



CODESRIA

13

ème

Assemblée générale
General Assembly
Assembleia Geral
الجمع العام الثالث عشر

L'Afrique et les défis du XXIème siècle
Africa and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century
A África e os desafios do Século XXI

إفريقيا وتحديات القرن الواحد والعشرين

DRAFT VERSION
NOT TO BE CITED

**Homo sacer: Citizenship, exclusion and irregular labour
migration from Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, to South Africa**

France Maphosa
University of Botswana

5 - 9 / 12 / 2011

Rabat Maroc / Morocco

Introduction

Homo sacer is a concept that was used by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) to refer to a naked or bare life that is depoliticised. Though he has a biological life, *homo sacer*, has no political significance. The term *homo sacer* was borrowed from ancient Roman law under which a man who committed a certain kind of crime was banned from society and all his rights as a citizen revoked. This status meant that such a man could be killed by anybody but could not be sacrificed in a ritual ceremony. *Homo sacer* is therefore the direct opposite of citizen. A citizen does not only have the right to political and economic participation but also the right to protection by the sovereign. Those who are excluded from these rights – *homo sacer* – exist in what Agamben refers to as “zones of exception” or “zones of indistinction” in which the application of the law is suspended. One who fall into this zone;

...is not, in fact simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside become indistinguishable (Agamben, 1998:28)

For Agamben, politics is preoccupied with the classification between inclusion and exclusion, between forms of life the sovereign will protect and represent and those it will not. Rajaran and Grundy-Warr (2004) used the concept of *homo sacer* to describe irregular migrants in Australia, Malaysia and Thailand. They argue that as used to indicate exclusion, today the term is applicable to “terrorists”, refugees and irregular migrants. The experiences of irregular migrants from Matabeleland in Zimbabwe fit a type of life portrayed by the concept of *homo sacer*.

The Matabeleland Problem

Several writers have discussed the Matabeleland problem as one of sustained political, economic and cultural domination, suppression, exclusion and marginalisation in post-colonial Zimbabwe (Alexander et.al 2000, Musemwa, 2006; Mhlanga, 2009, 2010; Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). The post-colonial state in Zimbabwe has over the years used various labels such as “dissidents” and “detractors” “enemies of the state” to exclude people from both political and economic participation and protection by the state. For example “dissident” was a term that was used not only to justify exclusion but also to denote individuals who could be killed with impunity. The term was not confined to individuals but to cities, regions and whole ethnic groups. This is lucidly captured by Musemwa (2006)’s

use of the phrase “disciplining a ‘dissident’ city:” to explain lack of serious political efforts to find a lasting solution to the perennial water problems of Bulawayo, Matabeleland’s largest city.

According to Darbon (1992) the military operations in the provinces of the south of the country during *Gukurahundi* operations gave the state an excuse to unleash intimidation on the local population. This was done through the use of force, imprisonment, torture and blocking of development aid and food. As Alexander and others (2006) observe, even after the cosmetic unity agreement of 1987, no deliberate development effort was embarked on in Matabeleland. There was no programme put in place to compensate the region for the loss through violence and neglect. Mhlanga (2010) provides several examples which prove that there has been a deliberate effort by the post colonial government in Zimbabwe to marginalise Matabeleland as a region in the distribution of national resources. The cases include the electrification of the railway line from Gweru to Harare, leaving out the Gweru to Bulawayo stretch despite the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) being headquartered in Bulawayo; the gradual relocation of heavy industries from Harare to Bulawayo and the unwillingness to implement the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project.

One of the objectives of the land reform programme embarked on by the government of Zimbabwe beginning in 2000, particularly its fast track (*jambanja*) phase was ostensibly to decongest the communal areas. This refers to reducing population pressure on the land. A Land Review Committee appointed by President Mugabe reported in 2003 that, for Matabeleland North;

“... the impact on decongestion had therefore been negligible... p.122”.

