples to illustrate the point.

My first example dates from 1967 when Britain's leading publishing house, Penguin, published an English edition of a book of cartoons by France's most acclaimed cartoonist, Siné. The Penguin edition was introduced by Malcolm Muggeridge. Siné's *Massacre* contained a number of anticlerical and blasphemous cartoons, some of them with a sexual theme. Many booksellers, who found the content offensive, conveyed their feelings to Allan Lane, who had by that time almost retired from Penguin. Though he was not a practising Christian, Allen Lane took seriously the offence that this book seemed to cause to a number of his practising Christian friends. Here is Richard Webster's account of what followed:

One night, soon after the book had been published, he [Allen Lane] went

into Penguin's Harmondsworth warehouse with four accomplices, filled a trailer with all the remaining copies of the book, drove away and burnt them. The next day, the Penguin trade department reported the book "out of print".

Now Britain has laws against blasphemy, but neither Allan Lane nor Penguin was taken to court. Britain's laws on blasphemy were not called into action. I want to point your attention to one issue in particular. Allan Lane was not a practising Christian but he had internalised legal restraint as civility, as conduct necessary to upholding peaceful coexistence in a society with a history of religious conflict. To put it differently, the existence of political society requires the forging of a political pact, a compromise.

My second example is from the United States. It concerns a radio show called *Amos 'n' Andy* that began on WMAQ in Chicago on 19 March 1928, and eventually became the longest running radio programme in broadcast history. Conceived by two white actors who mimicked the so-called Negro dialect to portray two black characters, Amos Jones and Andy Brown, *Amos 'n' Andy* was a white show for black people. *Amos 'n' Andy* was also the first major all-black show in mainstream US entertainment. The longest running show in the history of radio broadcast in the US, *Amos 'n' Andy* gradually moved from radio to TV. Graduating to prime time network television in 1951, it became a syndicated show after 1953.

Every year, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) protested against the racist character of the portrayal that was the show. Giving seven reasons 'why the *Amos 'n' Andy* show should be taken off the air,' the NAACP said the show reinforced the prejudice that 'Negroes are inferior, lazy, dumb and dishonest,' that every character in the all-Black show 'is either a clown or a crook'. 'Negro doctors are shown as quacks and thieves', Negro lawyers 'as slippery cowards, ignorant of their profession and without ethics,' and Negro women 'as cackling, screaming shrews ... just short of vulgarity'. In sum, 'all Negroes are shown as dodging work of any kind'.

But CBS disagreed. You can still read the CBS point of view on the official Amos 'n' Andy website which still hopes that black people will learn to laugh at themselves: 'Perhaps we will collectively learn to lighten up, not get so bent out of shape, and learn to laugh at ourselves a little more'. I was reminded of it when I read the Zapiro cartoon in *Mail and Guardian* yesterday.

The TV show ran for nearly 15 years, from 1951 to 1965. Every year the NAACP protested, but every year the show continued. Then, without explanation, CBS withdrew the show, in 1965. What happened? In 1965 the Watts riots happened, and sparked the onset of a long, hot summer. The Watts riots were triggered by a petty incident, an encounter between a racist cop and a black motorist. That everyday incident triggered a riot that left 34 persons dead. Many asked: What is wrong with these people? How can the response be so disproportionate to the injury? After the riots, the Johnson administration appointed a commission, called the Kerner Commission, to answer this and other questions. The Kerner Commission Report made a distinction between what it called the trigger and the fuel: the trigger was an incident of petty racism, but the fuel was provided by centuries of racism. The lesson was clear: the country needed to address the consequences of a history of racism, not just its latest manifestation. Bob Gibson, the St Louis Cardinals pitcher, wrote about the Watts riots in his book *From Ghetto to Glory*. He compared the riots to a 'brushback pitch' – a pitch thrown over the batter's head to keep him from crowding the plate, a way of sending a message that the pitcher needs more space. CBS withdrew Amos 'n' Andy after the long hot summer of 1965. The compelling argument that the NAACP and other civil rights groups could not make, was made by the inarticulate rioters of Watts.

Why is this bit of history significant for us? CBS did not withdraw Amos 'n' Andy because the law had changed, for no such change happened. The reason for the change was political, not legal. For sure, there was a change of consciousness, but that change was triggered by political developments. CBS had learnt civility; more likely, it was taught civility. CBS had learnt that there was a difference between

black people laughing at themselves, and white people laughing at black people! It was like the difference between blasphemy and bigotry. That learning was part of a larger shift in American society, one that began with the Civil War and continued with the civil rights movement that followed the Second World War. This larger shift was the inclusion of African-Americans in a re-structured civil and political society. The saga of Amos 'n' Andy turned out to be a milestone, not just in the history of free speech, but in a larger history, that of black people's struggle to defend their human rights and their rights of citizenship in the US.

Can we deal with hate speech by legal restriction? I am not very optimistic. The law can be a corrective on individual discrimination, but it has seldom been an effective restraint on hate movements that target vulnerable minorities. If the episode of the Danish cartoons demonstrated one thing, it was that Islamophobia is a growing presence in Europe. One is struck by the ideological diversity of this phenomenon. Just as there was a left wing anti-Semitism in Europe before fascism, contemporary Islamophobia too is articulated in not only the familiar language of the right, but also the less familiar language of the left. The latter language is secular. The Danish cartoons and their enthusiastic re-publication throughout Europe, in both right and left-wing papers, was our first public glimpse of left and right Islamophobia marching in step formation. Its political effect has been to explode the middle ground. Is Zapiro asking us to evacuate the middle ground as testimony that we too possess a sense of humour?

If so, Zapiro has misread the real challenge that we face today. That challenge is both intellectual and political. The intellectual challenge lies in distinguishing between two strands in the history of free speech – blasphemy and bigotry. The political challenge lies in building a local and global coalition against all forms of bigotry. The growth of bigotry in Europe seems to me an unthinking response to two developments: locally, the dramatic growth of Muslim minorities in Europe and their struggle for human and citizenship rights; globally, we are going through an equally dramatic turning point in world history.

The history of the past five centuries has been one of Western domination. Beginning 1491, Western colonialism understood and presented itself to the world at large as a civilising and a rescue mission, a mission to rescue minorities and to civilise majorities. The colonising discourse historically focused on barbarities among the colonised – sati, child marriage and polygamy in India, female genital mutilation and slavery in Africa – and presented colonialism as a rescue mission for women, children and minorities, at the same time claiming to be a larger project to civilise majorities. Meanwhile, Western minorities lived in the colonies with privilege and impunity. Put together, it has been five centuries of a growing inability to live with difference in the world, while at the same time politicising difference. The irony is that a growing number of mainstream European politicians, perhaps nostalgic about empire, are experimenting with importing these same time-tested rhetorical techniques into domestic politics: The idea is to compile a list of barbaric cultural practices among immigrant minorities as a way to isolate, stigmatise and frame them.

But the world is changing. New powers are on the horizon: most obviously, China and India. Neither has a Muslim majority, but both have significant Muslim minorities. The Danish case teaches us by negative example. To the hitherto dominant Western minority, it presents a lesson in how not to respond to a changing world with fear and anxiety, masked with arrogance, but rather to try a little humility so as to understand the ways in which the world is indeed changing.

There is also a lesson here for Muslim peoples. The Middle East and Islam are part of the middle ground in this contest. Rather than be tempted to think that the struggle against Islamophobia is the main struggle – for it is not – let us put it in this larger context. Only that larger context can help us identify allies and highlight the importance of building alliances. Perhaps then we – and hopefully Zapiro – will be strong enough to confront organised hate campaigns, whether as calls to action or as cartoons, with a sense of humour.

A Reflection on the Bandung Conference in the Era of Liberal Globalization*

With the theme of “GLOBAL-
AFRICA, GLOBAL-ASIA:
Africa and Asia in the Age of
Globalization”, Africa and Asia have descended on the Binghamton University Campus and on the Institute of Global Cultural Studies. We have been invited to witness this timely meeting of two continents and with all their complexities, their philosophical, political, social, cultural and economic implications to our lives and beyond. Before I elaborate on this speech, which Professor Seifudein Adem and Professor Edward Kannyo allowed me to deliver in about twenty minutes, this grandiose event would not have been possible without the commitment and the organization of a group of scholars which deserves many thanks:

- Professor Edward Kannyo, President of the New York State African Studies Association;
- Professor Seifudein Adem, the Organizing Committee chair and the host of the Conference, Professor Lisa Yun, and Professor Michael O. West, Co-sponsors;
- Members of the Board of the New York State African Studies Association;
- Professor Locksley Edmondson, a Board Member, the introducer;

I cannot complete this list of the names of individuals and members of various committees which made this event possible without finalizing it, within the African traditions of respect, with a word of gratitude to the Distinguished and Honorable Mwalimu Mzee Ali Mazrui, whose blessing and inspiration must be felt in our work, in this place and the world over. In my tradition, Mzee is the equivalence of wisdom. It comes with responsibility and high expectations.

Distinguished scholars and Honorable Guest and Participants;

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends and Colleagues,

When Professor Edward Kannyo called me on the telephone to inform me that I had been nominated and selected for the New York State African Studies Distinguished Africanist Award for 2010, I

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

paused for a few seconds without knowing exactly how to react. But I thanked him and I added that this award is dedicated to the African people, the world over, without whom this recognition would not have been possible. Furthermore, he added: another winner is professor N'Dri Assie-Lumumba.

In any case, here we are to reflect and celebrate, at the same time, on the complexity of the relationship, in a holistic manner, between Africa and Asia, their peoples, their histories, their cultures and traditions, their economies, and their politics.

