Panel: Revisiting the ‘National Question’ as a Continuing African Challenge in the 21st Century

Rethinking the Discourse of Development in the Context of the National Question in Postcolonial Africa

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This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section focuses on the historiographical analysis of the development discourse including exposing the darker side of development from a post colonial African perspective. What is highlighted here are issues of epistemic violence and racism embedded in epistemologies, pedagogies and anthologies of development. Tracing the genealogy of the development discourse from as far back as during the ‘civilising’ mission era, this paper argues that much of what is often accepted as development is actually shot through by Euro-American enlightenment thought. The second part discusses issues pertaining to the postcolonial national question in Africa as the locale from which development ought to be propelled, including understanding the inherent challenges and contradictions experienced therein. In this section, I also expose how through and the coloniality of power inherent in the global colonial matrices of power, the global hegemonic discourses complicates the postcolonial African national question. In the third section of this paper, focus is shifted to the development discourse in postcolonial apartheid South Africa as a case study. Here, the intention is to demonstrate how the colonial matrices of power play themselves out in the context of SA and in relation to the global hegemonic discourses. The last section is the conclusion, where I also make suggestions.
Genealogies of development discourse.

In tracing the genealogy of development, it becomes necessary to go as far back as the dawn of enlightenmen (Lushaba 2009). In so doing, it becomes mandatory to unpack the era of European enlightenment, as perhaps the locus from which both social and political organisation of European societies evolved and, an era wherein scientific knowledge production emerged to inform, through colonialism, much of Africa’s socio-political and economic organisation.

The emergence of enlightenment critical thought in the 15th century, began to question and scrutinise the hegemony of the sacrosanctity of theological wisdom divinely bestowed on the church and ultimately causing a radical shift to a more scientifically reasoned and articulated understanding of the world. They (philosophers) believed that everything in the universe could be scientifically reasoned and explained. It was during this era of the transformation of Europe (enlightenment), that a new order of knowledge premised on the universality of scientific explanation of every phenomenon emerged. This process resulted in an encyclopaedia of knowledge in which not only scientific laws of nature were recorded but also rules governing the entire enterprise of knowledge production. For Lushaba, (2009: 7), this era symbolised the victory of reason in its struggle with faith.

Lushaba in agreement with Mkandawire (2005:) further holds that, these transformations unfolding at a time developed a body of universal knowledge we now refer to as the discourse of modernity or modern social theory of development, history and progress with Europe being the universal exampler. Mitchelle (2000) justified these arguments when she stated that:

“…the modern age presents a particular view of geography, in which the world has a singular centre, Europe... that imagines itself a continent in reference to which all other regions are to be located; and an understanding of history in which there is only one unfolding time, the history of the West, in reference to which all other histories must establish and receive their meaning”.

In sum, development meant modernising/modernity, which rested on Eurocentric epistemology.
Modernity as development

In his endeavour to locate Africa’s underdevelopment within the larger project of modernity, Mitchell (2000) demarcates modernity into three epochal moments. These are as follows: the era of early modernity or ‘mercantile capitalism’ (15th - 18th century); modernity proper or ‘capitalist modernity’ (18th – mid 20th century) and the era of late or hyper modernity (late 20th century). These eras Mitchell (2000) insists, should not be read as mutually exclusive since in each one of them are to be found elements, processes, and structures that also characterise the other periods.

In the era of mercantile capitalism, the central objective was to construct Africa and its peoples as inhuman, mysterious, barbaric, backward, uncivilised and in need of rescuing and enlightenment (Wynter 1996 and Mkandawire 2005). This construction is what Wynter (1996) call liminality or conceptual ‘otherness’. Lushaba (2009) argues, that the discourse of constructing the ‘other’ as subhuman was purposefully used to legitimise morally, in reflection to European moral standards of humaneness, the imposition of colonialism in Africa, particularly the process of mercantile capitalism’s slave trade; expropriation of surplus value and minerals, for Europe’s own development, free of any moral inhibitions. In simple terms, enlightenment’s ‘civilising” mission discourse necessitated itself morally in Africa, while clearing a way under the pretext of modernity, for mercantile capitalism to launch and to plunder the natural resources of Africa.

The early modern and mercantile capitalist processes beginning in the 15th century Europe reached its peak coincidentally at the time of the changing European society in the 18th century, which lead to industrialisation and capitalism. These social transformations were later also understood as markers of modernity. What this meant was that the capitalist mode of production and its evolving social and political structures was spreading into the rest of the colonial world as part of the colonial ‘civilising’ mission Lushaba (2009).

As a result, European modernity gained universality and hegemonic status, by subaltenising epistemologies of the ‘damned’ to borrow from Fanon. Bhengu, Lessem and Schiffere (2010) also argue that, the capitalist system did the same. They posit that, notwithstanding economic activities between human beings dating back to the most ancient civilisation, economics as a discipline and the current global economic systems – capitalism – is fairly
young. They advance that this model of economics or global economic system also gained its hegemonic status globally by subalternising other forms of economic activity preceding the one propagated in 1776 by Adam Smith.