With regards to Matabeleland South, the Committee reported that,

Decongestion of rural areas has not been effected ... (p.130)

At the same time, the same Committee reported extremely high rates of uptake of land offered for resettlement in these areas. For example, Matabeleland South had a 100% uptake of farms offered under the A1 resettlement model while the uptake of similar offers in Matabeleland North was reported to be 120%. The national average rate of uptake was 66%, with Manicaland Province recording the lowest uptake rate of only 42%.

There are two possible explanations for the apparent contradiction between the high rates of land uptake and the “negligible” decongestion that occurred in the two Matabeleland provinces. One is that the land offered for resettlement might have been way too little for the already high demand for land. The other is that most of the people who were offered land for resettlement in these provinces were from outside the provinces. Whatever the reason, the land reform exercise which has been touted by the government as

economic empowerment for the people of Zimbabwe had little if any benefits for people in Matabeleland especially those in congested areas. This means that poverty levels continue to increase as land for farming continues to diminish in size and value.

At the height of the crises in Zimbabwe many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) either relocated from Zimbabwe, closed shop or scaled down their operations, mainly as a result of the unfavourable political environment in which they were often accused of funding opposition politics. As a result a lot of people who survived on support from NGOs especially those in drought prone and marginalised communities in Matabeleland were left vulnerable. Deepening economic and political crises and limited livelihood options made migration the only way to guarantee survival in Matabeleland.

Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa

There is now a substantial amount of literature on migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa. (van Onselen, 1976; Paton, 1995; Sachikonye, 1998; ILO/SAMAT, 1998; Zinyama, 1990; Russell et.al. 1990; Crush and Tevera,

<http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/policyseries/policy25.htm>, Crush, 2003; Crush et.al 2005; Hobane, 1996; Kanyenze, 2004, Maphosa, 2004, 2005, 2006). This is because of the long history of migration between the two countries. For example Crush (2003) found that 23% of the Zimbabwean adult population have been to South Africa, 24% have parents who have been to South Africa and another 23% have grandparents who have been to South Africa. Although the labour contract system which was legally sanctioned and regulated by government to government agreements (Kanyenze, 2004) was discontinued at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has continued to be a major source of labour for South Africa. Zimbabwe's position as an exporter of labour to South Africa has continued to grow as a result of the political and economic meltdown in the country.

Pre-independence literature links migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa with the contract labour system that was used to attract labour to South Africa mines. Post independence literature generally links migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa with the economic and political crises that started in the 1990s and peaked around 2008. Such literature discusses issues such as the structural adjustment programme, hyper-inflation, operation *Murambatsvina*, and the chaotic fast track land reform programme (*jambanja*) as the push factors. Studies focusing on emigration from Matabeleland are very scarce (Hobane, 1996; Maphosa, 2004, 2005; Ncube, 2011***). This is despite the fact that besides the factors

that have led to increased emigration nationwide, there are factors that are peculiar to Matabeleland that have led to high rates of, largely irregular emigration. These factors include the recurrent droughts, the political violence of the 1980s unleashed in the province through the *Gukurahundi* operation and the general political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the region.

Migration from Matabeleland to South Africa

Matabeleland predominantly lies in agriculturally marginal and drought prone Region V. Agricultural production, particularly crop production in this part of the country is largely for subsistence. Even in a good year, very few households are left with surplus produce from which they can obtain income. Since 1991 the region has experienced a series of severe droughts resulting in very low, if any, food production. For many years, the whole Matabeleland regions has been declared a state of disaster because of the serious persistent droughts that the region experiences. [**** **declared state of disaster** ***] Amanor-Wilks and Moyo (1996) state that some drought prone areas such as Zimbabwe's Matabeleland have sustained their populations from migrant incomes derived in South Africa. For example, Hobane (1999) found that 62% of the adult population in one community in Matabeleland South were employed outside the country mainly in South Africa and Botswana.