Let me start by saying that it is with a profound humility and an immense gratitude that I accept this Distinguished Africanist Award for 2010;

The world is at a crossroad of the meeting of cultural and civilization multitudes toward a more complex world system. The new movement contains more elements and voices of multiculturalism than what seems to be suggested by thinkers who support the thesis of the hegemonic domination of one culture. Understanding how these meetings have been taking place and the dynamics of cultures themselves is central to rethinking and projecting a better tomorrow.

Globalization is a tangible and functional phenomenon, as it manifests itself in the dynamics of international political economy, the quests for universal democratic values, universalization of the Internet and Google, etc. However, this globalization is not functioning as a monolithic force. It is dynamics shaped by multitudes of cultures. Furthermore, at the cultural level, we are still struggling to understand how the above factors, for instance, have been affecting or affected by specific national and regional cultures in positive manners. This is the context in which I will address the issues about the Bandung Conference.

What are the Origins, Main Objectives, and General Background of the Bandung Conference?

Since the 1990s, there has been the rise of the Global Social Forum (GSF) with the coalition of progressive groups from different social, environmental and intellectual backgrounds all over the world. Its role, as an umbrella of a resistance movement against neo-liberal globalization and its reformist policies and agenda, has been to influence or to disturb the meetings of the boards of directors of the global institutions on behalf of the poor people, the poor economies, and poor countries. In the long run, the ultimate claim of this movement is to search for an alternative system of governance with a high dose of participatory management of social and human resources, and a strong basis for equal distribution of global resources. The majority of the poor people are located in Africa.

This new movement did motivate this author to revisit the meanings of the meeting of the Bandung Conference. Furthermore, because Japan finally participated in this conference as an invited political actor; and because upon the ideology of this conference, the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was born, it is necessary to examine the evolution of this conference and see if it has influenced, directly or indirectly by action and intention, Japan-Africa's relations.

What did the Bandung Conference in 1955 specifically mean or represent for African countries and people that were at the time still mostly colonized by the European powers and for the Asian countries and people, who were politically independent from the same powers, though a few of them were still facing serious political instability because of the international and regional power struggles? What were the main agenda items of this conference? What specific role did Japan play in it? Finally, has the Bandung Conference succeeded in influencing, directly or indirectly, African-Japanese relations in some positive and significant ways during and after the end of bipolarity?

Although this speech does not specifically address all the above questions in a systemic or scientific manner, a general discussion on the historical significance of the conference helps locate its main objectives and strategies within the context of the imperatives of the international bipolarity of the world system. I capture its main objectives, identify major elements of the grand ideological foundation of the conference, if any, and describe the conference's policy implications for Japan and Africa.

One of the main issues raised in this chapter is about the "political vision" embodied in the declarations of the conference. The question of "political vision" also implies the existence of an ideology or ideological principle, or norms. However, historical facts testify that based on various political locations and historical backgrounds of the participants, the Bandung Conference could not be intended to produce a consensual political ideology, which would have been incorporated into the national party politics of any nation-state. The diverse voices of the participants and the advocates of the conference's ideals should transcend any national ideology basis in their actions against the imperialist nature of the world system as perceived and defined in the 20th century. Whether or not in reality, the above assumption could possibly be translated into national political actions in mobilizing the people and the states without creating any strong transcontinental ideological basis, is part of my problematic. However, it is sufficient to say that the conference aimed at creating a collective consciousness and a common platform based on the nature of the existing international political economy. What is the philosophical foundation of that consciousness?

Historically, the Western powers created the world system ideologically. As such, the struggles against those powers logically should start by deconstructing that ideology. These powers tend to react to and/or appreciate better the actions that are ideologically based than those which are not. It is so because in general with an analysis of an ideological framework, actions of a social group, a political party or an individual are more discernable, and thus, predictable.

Major cultural, socio-economic and political differences among the states represented were the factors which made the

ideological foundation of their public speeches difficult to reconcile with the common agenda of the forum. But the emerged critics of the world system from the delegates can be considered by themselves to be ideologically framed phenomena as well as the embodiment of the futurism that was projected during and after the conference. As argued elsewhere: "One cannot fully or comprehensively understand the dynamics of the nation-states, the policies, politics, and their international relations without linking them theoretically and empirically to their ideological base. ... the Nation-state is essentially an ideological construct and a self-motivating entity" (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005:152). Although it would be difficult to systematically demonstrate that the non-alignment has been a common accepted ideology among the participants of the conference, it is also equally difficult, based on historical facts and the nature of alliances that took place after the conference, to argue persuasively that it was not an ideologically based forum.

The agenda for holding an Asian-African Conference was gradually negotiated among its organizers on the initiative of Ali Mohammed of Pakistan. The vision was not shared by all at once. It is not clear what interests he had in Africa and what concrete factors motivated him to start this initiative. There was no collective regional interest in Africa at the time. As George McTurnan Kahin stated:

Indonesia's idea originating primarily with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. At first his proposal was to invite only the Afro-Asian group within the United Nations, and it was with this in mind that he introduced the idea to the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan at their meeting in Colombo at the end of April 1954. Initially only Pakistan's Mohammed Ali was enthusiastic; Ceylon's Sir John Kotelawala was willing to go along but India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma's U Nu, while both nodding polite approval of the idea, were skeptical of the feasibility and value of holding such a conference. Not until his trip to New Delhi in late September 1954 did Sastroamidjojo, Win Nehru's full acceptance of his proposal (1956:2).

Thus, *le fait accompli*, from 18 to 25 April 1955, the Prime Ministers of the group called five Colombo powers, namely, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Indonesia, India and Pakistan organized

a meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss the themes and problems of economic co-operation, human rights, self-determination, the problems of dependent people, and the promotion of peace (Ampiah 1997:39). Colombo is the capital city of Sri Lanka. Egypt was also an active member of the organizing committee located outside of Asia. This conference was a historic meeting in which political leaders and foreign ministers of 29 Asian and African countries gathered on the initiative of the leaders of the Third World at that time, including Premier Chou En-lai (China), President Achmed Sukarno (Indonesia), Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, Prime Minister U Nu of Myanmar, and Sir John Kotelawala of Sri Lanka. Who were specifically invited and why? The above organizers agreed that the conference should have a broad geographic basis as Homer Jack described:

All the countries in Asia and Africa, which have independent governments should be invited. However, "minor variations and modifications of this basic principle" were made and the invitations were limited to 25 specific countries as follows: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Federation, China (not Formosa), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Viet-nam (North), Viet-nam (South) and Yemen. It was further stated that "acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its view of the status of any other country" and the Prime Ministers also emphasized that "the form of government and the way of life of any country in no way be subjected to interference by another". They were certain striking omissions from the list of countries invited: North Korea, South Korea, Nationalist China on Taiwan (Formosa), Australia, New Zealand, Russia (which is at least in part of Asia), Israel and the Union of South Africa. While the basis for these omissions were politically obvious, there were never any official reasons given (1955:2-3).

There were more than 2,000 delegates, journalists and observers who attended the meeting. The African region had the smallest number of delegates from Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Libya and Sudan. The Egyptian delega-

tion was led by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. That of Gold Coast/Ghana (only 3 members) was led by Kojo Bastio, Minister of the State.

The conference is therefore recognized as a symbol of unity and *rapprochement* amongst the Asian and African States. It took place in the middle of Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the continuous march of Western colonial powers in the countries within the Global South, despite the rise of the various forms of nationalist and popular resistance to Western imperialism.

For many, this conference historically became the cornerstone of the African-Asian solidarity, despite the reality of the economic and political domination from the Global North and the structural weaknesses of the countries and states in the Global South, especially in Africa. Since the 1950s, regular African-Asian summits have been contributing to revive the spirit of Bandung and encourage the creation of a new partnership between African and Asian states and countries.

The fiftieth year anniversary of the Bandung Conference was celebrated in the Asian-African Summit 2005 and the Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Asian-African Conference 1955 on April 20-24, 2005 in Bandung and Jakarta, Indonesia under the leadership of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and the African President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The theme of the conference was "Invigorating the Bandung Spirit: Working toward a New Asian-African Strategic Partnership". Japan was the only industrialized country that was formally invited to the Conference. As a bridge between the conference and the G8 Process, it holds a special important position. The meetings of the preparation for this anniversary were held in Indonesia (Bandung) in August 2003 and South Africa (Durban) in August 2004.

In relation to what Bandung has historically represented, it is perhaps correct to argue that it would have been expected that major international events would have been organized by the United Nations for the celebration of this occasion as well as other mini-national conferences at the regional and national levels. The demands for such celebrations were not totally absent among African and Asian scholars and their research agendas. For instance, many African and Asian scholars ex-

pressed directly to me, as the Editor-in-Chief of the African and Asian Journal published by Brill in Leiden, the Netherlands, the need to organize some of important conferences on the Bandung Conference. However, by lack of financial resources, I only encouraged scholars who contacted him to organize seminars in their own institutions.

Has this major event been, to a large extent, forgotten in the euphoria of post-Cold War liberal politics and globalization? Many people, including this author, have thought that it would be necessary to re-think this conference in the context of permanent struggles in Africa to search for new paradigms of development – as the old ones have been in, most cases, clearly deficient or inappropriate more so in Africa than in Asia.