In the era of hyper-modernity beginning in mid 20th century, Lushaba (2009) argues that, this era is no different from the preceding ones, except its superimposition of the hegemonic capitalist principles of exchange value in areas that remained immune to it. He further claims that, there is still very much a correlation between the current global capitalist/neo-liberal development discourse and the enlightenment discourse of modernity. This is because global capitalism/neo-liberalism is also driven by the theoretical development rationale of market fundamentalism. Eurocentric rationale is considered a panacea for Africa’s transition from barbarism, darkness and underdevelopment, to become civilised, modern and developed. This era of global capitalism/neo-liberalism is also guilty of epistemological racism as it continues to reproduce it.

As a consequence of colonialism, Africa is today held hostage to what Quijano (1997) calls the “coloniality of power” which he explain thus: as a global hegemonic model of power in place since the conquest of the Americas that articulated race and labour, space and peoples according to the needs of capital and to the benefit of white European peoples (Quijano 1997). Quijano argues, that, if modernity is conceptualised as the project of the Christian secular West, then coloniality is: “…on the other hand – what the project of modernity needs to rule out and role over in order to implant itself as modernity and on the other hand – the site of enunciation where the blindness of modern projects is revealed, and concomitantly also the site where new projects begin to unfold. In sum, Andreotti (n/d) states that Quijano’s coloniality of power sees colonialism as constitutive of modernity rather than derivative from it. In this sense she further explains, colonialism is conceptualised as an Eurocentric process of expansion of a mode of knowing and representation ‘that claims universality for itself, derived from Europe’s position as centre’ (Escobar 2004)

The deeply embedded epistemic racism in the universalisation of Eurocentric modernity beginning in the 18 century became also visible during the epoch considered to mark a watershed moment of the discourse of development in the late 1940s. This is probably because the 1940s experienced a devastating post war reality, necessitating some form of global
cooperation on reconstruction and development. Secondly, this was the era of President Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949, which articulates the Euro-American centric views of development, whereby anything unlike European or American was deemed to be underdeveloped.

Truman’s speech reflected what de Sousa Santos coined as abyssal line thinking. He explains thus: abyssal line thinking divides social reality into two realms, the realm of ‘this side of the line’ which is the Eurocentric, and the realm of “the ‘other’ side of the line’. He explains that, the divisions is such that ‘the other side of the line’ vanishes as reality becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced as nonexistent in any relevant or comprehensible way of being. He further explains that, whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded because it lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers to be its other (de Sousa Santos, 2007: xxx-1).

The abyssal line thinking in Truman’s speech is exposed by the fact that he believed, whether arrogantly or by default, in the universality of western scientific advances as a panacea for the development of ‘these people’, ‘the damned’. This assertion resonates with and situates Truman’s thinking in what Enrique Dussel (1998) articulates as Eurocentric paradigm. Dussel argues that within this paradigm, Europe is believed to have the exceptional international characteristic (i.e. rationality) which is universal, to justify its superiority over the ‘other’

What this Eurocentric paradigm thinking hides, and which de Sausa Santos’s abyssal line thinking illuminates, is the epistemological violence and racism embedded in their thinking i.e. the denial of African agency, the emptiness, irrational and irrelevance of their epistemologies and pedagogies of the damned on the ‘other side’ to possess the knowledge to provide adequate food for themselves; to rid themselves of diseases and to relieve themselves of their suffering. Both Lushaba and de Sausa Santos state that the colonial discourse dismissed subaltern epistemologies from inclusion in the mainstream discourses of development.

Drawing on Michael Foucault thesis of the relationship between power and knowledge, Abramsen correctly argues that, the form and structure of ‘development’ was not negotiated
but rather enforced on the south due to the disproportionate north-south power relations - fostered through by coloniality of power. She emphasizes this assertion as follows:

…The problematisation of a particular aspect of human life ‘development’ is not natural or inevitable, but historically contingent and dependent on power relations that have already rendered a particular topic a legitimate object of investigation.

It is thus following this logic with an understanding of the uneven north-south power relations, that she further advances that, scientific enquiry i.e. ‘development’ should be understood in the context of the prevailing balance of forces at the time of their formation (Abrahamsen, 2000)

This reality meant that everything that was to be in the name of ‘development/modernity’ was to be understood, explained and fashioned within the western and European mold as the hegemon, which in the 19th century was articulated more by Rostow’s neo-liberal thinking. Lerner (1968) and Aina (2003) confirms the latter by defining modernization in this fashion:

As the process of social change whereby the less developed societies acquired characteristics common to more developed societies.

Escobar (2004) further adds that “Eurocentric modernity can be seen as the imposition of global designs by a particular history, in such a way that it has subalternised other local histories and design”

Central to the failure of, or critique of modernization/neo-liberalism, many scholars believe was its ill, narrow and lack of innocence Aina (2003). Furthermore, referring to neo-liberal SAPs, Aina in agreement with Lushaba’s dependent capitalism thesis – a capitalist system where Europe is dependent on Africa’s minerals and human resources - exposes the parasitic element inherent in the modernist/neo-liberal theory by using the metaphor below:

“SAP should not be seen as a treatment prescribed by a disinterested physician whose primary commitment is to the Hippocratic ideal of saving lives…In the case of the SAP, the doctor will want their fees paid, their debts settled, and continuous use of and dependence on their services, drugs and instruments”
The fallacious and empty promises of ‘modernization/development’ for the third world mentioned earlier, invited ‘alternative development’ thinking. These newer or contending theories and methodologies can be distinguished mainly within two categories i.e. those which Payne and Phillips (2010) argues, do not reject growth and modern industrialization per se, and the more radical ones such as the 1967 self-reliance doctrine of the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, insisting an African self dependent approach and the post development theory, which rejected the very conceptualization of ‘development’. However, such theories offer very little alternatives to the current nature and structure of development. This is because they themselves are firmly grounded in western and Eurocentric discourses and fail to challenge the racist geopolitics of knowledge at the heart of the western discourse and only serve to reproduce epistemic racism (Wynter 1996).