The post independence political unrest which ended with the signing of a unity agreement between the two warring parties, the ruling ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU contributed significantly to the rise in the rate of out-migration from Matabeleland to neighbouring countries especially South Africa and Botswana. Maphosa (2004) found evidence of an unprecedented increase in out-migration in the decade between 1981 and 1990 in a area located close to both the South African and Botswana borders with Zimbabwe. This is the decade of government's military operations in the province, code-named *Gukurahundi*, ostensibly aimed at combating the dissident activities that had broken out in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands provinces which however, turned out to be an excuse for ethnic cleansing. The actual number of those who were killed, imprisoned, tortured or forced to leave the country and internally displaced is not yet known, as open discussion of these atrocities is still restricted. A report published by the Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice on the massacres is still not in the public domain. A number of people who left the country to seek refuge in neighbouring countries ended up working there as undocumented migrants. Young men and women were the main targets of

the army's so called counter-insurgency activities in those parts of the country. Former soldiers who were being demobilised from the Zimbabwe National Army would later be hounded, hunted down, arrested, tortured or killed. Many survived by fleeing and finding refuge in other countries as undocumented migrants.

Many of the migrants from Matabeleland are irregular migrants. The methods used to gain illegal entry into South Africa include entering legally through official entry points and then overstaying (Crush, 2003; Mudungwe 2005) as well as various ways of entering unofficially. These include crossing through unofficial points and being smuggled through the official border post by human smugglers. Getting proper travel documents in Zimbabwe has not been an easy process especially for people in remote rural areas including some of the migrant sending areas of Matabeleland. For a long time, Zimbabweans required visas to enter South Africa. The process, cost and time it took to get a visa were all very probative for poor people. Around 2008 it took at least seven working days for the visa to be processed. The applications were processed at the South African High Commission offices in Harare. To be issued with a tourist visa to South Africa one had to produce evidence of availability of funds in the form of travellers' cheques for R2000 or USD300, together with certified copies of the cheques. Alternatively one could submit a bank statement from a foreign currency account indicating the availability of enough funds to sustain the applicant while in South Africa. These requirements were beyond the reach of many ordinary Zimbabweans including those from impoverished areas such as Matabeleland. As observed by Chomutare (undated) stringent visa requirements put in place by some countries which are popular destinations for Zimbabwean migrants were the main reason for the high rate of undocumented migration from Zimbabwe to those countries. Chingarande and Maphosa (2007) Beremauro (undated) and Siziba (undated) also point at strict visa requirements as the main contributor to the high rate of undocumented migration from Zimbabwe. Chomutare (undated: 23) asserts that visa policies put in place by some countries of destination make international travel for Zimbabweans "difficult, precarious and costly".

As a result of the difficulties in obtaining proper travel documents most people in Matabeleland have travelled to South Africa through *dabulaphu*. Originally *dabulaphu* involved crossing the border through illegal entry points and walking most or all the way to the destination. Currently the term is in a generalised sense to include all forms of irregular migration which including being smuggled across the border by *omalayisha* and long distance truck drivers or crossing the border through undesignated areas. This often exposes

them to a lot of risks such as being raped, abducted, trafficked or robbed even by those who purport to offer assistants. Stories such as the one presented below are common.

This weekend, in the Johannesburg offices of SAWIMA, a South African NGO dedicated to helping distressed migrants, I met three girls from Zimbabwe's second city, Bulawayo. They were still dressed in muddy rags, and sobbed as they told officials what had happened to them during their bid to escape from the Mugabe regime. Two of them, aged 12 and 13, were too upset. But the 15-year-old described graphically how their bid to find a new life in the Republic had gone terribly wrong. She told me that the three of them had managed to collect half the money demanded by agents in Bulawayo, in return for safe passage over the border, and on to Johannesburg. Her brother, who lives in South Africa, promised to pay the balance once the girls were delivered to him.

The girls were collected by a gang of several men who specialise in this trade in humanity. Their fee, an average for the trip I understand, was 1,500 South African Rand. "When we got over the border," said the girl, "they rang my brother on his mobile phone, and he confirmed that he would make the full payment as soon as we arrived. But then the men began to demand we have sex with them. When we tried to resist they beat us, and threatened to abandon us in the bush.

"It was in the night, we had no money, we were so frightened...They all raped us, over and over again...now I think they may have given me HIV."