An attempt to answer some of the questions posed above requires an interpretation and an understanding of political history in the light of national and international empirical facts. The Bandung Conference was essentially an international event. As part of international relations' paradigms, it can be examined as being part of the nation-states' projects in Africa and Asia. Pragmatism of international imperatives also may require that we make a deductive reasoning out of the dominant patterns of relationship among the states that participated in the conference and those which were yet to be born. The deductive analysis from the general rules helps relate the effects of the Bandung Conference to local national issues.

African and Asian delegates did not go to Bandung with the same agendas and expectations. The ways these nation-states were going to gain their independence, their political location in international relations, the level of their socio-economic development and the level and quality of the struggles toward the independence are some factors that influence the discourse that took place in the Bandung Conference and beyond. But participants had a commitment to have common resolutions.

As already indicated, this conference occurred at a period of decolonization in Asia. Although the movements of decolonization had gathered some important momentum in some African countries, most of them were still firmly under the yoke of the European colonialism.

Burma (Myanmar) gained its independence in 1948, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1948 and Indonesia proclaimed independence earlier on 17 August 1945 but it took 4 years of diplomatic negotiations and armed resistance against the Dutch to recognize its independence on 27 December 1949. India won its independence in 1947 with non-violence but there was a bloody struggle between the Muslims and Hindus which was instigated, inspired and supported partially by the divide and rule principle of the British colonial political strategy. Pakistan separated from India by the British signing a peace treaty with India in 1947. Thus, British colonial administration was forced to abandon its former colonies of India, Burma and Ceylon after a combination of armed struggles and negotiations.

There were all together 29 nation-states represented at the conference. In addition to the Prime Ministers who were the conveners, foreign ministers and many delegates from African colonized countries and many parts of Asia also joined the conference. The conference was well popularized and publicized. In that year, in Africa, only Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia were independent countries.

Liberia gained its independence from the American Colonization Society in 1847. Egypt gained its independence in 1922 from the United Kingdom, and Ethiopia was never formally colonized by the European powers (though it became a neo-colonial state), despite the Italian invasion of 1930 by Mussolini. Mussolini's invasion was supported by Japan, although Japan had previously good relations with the imperial Ethiopian power. But the "Northern province of Ethiopia", Asmara was firmly colonized by Italy. It is necessary to link this general background to the main objectives of the Conference, as Ampiah stated:

The conference was organized to promote the highest aspirations of the peoples of Asia and Africa; that is, positive life chances for the disadvantaged nations of the international community. These ambitions were to be further channeled into an articulate and coherent 'third force' in a world supposedly frozen into two camps by the Cold War. ...The one underlying theme that ran through the economic, cultural, and political objectives of the conference was a sense among the members, irrespective of their ideological orientation, that they

would not be trapped with their experiences as 'dependents' or appendages of colonialism. This was clearly expressed in the conference's universal declaration that 'colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end.' Essentially, the spirit of the conference hinged on the determination of the member states to preserve their newly won freedoms and to reach out for more through their persistent opposition to colonialism and imperialism, as well as through a systematic attempt to advance the economic well-being of the people they represented, thereby questioning the essence of the UN (Ampiah op. cit.:39-40).

Although Japan became occupied by the American and allied forces, it was an imperial power in Asia not long back before the conference. In addition, the delegates talked about a 'third way' while Japan was already located in the 'first way' associated with capitalism led by the United States. Thus, it is clear that Japanese delegates had some difficulties locating themselves in the discourse of the conference.

Despite the reluctance to accept the invitation, the Japanese delegates attended the conference after being persuaded by the United States to do so. It was in the interest of Japan to have it represented in a conference that was going to talk about a new Asia. "The proposal of the invitation was made by Pakistan with support of Ceylon, but also a certain amount of contention from others" (Ampiah op. cit.:41). As a result, in a strange or awkward way, Japan came back to Asia through the implementation of many dimensions of the Bandung Conference, as Kitagawa indicated:

Invitation of Japan to the Bandung Conference was a product of international political dynamism in Asia. This conference is widely known as the arena of the union of newly independent Asian and African countries that hoisted the flag of anti-colonialism. In reality, this conference was strongly coloured by the Cold War system in which Asian countries of liberal camp defended against offensive move by communist or neutral countries like India and China. India tries to call China to the conference. On the contrary Pakistan, who was in the liberal camp and opposed to India, schemed to invite Japan, an important figure as anti-communist, in

order to put a check on the India-China leadership in this conference, Japan tries to survive this difficult situation by the passive political stance but her existence itself had already become an important part of international politics regardless {of} her intentions (2006:3).

The Japanese delegation was led by Tatsunosuke Takasaki, who was a Minister of the State and the Director-General of Economic Counsel Board. Japan has been operating within the orbit of the Western world, but it also made an "unspoken" commitment to the Afro-Asian group, as articulated in this Bandung Conference. Japanese commitment to the conference's declaration may determine, to a certain extent, how Japan has defined and dealt with Africa later. Obviously, as a former colonial power, Japanese delegation's position was not comfortable. But, geo-politics' interests and those of world politics must be reconciled.

As a nation-state *par excellent*, an auto-centered political entity in terms of its interests, Japan desired to renew ties with Asia in trade areas and also to become a member of the United Nations in 1956. And it must correct its past mistakes as Kweku Ampiah indicated:

Most importantly, Takasaki's speech at the conference contained an element of apology to Japan's neighbours for the atrocities Japan committed against them: 'In World War II, Japan, I regret to say, inflicted damages upon her neighbours.' And he tried, obviously as instructed, to use the occasion to assure them that Japan had 'no intentions of repeating its past vicious foreign policy.' Japan has reestablished democracy, having learned her lesson at immense cost (op. cit.:43).

This speech did not have any immediate impact in Africa because most countries in Africa were still under colonization in the 1950s. However, since the 1970s, the situation started to change.

It should be also emphasized that in Asia at large, the political situation was still very tense, volatil and extremely complex at the time of the conference as C. P. Fitzgerald, who also attended the conference also, wrote:

From north to south there are four major trouble areas in the Far East: Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and Malaya. The Korea problem has been solved – or shelved – in manner highly

unsatisfactory to both parties in Korea, yet in all probability for a long time to come. Formosa remains acute, Indochina threatens renewed danger, Malaya smolders on. In each case, behind the immediate local conflict is the factor that makes these troubles significant for the world at large, growing power of China and her alliance with Russia. The West has wished to impose settlements of these issues which took no account of China, and the attempts has failed everywhere failed; for where settlements or partial solutions have been achieved it has been in each case necessary to abandon the pretense that China does not exist and come to term with Peking. The example of Bandung, where China was accepted, and where useful negotiation between China and her inimical southern neighbors proved, cannot in the future be ignored (1955:114).

The rise of the communist movement in Malaya was fully supported by China. Most of the communists were born in the mainland. China had both Russia and Japan in its political mind and its definition of security. Britain did not admit that a "foreign Asian power" could have a strong influence in its former colony (op. cit.:116).

In addition to the above matters, the issue of security of Japan in the region was also important for Japan and its sponsor and mentor, the United States. The conference took place in the real hot international political atmosphere of the Cold War politics. Its imperatives and implications were part of the debate. The Afro-Asian coalition was looking for the new definition and location of Africa and Asia in world system. The issue of anti-colonialism was also central, as its sentiment was the foundation of the Afro-Asian alliance, as Seifudein Adem stated:

Invitation of Japan to the Bandung Conference was a product of international political dynamism in Asia. This Conference is widely known as the arena of the union of newly independent Asian and African countries that hoisted the flag of anti-colonialism. In reality this conference was strongly coloured by the Cold War system in which Asian countries of liberal camp defended against offensive move by communist or neutral countries like India and China (2003:3).

In Japan itself, it also should be noted that in the same year of the conference, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) consolidated its power in becoming what is known as the 1955 System of Japan. It was called so in reference to the year in which the LDP was created from a merger of right-of-center political parties (Maswood et al. 2000:164). A new strong political machine, which subsequently ruled the country for more than three decades, did also shape its perceptions of Bandung in ideological and pragmatic terms.

Japan became an active participant in the Bandung Conference in 1955, which promoted solidarity in developmental policy and political decisions among the countries in the Global South (African and Asian) through the emerging non-alignment movement. This grouping later constituted the foundation of the group of 77 in the United Nations. As Samir Amin stated: "If I define Bandung as the dominant characteristic of the second phase of post war period, it is not from any "third worldist" predilection, but because the world system was organized around the emergence of the Third World" (1994:14).

The Conference offered a new departing ideological definition about the existing capitalist system and its main agency, the state. It would be necessary to look at how Japan-Africa's relations may reflect political struggles within the spirit of the Afro-Asian alliances and how these alliances could influence the orbit of power, as Samir Amin indicated:

The real obstacle to the United States hegemony came from the Afro-Asian national liberation movement. The countries in these regions were determined to throw off the colonial yoke of the nineteenth-century. Imperialism has never been able to make the social and political compromises necessary to install stable powers operating to its advantage in the country of the capitalist periphery (1994:28).

Non-Alignment Foundation of the Conference

The Bandung Conference has generally been recognized as a forum in which its political actors initiated the motion of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) from an Afro-Asian perspective. In my point of view, this conference was, in terms of its ideological and policy claims, and its international relations' implications, perhaps the

single most important Afro-Asian Conference in the 20th century.

Within the United Nations, the Group of 77 was formed to pursue nonalignment as a way of consolidating strong ties among the states, which were either formally colonized by the Western powers or those with economic and political characteristics of the Global South. The G77 countries are a group of more than a hundred less industrialized countries, which set up as a counter-lobby to developed G7 countries (Adams 2001:89). As of 2001, the group was constituted of 128 countries.