We have also come to appreciate that, western and Eurocentric notions of development and modernity are part of the Eurocentric enlightenment and civilizing mission discourse because of the abyssal line thinking and epistemological racism deeply embedded within the discourse i.e. – a discourse which does not recognize ontologies of and epistemologies of the ‘other’ in any rationale manner, and one which claims universal resonance.

Given Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power, Maldonado-Torres’ coloniality of being, and Mignolo’s coloniality of knowledge which continue to entrench the subalterns to the periphery, it goes without saying that, Africa finds itself within the discourse of development, immersed within the colonial matrices of power. In simple terms, Africa finds itself still situated in a position of misanthropic skepticism to borrow from Maldonado-Torres, where it is skeptical of and cannot justify its existence, let alone its own development. As a result, it follows that, much of what is in the name of the development discourse in Africa is informed by western and Eurocentric conceptions, which are not only parasitic in nature, but also alien to the African development question.

In the following section, the discourse of development is discussed in the context of postcolonial nationalist project that unfolded concurrently with decolonization and achievement of political independence.
The Post Colonial Nationalist Project in Africa

The shared experience of untold sufferings by the African peoples as a result of the imperial conquest is well documented and needs no further qualification. The severity of the onslaught on the natural resources, and the abuse and murders launched against the colonized people of Africa were so stark to the extent that between 1884 – 1910, ten million Africans were murdered, marking what Kasongo Lumumba calls the first genocide in world history. The bondage of the African people during this phase of our history, their subjugation, de-humanisation and barbarization as a result of the imperial condition became the rallying point for all African national liberation movements; FRELIMO in Mozambique; SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, MPLA in Angola and the ANC in South Africa and many others, to fight the political hegemony of the imperialists and to free the African peoples from bondage.

The central objective which ran across through most of these African National Liberation Movements, was according to Mkandawire (2005) the struggle for independence and nation-building, where Africans sought to govern themselves free from colonialism. The gaining of political power and authority by the African liberation movements was probably the fundamental telos, followed by a move towards the post colonial national project i.e. nation-building, economic development and prosperity for the African people.

Decolonisation that began with Ghana in 1957 marked a watershed moment in the 1960s when seventeen African states became independent. This new post colonial situation and the euphoria that came along with independence and self determination by the African people provided both challenges and contradictions to the post colonial African national project. Central to these was a challenge of dealing with the blind spots of the colonial legacy, which Maldonado-Torres (2007) terms coloniality. Maldonado-Torres differentiates colonialism and coloniality as follows: ‘while the former (colonialism) denotes a political and economical relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation and empire, (coloniality) instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administration’. He further adds that coloniality survived colonialism. Coloniality is imbricated in what Quijano termed the colonial matrix of power which he describes in four
interrelated domains thus: as control of the economy (land appropriation, exploitation of labor, control of natural resources; control of authority (institutions, army); control of gender and sexuality (family, education) and control of subjectivity and knowledge (epistemology, education and formation of subjectivity) (Quijano 2007).

It is thus within Africa’s own experience of coloniality and the colonial matrixes of power which interpellated and not only co-constructed both European superiority and African inferiority, but also, subalternised, erased, mystified and demonized African ontologies, epistemologies, and pedagogies, that, the post colonial Africa national project faced complex challenges to imagine a post colonial sovereign African state and nation-building outside the existing power relations of a master-serf type. The ethos of the postcolonial African national project was variously articulated in Nyerere’s Ujamma, Nkrumah’s ‘African Personality’ and the ANC’s Freedom Charter, Thandika Mkandawire (2005) noted that nationalism was the glue that underpinned the national project. But these post colonial African national programmes which appeared radical in providing alternatives to a capitalist system, suffered what Zizek would ordinarily call weak thought. This is because not only did they seek alternatives i.e. a liberated postcolonial African nation within the Eurocentric discourses - Marxism and socialism being amongst these - but also, without critically interrogating the structural nature of the state they inherited from colonialism. To put it bluntly, they sought liberation and nation-building within the structural and material terms and process of Europe, which according to Gordon (2011) locked us in the process of a redemption that is not theirs. He further argues that, consequently, this situation affirms, instead of a negating of their damnation. In simple terms, the postcolonial national question sought alternatives from the interiority, rather than from the exteriority of the global designs. These challenges and contradictions continue to this day to haunt the post independent African national question.