A SAWIMA official told me that the girls had been taken to a Johannesburg address and kept as sex slaves for several days, before being finally abandoned on the organisation's doorstep early one morning. The girls are now undergoing medical examination, and attempts are being made to find the 15-year-old's brother.

The official said that almost half of all women who escape illegally from Zimbabwe endure similar experiences, and she believes that many more are killed after being raped, their bodies left in the bush.

"These human traffickers are beasts," she told me.

"People know this, but they are so desperate they will even risk their lives to come here."

Back here in Harare the talks on power sharing begin yet again. And while the politicians talk, the rapes, the beatings and the murders continue.

Source: (<http://www.zimbabwetoday.co.uk/>) Posted on Tuesday, 28 October 2008 at 08:48

In November 1998 a group of Zimbabweans travelling through Botswana to South Africa, suffocated and died in an unventilated trailer of a vehicle that was being used to smuggle them into South Africa.

Circulatory Migration: Transnationalism or not?

The concept of transnationalism is used to describe a phenomenon in migration trends in which migrants do not sever ties with their home communities but build, maintain and reinforce multiple linkages between home and host countries (Duaney, 2002; Glick Schiller et.al., 1992; Glick Schiller et. al., 1995). Vertovec (1999) conceives of transnationalism as involving multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states. For Portes (1996) transnationalism involves a “dual existence”, because they have an existence that spans national borders. According to (Basch et.al., 1984) this dual existence leads to multiple identities as well as multiple involvements. Multiple involvements implies that migrants participate in the social, economic and political lives of all the countries in which they have a “simultaneous existence”. Multiple involves therefore implies benefitting from living in more than one country at the same time. Can the experiences of irregular migrants from Matabeleland to South Africa be described as multiple involvements?

Labour migration to South Africa from other countries in the region has always been “circulatory” (Weyl, 1991) or oscillatory (Wilson, 1972), with migrants occasionally returning to their homes and families. Weyl (1991) attributes this to the peripherisation and underdevelopment of the labour source regions as a result of the development of the capitalist mode of production in Southern Africa. This mode of production was characterised by uneven development between regions which were linked into one dominant economic system whose centre was the mining and manufacturing areas of South Africa. The underdeveloped regions became labour reserves whose role was to supply labour to the centres of accumulation. The regions of labour supply were not totally proletarianised but the traditional mode of production was left, albeit in a weakened and modified form. The “traditional” mode of production was allowed to exist so as to bear the costs of the reproduction of labour by not only reproducing and bringing up children who would eventually migrate to the centres but also by providing subsistence and social security for migrant workers in old age, rest periods or unemployment.

Migration from Matabeleland to South Africa has always been “circulatory”. There are several explanations for circulatory nature of migration from this area, the most important being the difficulties migrants encounter in trying to integrate into their country of destination. While migration is a route to escape poverty and alienation from the home country these migrants have found integration into their country of work very difficult or impossible. They experience xenophobia, discrimination and exploitation. The May 2008 xenophobic attacks are a poignant demonstration of migrants being unacceptable in their country of work. The feelings of insecurity and exclusion oblige the migrants to maintain links with their communities of origin. Rather than multiple involvements the experiences of the irregular migrants from Matabeleland to South should be seen as multiple exclusion. This is because of their exclusion from political, economic and social participation from both their country of origin and their country of work.

Political Exclusion

Migrants’ political involvement can be through electoral or non-electoral engagement (Itzigsohn and Villacres (2008)). Electoral participation involves membership in political parties, monetary contributions to campaigns and participation in campaigns and rallies and voting in elections. Non-electoral political participation on the other hand involves membership in home-town associations (HTAs), contributing money for projects in the home country and membership in charity organisations active in the home country. HTA activities ought to be considered political because through them migrants engage with local and regional authorities and influence the design and implementation of local development projects. As a result, HTAs become actors in local development and partners in local politics (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003).