The establishment of the Non-alignment Movement in 1961 was intended to begin the process of actualizing solidarity and cooperation among all nation-states, which were willing to join a block of interests called the Global South. For instance, on the principle of "ideological neutrality" and cooperation, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed on August 8, 1967 by the representatives of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia in order to deal with the sub-regional economic and political issues within the spirit of finding a common ground to address them. It was declared its non-alignment position in 1971.

As a movement, the non-alignment idea dominated the political discourse in the United Nations in the 1970s with some episodic eruption in the United Nations General Assembly in the 1980s. However, toward the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, despite the continuous visibility of the so-called Group of 77 in the United Nations, with the rigid implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the so-called International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization programmes and their social consequences in the Global South, and the abrupt end of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the flame of the movement started to weaken significantly. However, with the rise of global social forum, toward the end of the 1990s, the movement has risen again, this time with different agendas. It should also be mentioned that although the movement is well known internationally, there have been fewer empirical or historical research projects developed in the academic and research units on the policy and political implications of the Bandung Conference than what one would expect, given its historical importance.

The Conference was held when the colonial alignments were gradually breaking down in some parts of Asia. However, the United States, China and Russia were struggling to re-establish and/or maintain their interests in the region, while the colonial alignments were being redefined in South America, especially with the United States' neo-colonial domination and control in the sub-continent within a framework of "in my backyard policy reasoning" and when also, in Africa, the ideologies of colonial alignments with their regional nuances, were still too strong in most countries.

In the 1950s, many popular and social movements against colonial policies and politics in Africa were expanding and in some cases consolidating themselves despite the brutal actions and policies associated with the post-war colonial powers. At the same time, reformist colonial state policies, for instance, the French and British policies of gradualism as an approach to the political independence had started to be implemented. The discourse on transition politics had started with the exception of the Belgian administration, which believed in extending colonial administration for a longer period of time because of the lack of preparedness and readiness.

Furthermore, C. P. Fitzgerald indicated in 1955 that the atmosphere produced at Bandung was one of relaxation of tension. The controversial questions were put aside, and the conference did in fact "seek common ground and found it in the unanimous condemnation of colonialism in all its manifestations" (op. cit.:113).

In addition to nationalism, what were other important objectives pursued in the conference? The conference created a new possibility, new arena, for Japan to deal with—the fear of socialism in the region. The spirit of nationalism associated with the Conference engendered new dynamics between Japan and China. It should be noted that China was very influential to all over South East Asia, partially because of the nature of its revolution, namely people's revolution, and partially also because of the existence of extensively scattered Chinese Diaspora. Most of these Chinese groups were obviously not Maoists or Marxists, but they had a strong cultural nationalism, which made them attached to the mainland. China came to the conference with attitudes and strategies not to antagonize anyone or

show moral and intellectual arrogance, which generally is associated with any revolutionary socialism and its superiority complex. According to C. P. Fitzgerald, paraphrasing Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai)'s keynote speech:

The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel....There is no need at this Conference to publicize one's ideology and the political system of one's country....The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek common ground, not to create divergence (Ibid.).

This conciliatory perspective was more of a strategy for the Chinese leaders to gain the trust in Asia and Africa than a reflection of a process of giving up their socialism. In Africa, as indicated earlier, popular and social movements on the one hand, and reforms originated from the colonial African states on the other, were advancing different agendas: namely decolonization, independence, and the politics of "immorality" of, and/or the maintenance of quasi status quo within, the state by elements of the emerging African political elite.

In the decade of the 1950s, several African countries gained their nominal independence namely, Libya (1951), Sudan (1956), Morocco (1956) and Tunisia (1956). In the same period, the war of liberation was being waged in Algeria. In 1957, Ghana gained independence from Great Britain in the euphoria of pan-Africanism of Kwame Nkrumah with a strong cooperation of Nasser of Egypt who also was articulating pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. The case of Ghana was highly popularized – partially because of Kwame Nkrumah's charisma and his pan-African perspective on Africa and also because Ghana was the first country to gain independence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A brief *détour* is necessary to point out the importance of Ghana in the initial Japan-Africa's relations. The views about, and/or on, Africa as defined by the Japanese newspapers in the 1950s were very much fragmented for one to gain any systematic understanding of the problems colonial Africa was facing (Kitagawa op.cit.). However, with the independence of Ghana, and other countries later in the 1960s, Japan started to define its relationship with Africa differently, though it also

followed the British and American diplomatic paths. This issue is expanded in the section on Japanese foreign policy. The beginning of the Japanese relations with Africa started gradually in the 1950s in South Africa – then slowly they expanded to the independent countries following the political prism of the United States.

Although the Bandung Conference took place at a period of serious political tensions in Asia and the unpredictable acceleration of popular and social movements toward decolonization in most parts of Africa, it also produced achievements as C. P. Fitzgerald noted:

Unity, agreement, and common resolutions were therefore achieved on a number of more or less abstract questions, such as colonialism, human rights, the promotion of world peace, racial discrimination; but the major problems of Asia were not touched upon in the public sessions of the conference, nor in Committees. How far have these matters have been discussed in the many private lunches, dinners, and other meetings, is, of course unknown. Bandung created a feeling of fellowship of goodwill; it provided, the opportunity for a new departure, or it was used as a convenient occasion to announce a new policy. But the goodwill must meet hard problems, the new departure must find a way round major obstacles, and the new policy must try to resolve difficulties, which the old policies only aggravated (op.cit.:114).

The leadership of the conference was divided between India, which had adopted its liberal democracy model, Indonesia, which had articulated its nationalism under Sukarno, and China with its communist revolutionary dogmas. However, it should be noted that Zhou Enlai of China displayed a moderate and conciliatory attitude that tended to quiet fears of some anticommunist delegates concerning China's intentions. The outcome of this conference set up a motion that consolidated the relationship between Africa and Asia through the NAM.

Final Declared Resolutions

Despite cultural, ideological, historical and political differences among the delegates, a ten-point "declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation" was

adopted, which included the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and principles of the charter of the United Nations;
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;
5. Respect of the Right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations;
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of big power;
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries;
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations;
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;
10. Respect for justice and international obligation (Jayaprakash 2005 and Jack 1955:28).

Other points of the final resolutions include: economic cooperation (trade affairs and nuclear energy), cultural cooperation, human rights and self-determination, problems of dependent people, other problems such as the existing tension in the Middle East, and the promotion of a world of peace and cooperation. To actualize these resolutions into the policy arena, the state system was firmly valorized, regional cooperation was encouraged and supported, and the principles articulating human dignity were promoted. On the one hand, statism was going to maintain many dimensions of status quo in the world of the states, and on the other hand, the concepts of cooperation and solidarity, and the values of human rights were intended to advance political and economic reforms.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's speech in the concluding session embodies the core thoughts reflected in the listed resolutions above and final principles adopted. Thus, it is necessary to recapture a few short excerpts for the purpose of this work. As he articulated:

So, we all came with own perspectives, with our problems, each one considering his own problems the most important in the world, but, at the same time, trying to understand the big problems of the world, as also the big problems of Asia and Africa; trying somehow to fit our problems into this larger context, because, in the ultimate analysis, all our problems, however important they may be, cannot be kept apart from these larger problems and can hardly be solved unless these larger problems are settled. ... We are determined in this new phase of Asia and Africa to make good. We are, primarily not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent. ... It is time to bring happiness and prosperity to our people and to discard all the age-old shackles that have tied us not only politically but economically—to those you might call shackles of colonialism—and also shackles of our making. ... I know we directed such criticism ourselves because we thought that it was not the resolutions that would solve the problems that face us today, but that only our practices and actions would bring success to our aims and ideals. ... Well, if there is anything that Asia wants to tell the World, it is this: "no yes-men" in Asia, I hope, nor in Africa... But in the future we shall only co-operate as equals; there is no friendship when nations are not equal, when one has to obey the other and when one dominates the other... I wish to speak no ill of anybody. In Asia, all of us have many faults as countries, as individuals. Our past history shows that, Nevertheless, I say that Europe has been in the past a continent full of conflicts, full of trouble, full of hatred, and their conflicts continue and we have been dragged into their wars because we were tied to their chariot wheels. ... Are we copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians? What are we? We are Asians and Africans. We are nothing else (Government of India 1955:5-11).

Nationalism, self-determination, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and the spirit of cooperation were emphasized in

this talk. The position of Japan in the new projected international and regional relations was difficult to very clearly read. Japan was still strongly aligned to the United States politics (Japan became the closest ally of the United States after 1952), foreign relations and their international relations. It did not adhere to the ideas of non-alignment. In fact, it was antagonistic to this movement. But at the same time, Japan was obliged to work with countries, which have adopted the non-alignment as their policy guidelines in international relations. NAM implies some kinds of "ideological neutrality" within the international power struggles that characterized post world politics. However, considered as a "third way", in a world that was dominated by two other ways, non-alignment became clearly a new ideological symbolism (or an ideological umbrella) that was more important than a simple strategy. While most of these countries claimed for non-ideological commitment at the top (international level), at the national level, most of them had ideological positions, which also shaped their foreign policies and politics.

Given the nature of the Japanese political economy, its place in international political economy and its hidden political ambitions, it did not have any choice but to dialogue and also develop strategies for conducting businesses with other conference participants. The Japanese chief representative in the conference, Mr. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, emphasized that Japan had interest in (1) international peace; (2) economic cooperation; and (3) cultural exchange (Ampiah op. cit.:43). In this regard, Japan has been consistent in its international relations.