What was lost was deep appreciation of the prevailing African historical and cultural realities without which the African national project was to be situated, no wonder why Berman, Eyoh, and Kymlicka (2004) state that very often national movements were identified as under the domination of particular ethnic communities which sought ascendancy in the new state. For this reason Berman et al (2004) also stated that tribalism, often in the face of
the western imagery of modernity, was vigorously rejected by the postcolonial political leaders as archaic and atavistic. This was well pronounced in Samora Michelle’s dictum that ‘for the nation to live, the ethnic must die’. As a consequence, Mkandawire (2005) further states, nationalism denied ethnic identity and considered any political or worse, economic claims based on these identities as diabolical as imperialism itself. The silencing of the ethnic identities under the illusion of African nation-state, meant a negation of engaging with a core feature of the African national project and nation-building. Such a condition negated and catapulted a process that should have dealt with the matter (ethnicity) in a manner that would first, appreciate and embrace ethnic identities in a democratic way, and secondly, to unlock its genius to inform nation-building and development.

The result of silencing the ethnic voice under a falsely imagined identity of a homogenous nation-state together with the contradictions of political power in the postcolonial state was also not without consequences. This process frustrated the postcolonial nation-building project through exacerbation of ethnic tension and the culture of violence, suppression and repression inherited from and perpetrated by colonialism to maintain order, authority and allegiance to the colonial state. The Shona and Ndebele ethnic conflict in Zimbabwe in the 1980s and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is a case in point. In agreement with Fanon’s claim that violence is more of a constitutive condition of colonialism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011), locates the logic of violence of post colonial Africa in coloniality. He argues that whereas colonialism employed violence – slavery, dispossession, killing, rape an imprisonment – to ‘modernise’ the colonized, African nationalism on the other hand reproduced colonial violence and authoritarianism, now in the name of national unity, security and post colonial development. Young explains this phenomenon thus: “violence translates itself, as it transmutes from violator to the violated person of object, from impact to its disrupted effects, to live on as an afterlife in the cultural memory, from which it then erupts and repeats itself” (Young 1986)

In sum, the colonial matrices of power, in this particular respect, the coloniality of imagination at work in postcolonial Africa, became a barrier for the African political elite to imagine the construction of and governance of a postcolonial African state outside Eurocentric conceptions of the colonial state and its governance.
The contradictions and challenges of the postcolonial state became intense in the context of the social (ethnicity and violence); political (nationalism, nation-building, dictatorships) and economic (material emancipation and development), in relation to the colonial matrices of power, together with the devastation effects of the 1973 and 1979 oil crisis. The postcolonial national question became even more challenging to imagine and led to the 1980, being dubbed Africa’s lost decade. This period marked an important epoch in the history of post colonial Africa, because, it was the era that saw many African states take to World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s neo-liberal agenda of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). For Mkandawire (2005), this epoch marked the beginning of the betrayal of the nationalist struggle and its main projects by its heroes in the face of international institutions and forces of globalization. African economies entered a phase of greater foreign control than ever before.

The failure of the national project in Africa as it increasingly became reduced to and degenerated into xenophobia, citizenship, ethnicity and tribalism, chiefly as a result of the contradictions imposed by both colonialism and coloniality, changed the structural process of the struggle for a sovereign postcolonial state. Whereas the process of the liberation struggle, initially, sought socio-economic development and freedom through a political process - nationalism- a dramatic change was experienced in the 1980s, where economics and market forces following the western and Eurocentric conceptions of development, were considered germane to drive development but later ran roughshod over the former.

The market oriented approach took root in an environment of unresolved identities issues and complexities. According to Lumumba Kasangu (2011), such a drastic turn in approach meant an incomplete political process whose remnants continues to dog much of postcolonial African national states. In addition to these challenges, also central to the national question imposed by an aborted political process was also the role of agency of the postcolonial political elite. Rather than rescuing the post colonial African agenda by engaging from a de-colonial vantage point, the postcolonial political elite chose subconsciously to work in harmony with and within western-centric and Eurocentric notions of development. For Gordon (2011), these third world elites were agents of the neocolonial situation. Resounding Fanon, this point is qualified by Gendzie (1995) that, in the name of Africa’s development, neocolonialism regains its strength through the ruling elite and
technocrats – (lumpen bourgeoisies) – who work within and maintain the colonial status quo while promising to change it, invoking what Fanon calls repetition without change.

It is, therefore, within these contradictions and complexities – failed nationalisms and nation-building; colonialism and coloniality; the colonial matrices of power; and the hegemonic structure of the global design – which continue to reproduce rather than transform the hegemonic discourses within which, the answers to the failures of the African national question reside.

To attempt to resolve these issues in relation to the post colonial development discourse in Africa, especially from a colonial difference vantage point, necessitates what Mignolo terms border thinking i.e. that “I think from where I stand”. Although the notion of boarder thinking provides for a radical perspective on development if understood in relation to de Sousa Santos' notion of abyssal line thinking, this border thinking has in post colonial Africa only given narrow impetus to the construction of the post colonial states’ continental, regional and sub regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); Economic Community of Central African Sates (ECCAS); African Union (AU), and the Pan Africa Parliament (PAP) and several others to mitigate against the shared experiences of colonialisms and under development, and, to serve as agency to drive development in post colonial Africa.

However, notwithstanding the many efforts and structures formed to bring about development, post colonial Africa shows very little progress in development, leading scholars such as Gilbert Rist, Rita Abrahamsen, Cornwell and Eade, to dismiss the concept (development) as a myth, cloaked with emotive and seductive notions of humanism. Central to the challenge of development in post colonial Africa, is that, development is at best, understood within the post development theoretical understandings and at worst, within Eurocentric and planetary notions of modernity.