Migrant political involvement in Matabeleland is very low. This is because of the conditions of their existence or the rules put in place by the Zimbabwean state that prevent them from political participation. For example, external voting in Zimbabwe is not allowed for both documented and undocumented migrants. This constitutes political exclusion of migrant populations. Such exclusion is even more pronounced among undocumented migrants who cannot easily travel between home and the country of work because of lack of proper travel documents and inability to get days off for that purpose. Time constraints, elaborate processes of registering as a voter and loss of confidence in the electoral processes are serious constraints for migrants to exercise their rights to vote.

Among migrants communities worldwide, home town associations (HTAS) have evolved over time, gradually becoming more and more involved in development issues in their home communities. Hometown associations are a very important channel for transmitting collective funds from migrants to their communities for community projects (Hsu, http://www.princeton.edu/jhsu/writing/remittances_3.doc; Ortiz, http://naid.sppsr.ucla.edu/confs&class/class/UP/comp00/ch2_report.pdf; van Doorn, www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/finance.download/remit2.pdf; Orozco, 2000; Taylor and Fletcher, <http://www.precesam.colmex.mx/Volume2-ing.html>). These associations have been effective where they collaborate with local actors such as government, local non-governmental organisations and local development associations. The local actors provide a link with the communities and can also complement the efforts of the HTAs. For example in the Mexican state of Zacatecas, each dollar contributed in remittances is matched by three dollars (one from the municipality, one from the state and one from the federal government). Through this programme 400 projects with a total investment value of US\$4.5 billion were completed in eight years (van Doorn, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/atrav/publ/129/8.pdf>.) Home town associations are better developed in some countries than others. According to Calgar (2006), this is explained by two major factors namely; the policies of the sending states and the specific qualities of the migrant communities, such as the exit conditions or background characteristics. Policies of the sending states that may promote the existence and impact of hometown association are those that do not only recognise HTAs but also facilitate and support their activities. The exit conditions of migrants refer to whether the migrants are documented or undocumented. Undocumented migrants are unlikely to form strong hometown associations because of the constraints they often encounter in trying to send collective remittances back home. Such constraints exist at both the country of origin and the country of work. There have to be safe and efficient ways of sending remittances. Banking facilities in many rural areas of Matabeleland do not exist. Where they exist, they are poorly developed. The only form of organisation that exists among these migrants are burial societies which are mutual assistance organisations with little potential for meaningful development assistance and no potential at all to fight for change of their conditions. Despite holding South African passports and identity documents, many migrants do not vote in South Africa. The acquisition of South African documents is mainly for the purposes of travel. It often does not translate into claims associated citizenship such as the right to vote, protection and access to public facilities.

Economic Exclusion

Transnational economic activities involve participation in economic activities that cut across national boundaries. This includes working in one country and running businesses in another. It might also take the form of operating businesses that operate across borders. As a result of their irregular migrant status, undocumented migrants experience challenges in participating in the economic lives of both the home country and the country of work. The following sections discuss the experiences of undocumented migrants in their economic involvement in both countries. Businesses belonging to foreigners have been targets of attack in many instances of violence against foreigners in South Africa. During the May 2008 xenophobic attacks, businesses belonging to foreigners were attacked. Under the headline "Foreign traders tally losses", *The Pretoria News Business Report* of 22 May 2008 reported the destruction of foreign owned business around the country and observed that; "Most of them are uninsured and will have to bear the losses or close shop". As reported by CoRMSA (2009) police have continued to raid the businesses of migrants who depend on informal trading in South African towns and cities. The report states;

Violence against foreign shop owners has been prevalent in many years, with few repercussions for the perpetrators. Unfortunately, migrants entrepreneurs, and shopkeepers in particular, continue to be murdered in informal settlements across the country (p.24).

This shows the precarious situation in which businesses owned by foreigners often find themselves in South Africa. In 1998 South Africa street vendors in Johannesburg attacked their foreign counterparts. This creates a feeling of insecurity which makes South Africa an unsafe environment for foreigners to engage in business ventures. This even includes the small vendors on the streets. Some respondents indicated that they were not willing to invest in South Africa because of fear of losing their investment through xenophobia motivated violence. Even those with South African documents are discouraged from investing in their country of work by the possibility of arrest and deportation.