To conclude, it is necessary to recapture the most important elements that are related to the claims and ideas of the Bandung Conference. These points are reflected in the grand ideas of the political leaders in Asia and Africa. The leaders of China, led by Zhou Enlai, articulated socialism not *à la Moscou* and peaceful relations, those of India led by Prime Minister Nehru expressed liberalism, nationalism and non-violence, those of Indonesia led by President Sukarno articulated nationalism and decolonization, and the emerging leaders in many African countries were pushing for decolonization agenda with different strategies among which later nationalism, panAfricanism, or accommodationism became the most

prominent. The opposition against colonialism, neocolonialism or any imperialistic based kind of policies was probably the most important single consensual position that unified various interests, mobilized human spirit in envisioning a new and better world system. Could this opposition be forcefully managed and actualized without any concrete and well-defined ideology?

The final speeches and the declarations made cannot escape the evaluation from an ideological canon of geo-political location of the participants. Broadly, non-alignment was *de facto* an "ideological alignment" of the countries, which were structurally facing similar problems within a bigger framework, oppressed by similar forces and subjected to the same global rules of the games.

The Bandung Conference provided an avenue to discuss structural problems of the world and project how their impact in Asia and Africa was felt. It gave hope through cooperation and struggle against all forms of oppressive colonial forces. However, it failed to address the question of the structures of the Asian and African states and their relations to the international political economy. Nor did it deal adequately with the issue of the nature of the ideologies of the states in Asia and Africa. Thus, although the symptoms of the problems were well defined, it did not sufficiently clarify what kind of political societies to be created, based on what kind of national ideologies, as a result of the declarations and final resolutions of the conference.

The spirit of the Afro-Asian solidarity and cooperation rooted in the Bandung Conference has had various interpretations over the past four decades. It has been an instrument of power consolidation by both leftist and rightist African political leaders.

It should be noted that the Bandung Conference projected, for the first time, the consciousness of Third Worldism. The term third world was first used as a political category at this conference. The conference's main figures – Nehru (India), Nasser (Egypt), Zhou Enlai (China) – were already in power. This consciousness led to the movement of global solidarity among the countries located in the Global South. This was a big achievement then. However, within the current global economy, is this movement still relevant?

Finally, between 1956 and 1973, the non-alignment solidly emerged within the United Nations system as a new solidarity group among the countries in the Global South. The solid participation of Africans in its conferences is an indicator of how African states adopted this movement as part of their national agenda. For instance, in every single conference whether it was in Belgrade in 1961, Cairo in 1964, Lusaka, in 1973, or Havana in 1983, the African delegates constituted almost half of the total number of the delegates (Ebodé 1999:82). In the last conference of the members of the non-alignment in September 1989 in Belgrade, it was clear the movement was losing its fuel as a result of internal conflicts and the force of polarization of the Cold War era.

In the last summit of the NAM held in Cairo in Egypt in July 2009, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was elected as the President of the movement. Indeed, his election reflects the lack of seriousness and commitment among its members to consolidate the movement's momentum in order to deal effectively with the marginalization of its members in the functioning and political hierarchy of the world system. Most members of the NAM, especially those located in Africa, suffer from the deepening of the impoverishment in their conditions, which is partially caused by the contradictory actions and political philosophy of the forces and agencies of the 'disaster capitalism.' Mubarak is the strongest ally of the United States, the champion of this type of capitalism, as it was reiterated through the current financial and economic crisis.

With the rise of China and India in their particular triangular relationship with the European Union and the United States, does the spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity

matter any longer? Does Japan, the second largest economy in the world, in a new competitive world economy, need the spirit of Bandung? We should also pursue, within the solidarity beyond the Bandung, the studies (historically and culturally) of the presence of Africans in Asia which I have started to investigate.

Note

- * Being a text of the speech delivered as recipient of the 2010 Distinguished Africanist Award. The speech is based on a chapter entitled 'The Bandung Conference (1955): Ideology of Non-Alignment and Pragmatism of Afro-Asian Alliances' in my book, *Japan and African Relations*, New York: Palmgrave-MacMillan, 2010.

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
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Global History: A View from the South

Samir Amin



Responding to the need to take a fresh look at world history, hitherto dominated by Eurocentric ideologues and historians in their attempt to justify the nature and character of modern capitalism, Samir Amin looks in this book at the ancient world system and how it has influenced the development of the modern world. He also analyses the origin and nature of modern globalisation and the challenges it presents in achieving socialism. Amin examines the role played by Central Asia in determining the course of world history as well as the different roads taken by Europe and China. The book looks closely at a theme that has been primordial to his contribution to political and economic thought: the question of unequal development. This is a refreshing and creative work that is necessary reading for anyone wanting to understand the real process of history.

CODESRIA Activities

Research

In the second half of 2010, in addition to the routine tasks of monitoring of basic programmes (NWGs, MWGs and CRNs), special efforts were made to launch new programmes and hold conferences and workshops. Two hundred and fifty African researchers and academics, from across the continent, and representing different social science disciplines, attended the scientific meetings. During the selection process that preceded each of these activities, the challenge was to ensure a gender balance with regard to participants. Commendable efforts were made in the development of collaborative programmes involving regional and international institutions. The Research Programme maintained its leadership role in these collaborative programmes by either playing active roles in the scientific committees, actually organising specific activities, or directing organisations responsible for implementing such networks.

The Programme strengthened its visibility and that of its activities through a more regular exchange of information with the CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre (CODICE) which is responsible for updating the Council's website.

Main Programmes

Comparative Research Networks (CRNs)

A joint methodological workshop of CRNs selected in 2010 was held in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, from 21 to 23 October 2010. About twenty coordinators and members of networks attended the meeting. The teams were assisted by three resource persons, all specialists on comparative methods, namely Dr Abdul Karim Bangura from Howard University (*A Treatise of Pan-African Comparative Analytical Paradigms of Great African Thinkers: From Cheikh Anta Diop to Ali Al'amin Mazrui*), Professor Francis Akindes from the University of Cocody, Abidjan, (*Introduction to Social Science Research and Comparative Analysis Methodology*) and Professor Joseph Yao Yao from the University of Cocody (*Study and Research Method in Economics and Social Science*). The assessment of the meeting once again showed the importance of this major workshop held for the refinement of projects, especially on methodological issues.

Regarding the ongoing monitoring of CRNs, two teams submitted their final research reports/manuscripts during the period in question. They are:

- Professor Yvette Rachele Kalieu Elongo (2006): 'Community Participation in the Management of Health Systems in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of the National Policies of Benin, Cameroon and Chad'; and
- Dr. Ludovic Rosnert Alisoutin (2007), 'Conflicts in the Management of Water in Arid Zones: Case of Sahel Countries (Senegal, Mali, Mauritania)'.

Six mid-term reports were received during the period for mid-term evaluation. Below is the list of the team coordinators and reports:

- Professor Samir Amin (2009), African Response to the Crisis;
- Professor Albert Nouhouayi (2009), Funding of Elections by Political Parties and Electoral Corruption in Benin and Burkina Faso;
- Dr Faridah Sendagire (2009), On the Dynamics of Rural-Urban Interactions, Commuting Patterns and Resource Flows in Mountainous Regions of East Africa: Studies of Mt. Elgon (Uganda) and Mt. Kilimanjaro (Tanzania);
- Dr Edith Natukunda Togboa (2009), 'Identity, Culture and Conflict among Returnee Populations of Uganda: A comparative Study of Gulu and Orukinga Valley Communities';
- Dr. Onias Mafa (2009), Gender, Politics and Sustainable Land Utilization in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study of Pre-Fast Track and Fast Track (Jambanja) Agrarian Reforms';
- Dr. Bakary Camara (2009), 'Chinese Migration and Chinese Investments in West Africa: Attempt of Comparative Study on the Presence of the Chinese in Mali and Senegal'.

Child and Youth Programme

During the second half of the year, the Programme received two reports from the NWGs established in 2008. The team in Chad, working on 'The Resurgence of the Phenomenon of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups in Chad' coordinated by Dr. Hélène Lambatim, submitted its final report. The team in Cape Verde working on 'Youth and Urban Violence in Cape Verde', coordinated by Dr. Claudio Alves Furtado, also submitted its mid-term report in August. It would be recalled that two new groups were respectively selected for this programme in 2009 in Burkina Faso and Kenya. The research of these two groups are still ongoing.

Academic Freedom Programme

Following the International Conference on the theme 'Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Academics and Researchers in Africa: What are the new Challenges?' held in March by CODESRIA in collaboration with the Centre for Cultural Anthropology in Oran, and which helped to take stock of the evolution of academic freedom in Africa over the last thirty years, the Council was appealed to by a U.S. organisation working on the issue of 'Scholars at Risk' based in New York, for the development of a partnership. In this context, a small workshop that brought together twenty participants from 10 African countries was initiated.

This meeting was aimed at developing specific research projects on academic freedom issues. Of the 12 projects reviewed, 4 were selected and focused on practices and standards in terms of academic freedom, advocacy and awareness campaign. The workshop report is available activities are to be included in the next work plan as a collaborative project.

Economic Research Programme

A meeting on *'The Renaissance and the Revival of African Economies'* was held on 20 and 21 December, 2010 in Dar es Salaam, as part of the series of conferences in memory of the late Professor Guy Mhone. The conference was announced in the context of the global economic crisis which should prompt a critical review of all aspects of socio-economic development in Africa. As part of this conference, the programme recorded 110 paper abstracts. The selection process is ongoing.