The next section discusses the development discourse in the context of how the colonial matrices of power play themselves within South African national project in general and development discourse in particular.
Development Discourse in Post Apartheid South Africa

This section explores the discourse of development in the South African context. The aim here is not necessarily to evaluate the impact of key development approaches which became central to the development discourse of the post-colonial apartheid SA, Reconstruction and Development (RDP), and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. Instead, the exploration of this discourse in SA, is deliberately done in relation to the global development discourse articulated in the preceding section. This exercise will not only allow the reader to trace similarities between the global and the local (SA) discourse and how the two interface, and, to locate the locus from which the SA development discourse draws its logic. But also, attempt to expose the presence of the colonial matrices of power in full operation and how those forces dictated and acquired their space in South Africa’s national agenda.

The post apartheid era provides a very unique and dynamic understanding of development in SA. This is because SA rejoined the global community of nations at the height of the hegemony of neo-colonialism and the era of hypermodernity, globalisation and neo-liberalism, which was to affect every aspect of its socio-economic organisation and at worst caused the ANC to abandon the ethos that drove the liberation struggle for more than thirty years, the freedom Charter within a short space of 3 years.

Reconstruction and Development (RDP)

The coming into effect of the South African constitution, its structures and systems - under a unitary state model - won popular endorsement and was adopted after various heated political debates in the 1990s on the constitutional model South Africa was to follow, more so on the debate between federal and/or a unitary state system. The ‘unitarists’ won the day and a mould was developed within which the constitution was to be fitted. The fundamental reason for choosing a unitary as opposed to the federal state system was that the Republic was spatially racialised and ethnicised and that the former would better serve the ultimate objective of building a united de-racialised rainbow nation.

The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 set the tone - much to the adulation of the world - for a new democratic trajectory South Africa was to follow in delivering a better future to all. On matters of governance, a foundation was laid and entrenched by the Municipal Structures Acts 117 of 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act 32
of 2000 which demarcated the state and its functionaries into national; provincial and local government, all under a de-racialised unitary system, to pave a way to allow for a smooth process of building one united rainbow nation and delivering services to the people.

Davis (2003) states that, for decades, the freedom Charter, with its socialistically loaded and inclined vision, akin to Nyerere’s Ujamma, Nkrumah’s ‘African Personality’ and Senghor’s ‘Negritude, represented the ANC’s vision for the future postcolonial apartheid South Africa. This vision affirmed amongst others that, the national wealth of the country (minerals), the Banks and monopoly industry would be transferred into the ownership of the people; and that all the land would be divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and Hunger (Freedom Charter, 1955). This vision, Davis further claims, was further entrenched by Nelson Mandela, as the ANC’s vision, on the day of his release from prison. This is what Nelson Mandela said: ‘The nationalisation of mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and the change or modification of our views in this regard is in conceivable’ Davis (2003) states that these views were repeated in 1991 when Mandela had the following to say: ‘Nationalisation is a demand which is reasonable from our point of view. Where do we get the capital and resources to tackle the national issues facing us?’

To those ends – nationalism – and in pursuit of meeting the objects of the Freedom Charter, the ANC government introduced what was to become the first official government economic policy framework of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In keeping with and re-sounding the spirit of the Freedom Charter, the RDP emphasised redistribution and the intervention of the state, and called for the reconstruction and ‘the restructuring of the South African economy Davis 2003. He further states that, of significant importance was the proposal to restructure the economy by way of policy of growth through redistribution which acts as a spur to growth and in which the fruits of growth are redistributed to satisfy basic needs. In simple terms, Davis states that, read as a whole, the document proposed a form of a mixed economy in which all sectors - market and the state - would be involved and contribute to the national goals and objectives.

The RDP articulated its programme centred on the following key principles: (1) meeting basic needs, (2) developing human resources, (3) building the economy, democratising the state and society and (4) implementing the RDP. With regards to the latter - Implementing the RDP – government identified the following programs - these relate closely to the major
principles - as the key medium and long-term programs to drive the implementation of the RDP; meeting basic needs, urban and rural development, human resource development, democratising and institutional reform, and economic restructuring (White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, 15 November 1994)

In the first year of its operation, the Ministry in the office of the president, (1999, 5-16) stated that, the programmes aimed at kick starting the delivery of the RDP covered a range of activities including the following: land reform, redistribution and restitution; health care, in particular the provision that ‘no child under 6 years of age and no pregnant woman may be turned away from a hospital or clinic’; electricity; primary school nutrition, under which ‘5.4 million children are being fed a basic snack every morning’ and the provision of rural water

In sum, the RDP sought the transformation of the socio-economic setting of SA, in ways that would in a progressive manner, address the racialised socio-economic inequalities inherited from the legacy of colonial apartheid. It adopted a softer socialist approach, where the private sector or economic neo-liberalism was also accommodated to flourish, while striving for democracy and some equilibrium between economic development and human needs. From a theoretical point of view, the RDP’s approach was addressing economic development side by side with social justice and nation building in what can be called a social democratic system. According to Berman (2005), this system – social democracy – represents a full-fledged alternative to both Marxism and liberalism, which at its core, is a distinctive belief in the primacy of politics and communitarianism. For Carlsson and Lindgren (2007) a social democratic system is one which employs a welfare approach. In short, we can argue that a social democratic system embedded within the RDP sought to harmonise relations between two oppositional ideologies within hegemonic discourses, democratic capitalism and socialism, in ways that would allow for liberalism, social justice and nation building to be in harmony and being mutually constitutive of each other.