Migrants send substantial amounts of money as remittances to their relatives back home. The money does not necessarily produce economic development for the migrants and their relatives left back home (Ballard, 2004, in Osella, Maphosa, 2004). A large proportion of remittances it is used for daily expenses such as food. Health care and school fees also take a large share of the remittances. Remittances are also used to build and improve houses, to buy livestock and consumer goods. A very small proportion of the remittances is saved or used for productive investments. Remittances are also used for other purposes such as debt

repayment, funeral expenses, membership and subscription to burial societies and payment of domestic workers. There is very little investment in productive activities. Businesses run by migrants of micro-scale comprising of general dealer shops, grinding mills and bottle stores or other informal, micro-scale and seasonal income generating activities with very little multiplier effects such as employment creation. Lack of infrastructure, business training, insecurity and low incomes are some of the factors that discourage migrants from investing in business.

Social Exclusion

In order to survive in the two countries in which they spent their working lives moving between, irregular migrants have to continuously shift and change identities. Identity refers to the sense one has of who they are and of what is important about them. Sources of identity include nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, gender and class. Traditionally, identities were seen as widely shared within social groups and as based on one or two key variables such as class and nationality (Green, 2004). Identities are fluid and changeable. In other words, people actively create their own identities. As stated by Taylor and Spencer (2004) both individual and collective identity is open to continuous reassessment. Within that context, undocumented migrants often have to devise ways to survive which include falsification of documents in order to have access to some of the services that they need. According to Crush and McDonald (2002:10) this constitutes hybridisation of identity in which migrants take on a multiplicity of identities that are a combination of host and home. When in South Africa they do not only strive to get the identity documents of that country (which can be obtained fraudulently), they also have to look, talk and in every respect be like the South Africans. Anything that gives away one's identity as not South African usually leads to arrest and deportation or being subjected to various forms of abuse or violence. That is why *injiva*, as these migrants are known back home acquire characteristics including language, dressing, music, style of walking, mannerisms and even temperament that are unique to them. Sometimes this helps them to survive in South Africa. **At times it does not because At the same time the identity of *injiva* sometimes alienates them from their communities of origin as ...**

Citizenship, half citizens or non-citizens

Marshall (1950) identified three elements of citizenship, namely, the civil, the political and social elements. The civil elements of citizenship involve the rights necessary

for individual freedom. These constitute individual liberties which include freedom of speech, thought, faith, the right to own property and conclude valid contracts and to the right to justice. The political aspects of citizenship have to do with the rights to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. Social elements of citizenship range from the right to a degree of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society. As stated by Fauks (2000), citizenship entails both rights and obligations. What differentiates it most from mere subjecthood is an ethic of participation. Citizenship is an active rather than a passive status. In other words, citizenship is incompatible with domination whether by the state, the family, the husband, the church, the ethnic group or any other force that seeks to deny a individual recognition as an autonomous individual capable of self government. Citizenship, however, does not just confer benefits to an individual. It also involves responsibilities and obligations to others. Citizenship is therefore reciprocal where rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities are given and taken. Fauks believes that the concept of citizenship is an excellent example of what Anthony Giddens (1984) calls a “duality of structure”, where the individual and the community cannot accurately be understood as opposed and antagonistic ideas. Instead, individual agency and social practices are mutually dependent. Through exercising rights and obligations, individuals reproduce the necessary conditions for citizenship. Lister (1997) also emphasises citizenship as participation which is an expression of human agency. He argues that as a right, citizenship enables people to act as agents. A citizen is therefore the opposite of a subject. The relationship between the state and citizens is one which guarantees the enjoyment of certain basic rights. It is also a relationship in which people exercise control over governments directly or indirectly by participating in political activities which include casting votes on specific issues or by electing their representatives. As stated by Baubock (1994) the underlying assumption about citizenship is that of the equality of members of the community. This does not mean lack of differentiation among the members but it implies that each citizen is counted as one and one only and all citizens are counted together.