National Working Groups (NWGs)

a) Monitoring of NWGs during the Second Half of 2010

Four of the NWGs launched in 2007 submitted their final manuscripts between June and September 2010. These are the Togo, Egypt, Nigeria and DR Congo NWGs. The Zimbabwe NWG requested additional time to finalise its manuscript. The NWGs launched in 2008 held their synthesis workshop and are in the drafting phase of the final research reports, and these would be sent to CODESRIA by the end of 2010. All NWGs launched in 2009 held their methodology workshops and are continuing the field work which they began in early 2010. All methodological workshop reports were received except for the groups of Djibouti and Cameroon which were delayed in launching research activities.

b) Meeting of NWG Coordinators, 16–17 December 2010, Dakar

As has been the case since 2008, the annual meeting of NWG coordinators was held in Dakar on 16 and 17 December, 2010. This meeting was part of the decision to strengthen the operation and monitoring of the NWG programme by involving more coordinators. The main idea behind the creation of this forum is to enable the coordinators to meet and share their experiences as part of their research project, and therefore, help strengthen local research communities and by extension the spirit of pan-Africanism. The outcomes of these annual meetings have been very positive. CODESRIA has also begun to reflect on how to enable the groups to continue to exist and work after the expiration of their formal interaction with CODESRIA. The meeting was a good opportunity to understand on-the-spot issues and ensure the monitoring of research, the mentoring of young researchers, and the networking and relationships with communities and policy makers.

Multinational Working Groups (MWGs)

The MWGs are the oldest research tool and the most frequently used at CODESRIA. They have become the most important instrument of the Council to mobilise the research community around specific issues at pan-African level. An MWG is always built around one of the priority themes resulting from the work of the General Assembly. The Research Programme aims to launch new MWGs in 2011. Four calls for proposals for the creation and launching of new MWGs will be issued in January 2011 and the selection will be made in May 2011.

The themes are:

- Health, Society and Politics in Africa;
- Public Sector Reforms in Africa;
- Africa in the Face of Emerging Countries; and
- Privatization.

Green Books

A list of themes was developed for the launch of twelve new Green Books at the beginning of 2011.

Humanities Programme: International Symposium

The management of the humanities in the Council's work is part of the recent concerns of the Secretariat. To meet this objective, the Programme made it a point of duty to go beyond the regular participation of the Council in FESPACO activities, by adding other activities to its portfolio of annual activities, giving more significance to the existence of the organisation created for this purpose at the University of Ghana, Legon. In this context, the Council held, from 26 to 29 September, in collaboration with the African Studies Centre, University of Ghana, an international symposium on the theme: *'Dream, Reality: Re-evaluation of African Independence'*. This symposium was the major event at the first edition of the Kwame Nkrumah Pan-African Intellectual and Cultural Festival Week, a bi-annual event organised under the auspices of the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies.

The event was aimed at achieving three critical goals: the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Africa's independence (1960-2010), the centenary of the birth of Kwame Nkrumah (1909-2010) and the promotion of a critical review of Africa's contemporary situation and extensive reflections on the future development of the continent.

It should be noted that the theme of the symposium aroused great interest from researchers in Africa and worldwide. Nearly 500 researchers submitted article proposals which were assessed by CODESRIA and colleagues from the University of Ghana. After this initial

assessment, about 70 proposals were shortlisted, out of which 32 were finally selected: 22 Anglophone, 9 Francophone and 1 Lusophone. The gender distribution was 9 women and 23 men. The report on the symposium is available at the Council's Secretariat and will soon be released and posted on the Council's website.

2010 Gender Symposium

The 7th Gender Symposium was held from 24 to 26 November, 2010 in Cairo, Egypt, as in previous years. The theme for this year was *'Gender, Migration and Socioeconomic Development in Africa'*. Over 250 applications were received, out of which the selection committee shortlisted 37. The final selection resulted in 20 papers for presentation. Resource persons were also invited to share their experiences in the field, enabling young researchers to get the best from the symposium.

Collaborative Programmes

• Governance Monitoring Programme

The issue of governance is central to the challenges facing most African countries. This concern justifies the joint initiative taken by CODESRIA and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). The novelty, compared to previous years, is that the monitoring work in each country, instead of a being done by a single coordinator, is now done by a team of 3 researchers working on the following areas: 1) Democracy and Political Governance; 2) Governance and Economic Management, and Corporate Governance; and 3) Socio-economic Development.

The study was conducted in 16 countries out of the 18 initially planned for. A methodological workshop was held in Dakar in June to review the objectives of the initiative itself, as well as define and agree on the countries' main and specific parameters for governance monitoring. The coordinator conducted a few support missions to needy teams during the second half of the year and the Council received a number of country reports.

• South-South Programme

Under this programme, the major event was the meeting of its steering committee. This meeting, held in Accra on the sidelines of the international symposium on 'Dream, Reality: Re-evaluation of African Independence' was attended by representatives of CODESRIA, CLASCO and APISA, represented by Ebrima Sall and Carlos Cardoso, Alberto Cimadamore, and Hari Singh, respectively. This meeting was aimed at taking stock of the progress of this programme. The emphasis was not only on the various achievements but also on prospects for 2011.

• Consortium for Development Partnership (CDP)

The main activity undertaken under this programme was the 4th meeting of its steering committee in Abuja (Nigeria) on 13th and 14th September, 2010. The meeting brought together the coordinators of various projects, the overall coordinating organisations (CODESRIA and ASC Leiden), and the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. The meeting cast a critical reflection on the launch of Phase II, the main achievements, the progress of various

research projects, the general outlook that emerged and other issues considered relevant for the proper operation of the CDP-II Programme. Some research teams submitted their first reports from July 2010 (Financing Democracy, Agribusiness, Access to Justice, Local Governance and Media).

• Health Programme: West African Health Research Network (ROARES)

From 22 to 24 November 2010, CODESRIA attended the inaugural Congress of Health Research Centres and Institutes in the ECOWAS, held in Ouagadougou. It is noteworthy that CODESRIA is part of both the scientific and organising committees responsible for implementing this network. The congress was organised under the auspices of the ECOWAS. CODESRIA was in charge of drafting the strategic plan of this network and providing scientific support, among other things. This health research programme was initiated by the West African Health Organisation (WAHO). The main objective of the congress was the launch of the West African Health Research Network and the holding of the first scientific conference of health research centres and institutions within the ECOWAS.

Training, Grants and Fellowships

The activities of the Training, Grants and Fellowships (TGF) Programme demonstrates, to a very large extent, the evolving relationship between CODESRIA, African universities and the community of social science researchers as a whole. In a proactive manner, CODESRIA initiated a set of coherent and relevant activities to meet the needs of the community of social science researchers in Africa, both within and outside the university environment.

The Training, Grants and Fellowships Programme runs in line with the vision of the 2007-2011 strategic plan of CODESRIA, which is 'to nurture and strengthen the higher education system in Africa, contribute to the renewal of social sciences, and stimulate the emergence of new fields and approaches in the area of knowledge'.

Institutes

The thematic institutes (gender, governance, child and youth) were held as scheduled.

Gender Institute

The Gender Institute, established in 1996, is aimed at introducing the gender dimension into the core of the methodological agenda of social sciences, and generally integrating gender analysis into the social sciences. The 2010 edition was held in Dakar from 7 to 25 June. Its theme, 'Sports and Gender: For Gender Equality in Sports in Africa', added further inputs to the reflection initiated by the Gender Symposium held in Cairo in November 2009 on the theme 'Sports and Gender for Africa's Development'. The issue of gender in sports and the concept

of hegemonic masculinity were critically addressed by the director of the institute, Monia Lachheb, with the assistance of other resource persons, namely Jimoh Shehu, Jessie Kabwila Kapasula and Aretha Oluwakemi Asakitikpi, and the fifteen laureates.

Addressing sports as a social practice in the light of the gender paradigm provided an opportunity to re-visit the relationship between gender, identity and sports in contemporary Africa, or to explore the links between sports, modernity and subjectivity. The roundtable was facilitated, firstly, by Professor Djibril Seck from Senegal's Higher National Institute for Popular Education and Sport (INSEPS) – UCAD, who explained in details the process of institutionalisation of modern sport and the gendered patterns of practice; and secondly, by Miss Mame Fatou Faye, a Masters student, twice gold medalist in 100 and 400-meter hurdles, in the Junior African championship. Miss Fatou Faye used her practical experience as an athlete to highlight the gender dimension to sports in Senegal.

For the monitoring of this institute, proposals in English were reviewed by Mr. Shehu Jumoh and comments sent to the laureates, while proposals in French were handled by the director of the institute. The deadline set for the submission of laureates' final papers was 31 October 2010.

Governance Institute

The 2010 edition of the CODESRIA Governance Institute was held from 26 July to 13 August. The theme was 'Corruption, Democratic Governance and Accountability' and the director was Saïd Adejumbi of the Governance and Public

Administration Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), assisted by Oscar Victor Bayemi, Abdou Salam Fall, Aderibigbe Olomola. The focus of this edition was primarily on the context of the discourse on governance, its relationship with the ongoing debate within CODESRIA on Democratic Governance in Africa, the issue of corruption (which has become a crucial issue since the late 80s and in the 90s), the perception of corruption in Africa by Western intellectuals. The task of this institute was mainly to interrogate the assumptions of these intellectuals, problematise and de-constructing them in order to build up better alternatives. The contributions of the resource persons assisted very much in drawing out a typology of corruption, taking a look at the responsibility of the state in terms of corruption, anti-corruption reforms, associative governance, etc.