However, as a result of the colonial matrixes of power well enmeshed in the era of hyper-modernity and globalization dictating the global socio-economic agenda of neo-liberalism, the development discourse in South Africa took a different turn to embrace the core elements of the neo-liberal discourse. This policy change was to resound what Rogerson (2009) observed, that, local economies are affected more than ever before “by policies and processes formed at the supranational level, such as market liberalisation, expanding global production systems and the changing terms of trade”.

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Gearing for GEAR

The RDP did not last very long as the ANC government’s economic policy. By mid 1996, GEAR a new economic strategy emanating from the Department of Finance emerged, promising a growth rate of 6 per cent per year and job creation of 400 000 per year by the year 2000 and concentrating capacity - building on meeting the demands of international competitiveness Davis (2003). However, for meeting these targets, the Gear strategy proposed the following: attracting foreign direct investment, but (that it) also requires a higher domestic saving effort; greater industrial competitiveness, tighter fiscal stance, moderation of wages increases, accelerated public investment, efficient service delivery and major expansion of private investment.

In addition, Davis states that Gear also recommended faster deficit reduction programs, the liberalisation of financial control, including the lifting of exchange controls and a privatisation programme which would eventually cover all ‘non-essential’ state enterprises. The adoption of the Gear strategy meant embracing the Washington Consensus and set a new trajectory for development. According to Turok (2008), South Africa joined the IMF and World Bank in 1944, but the bank ceased to lending to the country in 1996. However, in 1990 De Klerk attended the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank and was promised ‘help’ to bring about democracy in SA, and as a result, the Fund produced policy papers on economic policy to subscribe to – the 1977 Articles of Agreement – under which IMF was granted powers to oversee all financial policies of the country. This situation continued well into the 90s and Turok (2008) adds, that, Mbeki admitted to Gevisser that, five months before coming into power, the ANC had ‘signed a letter of intent to the IMF, committing itself as the future government to a programme of fiscal austerity in return for a loan of 850-million. He further states that, Mbeki also said that, he and the government had been forced to acquiesce to the Washington Consensus on Macroeconomic policy when they implemented their Gear policy. Such conditions, confirm Fanon’s observation of the dialectic facing the postcolonial political elite in ‘the Pitfalls of National Consciousness’. he puts it as follow:

...The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an under-developed middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. In its willful narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country. But that same independence which literally drives it into a corner will give
rise within its ranks to catastrophic reactions, and will oblige it to send out frenzied appeals for help to the former mother country (Fanon 1961).

This new strategy towards South Africa’s development meant the abortion of a political process - nationalism - , echoed in the freedom Charter and embracing a more technicist economic process of neo-liberalism, which according to Fanon (1961) developed outside the limits of our knowledge, as means to achieving development. All this, in following with neo-liberalism’s demand for state contraction and ‘universalist’ Rostovian rationale that the free market will encourage growth and as a consequence, development will follow via a trickle-down system (Fig, 2007). This point emphasises Mignolo’s epistemological racism embedded in colonialism, now currently reinforced through coloniality as stated earlier. Mfuniselwa Bhengu from the Centre for Economic Humanism, in agreement with Lessem and Schieffer, confirm that epistemological racism and the colonial matrices of power has disrupted African economic relations to a point of non-existence, and as such, created an African economic vacuum.

Unfortunately, the trickle-down effect of wealth and development in a Rostovian sense is yet to be seen unfold in South Africa. In fact, Fig (2007) argues that, much as significant economic growth was registered in South Africa, it was jobless, thwarting Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA)’s notion of “shared growth”. Fig, further confirms that, as a result of the failures of the trickle-down effect, Africas’ development has been reversed since the 1960, where livelihoods and life span amongst other things have fallen.

**Consequences of the new strategy**

It becomes very important at this stage to look at the postcolonial apartheid South Africa’s national question and development path sought, from a de colonial and colonial difference point of view. The entry point here is the period from the era of Freedom Charter in 1955 and the RDP – to- Gear. This is because no matter how progressive or retrogressive these programmes were in the context of SA, they were conceived from the limits of the epistemologically racist, Universalist rationality of Europe, and thus offered very little de colonial alternatives.