Parrenas (2001) has observed that migration results in dislocation which leads to partial citizenship or non-belongingness. This effect of migration is most evident in undocumented migration where migrants are uprooted from their countries of origin while not being fully integrated into their countries of work. Being uprooted from their country of origin because of economic, political and social exclusion, undocumented Zimbabwean

migrants, particularly those from Matabeleland to and South Africa are often faced with the reality of being “outsiders”, through being subjected to various acts of violence, exclusion and exploitation. They are stripped of both political and economic agency in both country of origin and country of work. At their country of work, they are excluded from accesses to social services provisions and participation in civil society. They cannot make claims against the state. As outsiders, they are also unlikely to subscribe to the obligations and duties of “insiders” (Reitzes and Bam, 2002:98).

In the country of work (i.e. South Africa), the state has devised various mechanisms meant to exclude people from other countries including Zimbabwe such as stringent visa requirements. Even the removal of visa does not afford total inclusion because migrants still need to have valid passports which are difficult to obtain. Besides the formal mechanisms of exclusion labels such as “border jumpers”, “illegal immigrants” and “*makwerekwere*” are used to justify not only exclusion but also violence against immigrants by locals by categorising them not just as different but as those who live outside the protection of the law and have no rights including the right to life. The May 2008 xenophobic attacks on foreigners that took place in many parts of South Africa is clear-cut evidence that many South Africans perceive foreigners as people who fall within the zone of exception. The delayed response of the state in dealing with the attacks after they broke out and the delay in bringing those responsible to book may also suggest that the protection of foreigners had not been a matter of serious concern to the South African state.

According to Mbiba (2004), among the various terms used to describe mobile migrant populations diaspora is often used to connote marginalisation in both the homeland the “host” nations. He asserts that with regard to the original state they are an appendage, often illegitimate or undesirable components of the homeland. To the host nation, they are again undesirable, a marginal component of the community. They may be tolerated only when they are perceived as temporary sojourners who will one day go away.

Weapons of the weak

Mhlanga (2009) warns that the feelings of being dominated, suppressed, excluded and marginalised from various development projects, resource distribution, policy formulation and implementation may cause violent conflict with people questioning national belonging due to lack of involvement. This is one of the possible responses. More often than not, however the oppressed do not respond with violence but apparent acquiescence. The other possible response is for the dominated to internalise and rationalise

their situation. Mhlanga refers to this as the psychology of oppression which leads to “mental warping” This denotes a condition in which the oppressed adapts an attitude of acceptance to the oppression.

While migrants, especially undocumented migrants, exist in the zones of exception in both their country of origin and in the country of work, their behaviour does not indicate a fatalistic acquiescence to those conditions. Evidence demonstrates that they resist the state of exception in both the country of origin and the country of work. As observed by Ellermann (2009) however, resistance by those who have been reduced to the state of a bare life rarely amount to collective or organised political action. Instead, the nature of resistance in the state of exception is individual rather than collective, oriented towards short term rather than systematic change and fought by means that present an indirect rather than direct challenge to the sovereign. This explains the absence of formally organised political action among the migrants. In an increasingly repressive political environment emigrants are labelled traitors, cowards or saboteurs, among other names organised political activity by migrants is extremely difficult.

In explaining resistance to the state of exception, Ellerman borrows from James Scott’s ideas on how subaltern people resist dominance. In a series of publications which began with studies of peasants in the Kedah state of Malaysia, Scott (1976,1985,1990) provides an alternative explanation of how subalterns respond to dominance to the one provided by the concept of hegemony as used by Antonio Gramsci. Under hegemony, domination of the subalterns is not achieved through coercive force but through the creation of a hegemonic culture in which the values of the dominant class become accepted as generalized common sense. As a result, the dominated do not only consent to their being dominated but they actively help to maintain the status quo. Using rich ethnographic material, Scott demonstrated that the dominated or the weak do resist their state of being dominated. They do that using the “weapons of the weak” which are the everyday forms of resistance which include passive non-compliance, sabotage, subtle evasion and deception. The activities of the migrants clearly demonstrate that despite their lack of formal or overt political action, they have not consented to domination.