The roundtable was a major highlight of this institute, given the great stature of its facilitators: Karamoko Kane from the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), who was at this time completing a book on corruption; Abdou Latif Coulibaly, renowned investigative journalist and editor of the *Gazette* magazine; Mohamed Mbodj from the Civil Forum, the Senegalese chapter of Transparency International; and Abdoulaye Saine from Miami University. The schedule for the follow-up of the presentations at the institute, for publication, is as follows:

- September 2010: Submission of drafts;
- October - November: Review of papers;
- December - January 2011: Finalisation of papers;
- February 2011: Submission of the final version of papers.

Institute on Health, Politics and Society

This institute is aimed at promoting dialogue between social sciences and medical sciences. The director of the institute, Cheikh Ibrahima Niang, attended the selection committee meeting held on 12 October at CODESRIA, during which fifteen laureates and three resource persons were selected. The institute has been postponed to 7 – 25 February 2011.

Child and Youth Institute

The institute was held from 6 to 24 September, 2010 in Dakar. Its director, Michael Bourdillon from Zimbabwe, assisted by Dorte Thorsen, Yaw Oforu-Kusi and George Mutambwa ensured a thorough 'scientific' supervision of the 15 laureates who had been selected for this institute. The approach adopted by the director was very much in line with the philosophy of CODESRIA, which is to design and document African perspectives in terms of social sciences, rather than simply embracing dominant discourses. The main objective of this institute was therefore to de-construct the discourse and values advocated by international organisations like the ILO, which are rooted in the prohibition of child labour before the age of 15, without taking into account the centrality of work in African childhoods. This shift in paradigm and perspective enabled the director and resource persons to focus their interventions on concepts and definitions, statistics and their interpretation, as well as the historical and ethnocentric conception of childhood, in order not to fall into the trap of the discourse of condemnation and the paradigm of victimization. The

roundtable and the session with representatives of the African Movement of Working Children and Youth (AMWCY) enabled laureates to better understand the shift in paradigm and perspective indicated by the director and resource persons. The intention was to make this edition a model of good practice.

Methodology Workshops

These workshops are, in addition to the institutes and the Small Grants, the backbone of the Training, Grants and Fellowships activities. On the advice of the Executive Committee, the methodology workshops have been reduced from six to four by combining the regional with the linguistic criterion.

Postponed Methodological Workshops

In 2010, three out of the four workshops were not held for the same reasons related to ACBF. These are: 1 - Methodological Workshop for Social Sciences in Africa: West and Central Africa (Francophone); 2 - Methodological Workshop for Social Sciences in Africa: West and Central Africa (Anglophone); and 3 - Methodological Workshop for Social Sciences in Africa: Southern Africa.

Planned and Held Methodological Workshops

Despite the hard financial situation, CODESRIA was anxious to hold at least one methodological workshop, that of North Africa. This workshop, held in Oran, Algeria, from 4 to 8 October, 2010 enabled fifteen laureates – five from Morocco, seven from Algeria and three from Tunisia who were at different levels of progress in their thesis works, to receive training in research methodology.

The pedagogical team was comprised of Omar Derras (Algeria), Monia Lachheb (Tunisia) and Houda Laroussi (Tunisia). The laureates expressed, during both the discussion and evaluation sessions, deep satisfaction with the workshop in terms of better understanding of their works in general, and the methodological orientation in particular. They all stressed the fact that they had not had any such pedagogical and methodological supervision prior to their CODESRIA experience.

Scholarly Writing Workshop

The writing workshops scheduled for September in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) for the Francophone edition and October in Kampala (Uganda) for the Anglophone edition were both postponed until 2011. Again, the reasons were related to the ACBF funding.

Training-of-Trainees Workshop

Sixty-seven applications were received from prospective laureates thirteen from resource persons. The selection committee members had been identified as Thieno Bah (historian) and Boubacar Ly (sociologist). They were to meet in late October.

Small Grants for Thesis Writing

The selection committee met in Dakar between 16 and 20 August 2010. It was comprised of the following: Prof. Makhtar Diouf – Senegal (Chairman), Dr. Egodi Uchendu – Nigeria (Secretary),

Dr. Fatou Diop Sall – Senegal, Dr. Alioune Sall – Senegal, Prof. Hervé Diata – Congo Brazzaville, Prof. Ibrahim Abdullah – Nigeria. The final selection of the jury was: PhD 60, MPhil 30, Master 10, which makes a total of 100 theses/dissertations. Yet, due to budget reduction, only 30 PhDs, 5 MPhils and 10 Masters were finally considered.

Advanced Research Fellowship

The contracts for the eight (8) successful advanced research fellowships were signed in September 2010.

CODESRIA Prize for Doctoral Thesis

The contract with the winner of the prize for 2010, Lucien van de Walt, is being finalised. The agreement between the him and CODESRIA is a joint publication by CODESRIA AND WITS University Press (WUP) of a monograph derived from the thesis. The only thing remaining is to determine the universities for the Letcture Tour so that he can present the results of his research.

South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development (SEPHIS)

Extended Workshop on Social History

This programme is a platform for innovation and creative experimentation in terms of knowledge production and dissemination in Africa. The theme of the 2010 Extended

Workshop on Social History was ‘Gender and Sexuality in the Global South’. Forty-one applications were received from prospective laureates while ten others were received from resource persons. Ten laureates were finally selected by a jury comprised of Ndeye Sokhna Gueye (UCAD), Abderrahmane Ngaïde (UCAD), Marina de Regt (SEPHIS). The composition of the final list, on regional basis was the following: Middle East - 2; Africa - 2; Asia - 2; Latin America - 3; and Caribbean - 1. The selection in terms of gender was Female - 7 and Male - 3. None of the ten applications received from resource persons was for the position of director. Finally, the committee selected a female director from India and two resource persons from India and Africa. The workshop was held as scheduled from 2 to 12 November, 2010.

Lecture Tour

The 2010 Lecture Tour was to cover the East African region. It was to be held between 12 and 23 July 2010 in two stages: Between 12 and 17 July in Uganda (Faculty of Social Sciences at Makerere University) and between 19 and 23 July in Sudan (Institute of Women, Gender and Development Studies, Ahfad University). The theme of the lecture is ‘The NGOization of the Arab Women’s Movements’. However, unfortunately, the lecturer, Dr. Islah, Director of the Women Studies Institute at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah, Palestine, requested the postponement of the tour for health reasons.

CODICE

During the second half of 2010, the CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre (CODICE) attended the evaluation workshop of the project Directory of African Theses and Dissertations (DATAD) on the theme ‘Visibility of Theses and Dissertations in Africa’ organised by the Association of African Universities (AAU) on 28 and 29 June, 2010 in Dakar (Senegal). The centre also contributed to the training workshop conducted by the project IKM Emergent from 5 to 9 July, 2010 in Nairobi (Kenya), with the use of Web 2.0 tools for the reporting of research results,. In addition, CODICE achieved a number of thematic bibliographies on the following topics:

- Corruption, Democratic Governance and Accountability (Democratic Governance Institute);

- The Place of Work in African Childhoods (Child and Youth Studies Institute);
- HIV/AIDS and the Discourse of the ‘Outsider’ in Africa (Health Institute);
- Historicizing Gender and Sexuality in the Global South (CODESRIA/SEPHIS Intensive Workshop on Social History).

Finally, CODICE issued a bulletin on current contents developed from the journals it received, and two lists of new acquisitions in July and September 2010.

Publications

The Publications Programme is responsible for turning CODESRIA's research findings and other manuscripts of relevance to Africa's social science development into publications, and disseminating them in both printed and electronic forms. During the second half of this year (2010), the programme's resources were concentrated on clearing a sizeable number of pending manuscripts, culminating in the release of quite a number of publications. Other highlights of this report are CODESRIA's dissemination activities and the Annual Conference of CODESRIA's Journal Editors which is one of the avenues for improving the quality and relevance of our journals globally.

New Publications

During the second half of this year (July-December), from the Work Plan presented earlier in the year, the Publications Programme was able to publish, or finalise for publishing, ten (10) new titles in the Book Series, six (6) issues of the different Journals, and seven (7) titles in the Lecture Series:

Book Series

Islam and Open Society: Fidelity and Movement in the Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, Souleymane Bachir Diagne

ISBN: 978-2-86978-305-8

Espaces, culture matérielle et identités en Sénégal,

Sous la direction de Ibrahima Thiaw

ISBN: 978-2-86978-482-6

Repenser les économies africaines pour le développement,

sous la direction de Jean-Christophe Boungou Bazika & Abdellali Naciri Bensaghir

ISBN: 978-2-86978-329-4

Mémoire d'un étudiant africain de l'école régionale de Diourbel à l'université de Paris (1945-1960), Amady Aly Dieng

ISBN: 978-2-86978-481-9

Framework and Tools for Environmental Management in Africa,

Godwell Nhamo

ISBN: 978-2-86978-321-8

Genre et dynamique socio-économiques et politiques en Afrique,

Fatou Sow & Ndèye Sokhna Guèye

ISBN: 978-2-86978-297-6

Les Défis de la Centrafrique : Gouvernance et Stabilisation du Système Economique, Recherche de Canevas pour Amorcer la Croissance, Roger Yele