Although the Freedom Charter and later the RDP were seen progressive since they advocated for a radical transformation of capitalism in SA, their logic was derivative from
the global hegemonic discourses and the colonial matrices of power. This is because socialism itself was more of a critique of modernity within modernity, and thus suffers the same limitations as capitalism (Mignolo 2007). The two are constructed and articulated based on a singular historical process and experience of Europe as the centre. What this means is that, as a result of epistemological racism, and coloniality of knowledge, Africa and SA in particular had very little ideas and epistemological tools to construct a developmental path outside the Eurocentric discourses. As a result, the ANC was from the very conception of the Freedom Charter to the democratic transitions in 1994, found itself caught-up in the web of the colonial matrices of power and coloniality of imagination. SA had very little options to choose policy options and development trajectories outside the Eurocentric discourses and the current global design. Rather, it was pressed to choose its path from the two contending global hegemonic discourses, capitalism, marxism and socialism, 

On the other hand, the abandonment or abortion with all its contradictions, of a political process of nationalism and nation-building in SA, in favour of Gear’s economic and technicist approach to development has not been without its share of serious consequences to the national question. This approach gave-in to the hegemony of the Euro-American capitalist system and paved way for a series of programs such as the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). BEE emerged as a result of Mbeki’s argument in what became known as a ‘Two Nation’ state address, where he argued that, national unity and reconciliation between black South Africans were impossible dreams if socio-economic disparities, which prevented blacks South Africans from exercising their citizenship rights to the same extent of white South Africans, were not rapidly overcome (Mbeki 1998). As a consequence, according to Ponte et al (2007), BEE sought to increase black ownership of shares in major cooperation. This program gave rise to what is commonly known as the ANC’s 1996 class project. Notwithstanding, this policy was criticised as it became evident that, rather than benefiting the previously disadvantaged blacks as a whole, it benefitted only powerful elites with political connections (Roger and Roger, 2008 and Ponte et al 2007, 934).

This post apartheid neo-liberal scenario of BEE in South Africa resonates with Fanon’s prophetic vision in a very interesting way. The post colonial apartheid SA through the BEE program, created a powerful black middle class bourgeoisies in South Africa which according to Fanon is pretty much useless because not only does it assume a comprador tendencies and a lumped black elite outlook, but also, reproduces in them, new agents to
administer, protect and entrench neo-colonialism’s grounding, in this particular respect, in the national agenda of SA. This point is justified more by Moeletsi Mbeki, resonating Fanon’s argument that the postcolonial elite are driven more by state managerialism and the ‘Replace the foreigner’ syndrome. This is because the first purpose of BEE was to create a buffer group among the black political class that would become an ally of big business in SA. This buffer group would use its newfound power as controllers of government to protect the assets of big business and the modus operandi and thereby maintain the status quo in which South African business operates (Mbeki 2011).

This is as Fanon correctly prophesised that because neither financiers nor industrial magnates are to be found within this national middle class because this class is not engaged in production and nor in invention, nor building, nor labour. He further adds that, through the rhetoric of nationalism and in seeking to secure justice for itself, this class occupies the posts vacated by the ‘foreigners’ and their historic mission becomes that of intermediary or managers of white capital (Fanon 1961). For Moeletsi Mbeki (2009), this class is doing nothing to boost the South African economy but instead entrenches the country’s economic inequalities and created a culture of cronyism and entitlement that discourages black entrepreneurship

The ‘replace the foreigner’ syndrome endemic in the postcolonial attitude, Fanon further argues, gets also carried over to the lower rungs of the community - taxi drivers and cake sellers etc - who equally insists that the foreigners must go. In many too often a case, the frustration of the poor black South Africans in townships and informal settlements has, in the face of limited resources, lack of employment and of services delivery, at least led to violent service delivery protests, and at worst, xenophobic attacks on African foreign nationals more especially on the Somalians and Zimbabweans as witnessed on April 19 2009.

On the other hand, with poverty still being too often a reality for the majority black South Africans, and governments’ failure to deliver some of the most basic services to the people, racial polarisation and tension has resurfaced in SA. This is because as a result of the racial socio-economic inequalities created by apartheid, white South Africans - whom were privileged under apartheid - are still seen better off under the circumstances, in comparison to the majority blacks - whom suffered under apartheid and continue to do so in the new dispensation. The ANC –Youth League leader, Julius Malema’s, calling for nationalisation of mines and seizure of white-owned land without compensation is a case in point (Dixon
The brewing racial antagonism was further justified in the words of Malema, who said:

“...the struggle for today’s youth was for “economic emancipation”, to “take command of the economy from the Hands of white males” ... “ we must say here today, following the clip we played (a video clip of an interview of Nelson Mandela in support of nationalism) in our lifetime we demand economic freedom” (Quoted in Marrian 2010)

The challenges of declining quality of life in SA, i.e. declining life expectancy from 65 years to 53 years since the ANC took over, high levels of unemployment, lack of service delivery and the violent service delivery protest which accompany the frustrations is an issue for serious concern. This is so much so a reality that, Moeletsi Mbeki predicts that SA’s ‘Tunisia Day’ will arrive much sooner in SA than was the case in other postcolonial African states. Tunisia Day is when the masses will rise against the powers that be, as happened recently in Tunisia (Mbeki, 2011). This assertion was further qualified by the general secretary of Congress of South African Trade Union (Cosatu), Zwelinzima Vavi, who stated that, South Africa was facing a ‘ticking time bomb’ due to high unemployment, racialised economic disparities, massive income inequalities and failure by the state to redistribute wealth effectively. In sum, this situation points to the failure of the South African government to claim its own, under the current global design of the global political economy and concomitantly casts the national question into disarray.