Scott also uses the concept of “hidden transcript” to describe forms of resistance to domination which are not apparent to the power holders. He contrasts this to the “public transcript” which involves open forms of resistance to domination. Scott’s analysis emphasises the importance of individual peasants as agents and not passive victims of domination. This analysis accords with the theoretical framework of structuration used in

here, which also views transnational communities as agents who use various ways to resist domination and exclusion. Migrants use various forms of resistance including smuggling both human smuggling and the smuggling of goods, bribery, fraudulent acquisition of identity documents and using informal routes of crossing the border.

Conclusion

Literature on transnationalism has often defined it as involving a simultaneous existence of migrants in more than one country and as such, constituting multiple involvements, which implies participating and benefiting in the social, political and economic lives of the countries in which the migrants have the simultaneous existence. The argument I have presented in this chapter is that the notion of multiple involvements does not portray the experiences of migrants from Zimbabwe's Matabeleland region to South Africa. Instead, their experiences ought to be seen as multiple exclusions. This is because they are excluded from participating fully in their home countries' social, economic and political lives while also being excluded from participating in the country of work. While they are dislocated from their country of origin, integration into the country of work is very difficult. As a result they are neither here nor there. The migrants, however, adopt various survival strategies some of which fall outside the limits of what is legal in order gain access to the resources that they are excluded from in both the country of origin and the country of work.

References

- Agamben, G 1998 *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Alexander, J MacGregor, and Ranger, T 2000. *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forest' of Matabeleland, Zimbabwe*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Boubock, R 1994 *Transnational Citizenship*. Hantis: Edward Elgar
- Bourdieu, P 1989 "Social space and symbolic power" *Sociological Theory* 7:14-25.
- Bourdieu, P and Wacquant, L.J.D 1992 "The purpose of reflexive sociology" In P Bourdieu and L.J.D Wacquant (eds.) *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carens, J.H 1995 "Aliens and citizens: The case of open borders" **In** R Beiner (ed.) *Theorising Citizenship*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Dietz, G. 2004 "Frontier hybridisation or culture clash: Transnational migrant communities and sub-national identity politics in Andalusia, Spain" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 30 (6), pp. 1087-1112.

Durrsmidt, J 2006 "So near yet so far: Blocked networks, global links and multiple exclusion in German-Polish borderlands" *Global Networks*. Vol. 5 pp.245-263

Ellermann A, "Undocumented migrants and resistance to the state of exception. Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association 2009 Annual Meeting in Vancouver, March, 19-21.

Faulks, K *Citizenship*. Routledge: London/New York

Giddens, A., 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Goffman, E 1961 *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*. New York: Doubleday Anchor.

Government of Zimbabwe, 2003 "Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr Charles Utete" Vol. 1. (Main Report), submitted to the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

Government of Zimbabwe, 2003 "Poverty assessment study survey (PASS II)", Harare: Ministry of labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare.

Hobane, A.P., 1996 *The Commercialisation of Gonimbrasia Belina in Bulilima-Mangwe District: Problems and Prospects*, Unpublished Mphil theses, Harare: Centre for Applied Social Sciences.

Kanyenze, G 2004 "African migrant labour situation in Southern Africa" Paper presented at the ICFTU-Afro Conference on **Migrant Labour**, Nairobi, 15-17 March, 2004.

Mbiba B 2004 "Contentious transformations and global citizenship: Zimbabwe's global citizens in Harare North (United Kingdom), Paper presented at the International conference on **Looking to the Future: Social, Political and Cultural Spaces in Zimbabwe**, held in at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, from 24 to 26 May.

Rajaran, PK and Grundy-Warr, C 2004 "The irregular migrant as *homo sacer*: Migration and detention in Australia, Malaysia and Thailand, *International Migration*, Vol. 42 (1) pp. 1-32

Ritzer, G 2000 *Sociological Theory*. McGraw-Hill: New York.