ISBN: 978-2-86978-226-6

Journals

Journal of Higher Education in Africa, Volume 7, Number 3, 2009 ISSN: 0851-7762

Afro-Arab Selections for Social Science, 11, 2010

Africa Review of Books, Volume 6, Number 2, 2010 ISSN: 0851-7592

CODESRIA Bulletin, Numbers 3&4, 2009, French ISSN: 0850-8712

CODESRIA Bulletin, Numbers 1&2, 2010, English ISSN: 0850-8712

Africa Development, Volume 35, 1&2, 2010

ISSN: 0850-3907

African Sociological Review, Volume 13, Number 2, 2009

ISBN: 1027-4332

Lecture Series

Telling the Truth about Capitalist Democracies, Atilio A. Boron

ISBN: 978-2-86978-309-6

O Público O Privado E O Papel Social Das Universidades Em África,

Teresa Cruz e Silva

ISBN: 978-2-86978-480-2

Public and Private Domains and the Social Role of Universities in Africa,

Teresa Cruz e Silva

ISBN: 978-2-86978-313-3

Financial Crisis? Systemic Crisis? Samir Amin

ISBN: 978-2-86978-311-9

Crise financière ? crise systémique ? Samir Amin

ISBN: 978-2-86978-479-6

Gouvernance et gouvernabilité, Ali El Kenz

ISBN: 978-2-86978-310-2

The Popular Arts and Culture in the Texture of the Public Sphere in Africa, Tsitsi Dangarembga

ISBN: 978-2-86978-312-6

Dissemination

Distribution of free printed and electronic copies of our publications to various different institutions, libraries, bookshops and individuals on the continent continued. In addition, to widen the readership of our publications, we participated in three book fairs: two on the continent and one in Europe. Our Distribution and Marketing Officer was at the Nairobi Book Fair in September, where we recorded a 6.4% increase on sales over the preceding year and also identified two potential distributors for the region. We were represented at the Cape Town (South Africa) and Goteborg (Sweden) Book Fairs by the Head of Programme.

2010 Annual Conference of CODESRIA Journal Editors


This conference was held in Dakar on 30 and 31 October, 2010 under the theme *Enhancing the Authority of CODESRIA Journals in Global Knowledge Production*, a suitable follow-up to the preceding year's theme which reiterated the central role of CODESRIA Journals in initiating and promoting debates on African realities. The Keynote Address was presented by Shameel Jeppie, Professor of History at the University of Cape Town, author of numerous publications, co-editor of *The Meanings of Timbuktu*, member of the Scientific Committee of CODESRIA and co-Chair of the South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development (SEPHIS). As typical of the annual conference, the keynote address was applauded with series of stimulating discussions. Other highlights of the conference include an overview of CODESRIA Journals, the

various views and reports form the individual journal editors and operational issues (in form of guidelines for improved production and dissemination of the journals, presented by the Head of CODESRIA Publications and Dissemination Programme, Alex Bangirana).

A total of 13 editors of the various journals published by CODESRIA participated in the conference. Also in attendance were the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, Dr Ebrima Sall; his deputy, Professor Bernard Lututala; other key members of the Council's Secretariat as well as the staff of the CODESRIA Publications and Dissemination Programme. The next edition of the Annual Conference of CODESRIA Journal Editors was scheduled for December 2011 during the Council's 13th General Assembly.

Philosophy and African Development: Theory and Practice

Edited by
Lansana Keita




Philosophy and African Development: Theory and Practice appraises development in a holistic manner. It goes beyond the usual measurement in terms of economic achievement and widens the scope to include the impact that history of ideas, political theory, sociology, social and political philosophy, and political economy have had on development in Africa. It is a departure from the traditional treatment of development by economists who point towards the so-called time-tested assertions and recommendations for 'sustainable development', but which are yet bring about significant change in the economies of the so-called 'developing' societies. It is on account of the failures of the economic development theory, with its tepid prescriptions for 'sustainable development' and 'poverty reduction' that theories of development have now been expanded from mere economic analysis to include considerations of history, sociology, political economy and anthropology, as could be discovered in this book. Most of the contributions in this book have been prepared by philosophers across Africa and the United States who implicitly practise their discipline as one whose most effective modern function would be to appraise the human experience in all its dimensions from the standpoints of modern social and natural sciences, all disciplinary offspring of philosophy itself. With chapters ranging from issues of modernity and religious interpretations, the human right to development, the idea of 'African time', the primacy of mental decolonisation, and the type of education we are offering in Africa today and as a tool

for development, to development planning, science, technology and globalisation, as well as issues of post-coloniality among others, the tenor of the contributions is not only proportional, but also engaged in the meta-analysis of the theories on which the concept of development is founded and practised. This book is strongly recommended as a useful text in the hands of scholars, researchers and students of development studies. It approaches the important issue of African development from the broad perspective of the social sciences in general, and buttresses this with the keen analytical approach of its contributors.

Islam and Open Society

Fidelity and Movement in the Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal

By Souleymane Bachir Diagne



In the atmosphere of suspicion and anger that characterizes our time, it is a joy to hear the voice of Iqbal, both passionate and serene. It is the voice of a soul that is deeply anchored in the Quranic Revelation, and precisely for that reason, open to all the other voices, seeking in them the path of his own fidelity. It is the voice of a man who has left behind all identitarian rigidity, who has 'broken all the idols of tribe and caste' to address himself to all human beings. But an unhappy accident has meant that this voice was buried, both in the general forgetting of Islamic modernism and in the very country that he named before its existence, Pakistan, whose multiple rigidities – political, religious, military – constitute a continual refutation of the very essence of his thought.

But we all need to hear him again, citizens of the West, Muslims, and those from his native India, where a form of Hindu chauvinism rages in our times, in a way that exceeds his worst fears. Souleymane Bachir Diagne has done all of us an immense favor in making this voice heard once again, clear and convincing.




From 'Foreign Natives' to 'Native Foreigners'

Explaining Xenophobia in Post-apartheid South Africa

Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics

By Michael Neocosmos




The events of May 2008 in which 62 people were killed simply for being 'foreign' and thousands were turned overnight into refugees shook the South African nation. This book is the first to attempt a comprehensive and rigorous explanation for those horrific events. It argues that xenophobia should be understood as a political discourse and practice. As such its historical development as well as the conditions of its existence must be elucidated in terms of the practices and prescriptions which structure the field of politics. In South Africa, the history of xenophobia is intimately connected to the manner in which citizenship has been conceived and fought over during the past fifty years at least. Migrant labour was de-nationalised by the apartheid state, while African nationalism saw the same migrant labour as the foundation of that oppressive system. Only those who could show a family connection with the colonial and apartheid formation of South Africa could claim citizenship at liberation. Others were excluded and seen as unjustified claimants to national resources. Xenophobia's conditions of existence, the book argues, are to be found in the politics of post-apartheid nationalism where state prescriptions founded on indigeneity have been allowed to dominate uncontested in conditions of an overwhelmingly passive conception of citizenship. The de-politicisation of an urban population, which had been able to assert

its agency during the 1980s through a discourse of human rights in particular, contributed to this passivity. Such state liberal politics have remained largely unchallenged. As in other cases of post-colonial transition in Africa, the hegemony of xenophobic discourse, the book contends, is to be sought in the specific character of the state consensus.

A Study of the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria

By Jibrin Ibrahim and Dauda Garuba




This report on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of Nigeria is part of a broader project on Modelling Success: Governance and Institution Building in West Africa, being implemented by the Consortium for Development Partnerships (CDP), a community of institutions dedicated to collaborative policy-oriented research and capacity-building in North America, Europe and West Africa. The first phase of the project was jointly coordinated by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Programme of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University, USA (2004-2008). The second phase (2008-2012), which is ongoing, is under the coordination of CODESRIA and the African Studies Centre, Leiden, the Netherlands. The project focuses on the identification of concrete strategies to advance institutional performance in Africa. Studies sponsored under the project undertake in-depth analysis of institutions which are key to ensuring that governments and public officials act in the public interest. The study looked at INEC, the body constitutionally empowered to organize, undertake and supervise all elections and electoral processes, with a mandate to ensure transparency and accountability. The report examines the process and challenges of institution building for democratic governance in Nigeria. This report makes a valuable contribution to

both knowledge and policy. It examines the constitution, operations, performance, successes and challenges of the electoral body, taking into cognizance INEC's centrality and strategic importance to the evolution of good governance, social cohesion and political stability of the country.

A Study of Ghana's Electoral Commission

By Emmanuel Debrah, E. Kojo Pumpuni Asante and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi



This report on the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana is part of a broader project on Modelling Success: Governance and Institution-building in West Africa, being implemented by the Consortium for Development Partnerships (CDP), a community of institutions dedicated to collaborative policy-oriented research and capacity-building in North America, Europe and West Africa. The Consortium is coordinated by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) with initial collaboration of the Programme of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University, USA. The project focuses on the identification of concrete strategies to advance institutional performance in Africa through an indepth analysis of institutions which are key to ensuring that governments and public officials act in the public interest. Since the beginning of the post-1990 democratic reforms, studies that assessed governance institutions in Africa, and Ghana in particular, revealed poor performance due to weak systems and lack of credibility. In addition, the discourse on governance revealed a multiplicity of non-performing and under-performing institutions. This situation led to a deficit in knowledge about the true abilities of such national and regional institutions. A typical example is the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana, as it was not given any staid attention in the study of governance institutions in the country. Ironically however, the EC which evolved as part of the transfer of the superstructure of British colonial

rule, with limited responsibility and jurisdiction, has grown over the years to enjoy the confidence and cooperation of the Ghanaian elite. Its high level of competence, efficiency and the ability to withstand negative influences and manipulations, have won it wide acknowledgement as an independent body with the capacity to hold free, fair and credible elections. This report demonstrates that there are governance institutions in Africa that perform creditably well. It is therefore a very important report that all individuals and institutions committed to good governance, transparency, accountability, and credible elections and electoral processes in Africa will find very useful.