To understand the underlying cause of these challenges and South Africa’s ‘ticking time bomb’, Lassem and Schiefer’s integral economic theory could provides useful analytical tools if applied differently. This is because their application of this theory at the local or community level may also be guilty of seeking alternatives within the hegemonic discourses and instead further entrenching their hold, because the underlying assumption behind Lassem and Schiefer’s application of their theory at the level of a village, are blind to the hidden forces of coloniality of power. In their invisibility, these forces anchoring the global hegemonic discourses are far greater to be understood and challenged from below (village or communities) who are in fact powerless, in relation to the postcolonial South African state, where these forces reside, dictate and launch their status quo. However, if Lassem and Schiefer’s theory could be applied from the level of the state, upwards and sideways into the rest of the continent, it could prove useful to shedding light on the challenges currently experienced by Africa and particularly SA especially from a de-colonial vantage point.
These scholars argue that every social system be it a state, law, economy etc, needs to find, in order to be and stay sustainable, a dynamic balance between its four mutually reinforcing and interdependent ‘world’ and its center. In other words, they argue, a living social system consists of a:

Centre: realm of religion and humanity

South: the realm of nature and community

East: the realm of culture and spirituality

North: the realm of science and technology

West: the realm of finance and enterprise,

This approach is what they call the four world and a centre approach (Lessem and Schiefer 2010).

They insist that this integral perspective is applicable for all types of social systems, from the individual to the organizational, from community to society. For example, on an individual level, this approach would seek a dynamic balance between heart, spirit, mind and soul.

To understanding the current frustrations of the poor threatening an implosion in postcolonial apartheid South Africa can be best done by asking questions in relation to Lassem and Shcifferes’ four world and a center approach. These questions are as follows.

Does the postcolonial apartheid South African state construct and exist vis-à-vis in harmonious relations with its humanity and religion (Ubuntu); its natural environment and community; its religion, cultures and traditions (ethnicities); its epistemology (science and technology) and its finance and enterprise?

To answer these questions may well be too complex and debatable more especially when sought within the limits of coloniality, however, from a de-colonial perspective these question further expose the strength of colonialism, coloniality and the colonial matrices of power. While the South African state i.e. its structure and geographical borders remain by inheritance, colonial constructions Mkandawire (2005), the South African state as both structure and agency, is pressed to act inside the very same structure which was historically designed to oppress.
Using Lessem and Schieffer’s argument that all social systems needs to find, in order to be, and stay sustainable, a dynamic balance of five core areas mentioned earlier, in relation to the forces of colonialism still present in the postcolonial apartheid South African state, allows us to arrive at certain conclusions to explain brewing threats of an implosion.

Amongst these, is that, as a result of the forces of coloniality, in itself, the South African state as both a structure and agency, is in conflict with vis-a-vis, rather than in harmony with (its natural environment and community; its religion, cultures and traditions (ethnicities); its epistemology (science and technology) and its finance and enterprise.

In simple terms, the South African state is administering a system (neo-liberalism), which is not only alien to it, but also militates against its very own people’s natural environment and community; its religion, cultures and traditions (ethnicities); its epistemology (science and technology) and its finance and enterprise (economy). From an economic point of view, this system alienates its people from participating effectively in main stream economy. This situation, in conjunction with neo-liberalism’s call for public expenditure cuts, further deepens the poverty experienced daily by the poor black majority and will if not properly re-thought, as Mbeki predicted, detonate the South African ticking time bomb.

Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the discourse of development is in fact part of the colonialism; accept that this time around, its motives are invisible and hidden behind its hegemonic discourses which are supported by the colonial matrices of power. We have also come to appreciate that, while visible structures of colonialism are no more, coloniality continues to re-construct colonialism in invisible ways through the post colonial African state. As a result, Africa remains entrapped within the colonial matrices of power, which perpetuates and entrenches the parasitic muster-serf relations between Africa and, America and Europe to the advantage of the latter. It is thus not surprising that while post colonial Africa took to modernization in the promise for development, the continent still remains entrapped in poverty. This reality is arguably the central cause of civil unrest, violence and authoritarianism in some parts of the African continent.

It is within this context and the recent credit crunch or the global financial crisis exposing the limits of the hegemonic discourses, Eurocentric and western centric capitalism or modernity, which resonate with Audre Lorde’s dictum that “the musters tools will never dismantle the muster’s house, which necessitates a de colonial development trajectory Africa is to pursue.
This means that this trajectory, while being conscious of the good inside, should be carved from the exteriority rather than from the interiority of hegemonic discourses. In simple terms, this means that Africa cannot rescue itself from bondage by seeking solutions within the canon of hegemonic discourses.

However, that being said, there remains greater need for interrogating robustly the nature of the current post colonial state and its organs, and its functions. The state should be interrogated from a de colonial vantage point in relation to Lessem and Schieffer’s four worlds and a center approach. In simple terms, the nature and function of the post colonial state and its organs should be questioned whether it is indeed in harmony with rather than in conflict, with (its natural environment and community; its religion, cultures and traditions (ethnicities); its epistemology (science and technology) and its finance and enterprise. Once the post colonial African state as both structure and agency is in harmony with the latter, it would have in hindsight dealt with issue such as misanthropic skepticism, ethnicity, nation-building, which are core issues which continue to dog much of Africa’s national agenda and unleash the genius of Africa’s own path from within itself. Failure to do that will mean Africa will continue seeking solutions for its challenges by employing Eurocentric and western centric methods which developed outside its knowledge systems, and much worse, remain undeveloped and alien to its own.

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