



Identity, Culture and Politics, Vol 5, Nos. 1 & 2, 2004, pp. 37-59

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Globalisation, Boundaries and Livelihoods: Perspectives on Africa

Francis B. Nyamnjoh*

Abstract

This paper takes a closer look at the paradoxes of globalisation as a process of inclusion and exclusion, empowerment and enslavement, citizenship and subjection, hope and disappointment. It argues that the neo-liberal rhetoric and euphoria on globalisation must be countered with the reality of exclusion for all but an elite few. The basic split might be between the rich and the poor across national borders, but the fact remains that the investors, advertisers and affluent consumers whose interests global capitalism represent, are more concentrated in and comprise a significant proportion of the populations of the developed world, than is the case in Africa where only an elite minority are involved and hardly any local consumer products are competitive globally. Yet, although structurally excluded, the bulk of ordinary people in Africa refuse to celebrate victimhood. Thanks to their ability to manoeuvre and manipulate, and thanks to the sociality and conviviality of their cultural communities, Africans have refused to internalise and surrender to marginalisation by states weakened by the profit motives of global capital. Thus, the paper also explores some of the creative strategies employed by Africans to appropriate, gatecrash, cushion, subvert or resist the effects of their exclusion by the global structures of inequality. The paper is therefore in tune with the growing need to understand the processes and prospects of globalising Africa and Africanising globalisation.

Résumé

Cette communication s'intéresse aux paradoxes de la mondialisation, en tant que processus d'inclusion et d'exclusion, de responsabilisation et d'asservissement, de citoyenneté et de sujétion, d'espoir et de déception. Elle avance que la rhétorique néo-libérale, ainsi que l'euphorie relative à la mondialisation sont contrebalancées par l'exclusion de la majorité, à l'exception de l'élite. La principale fracture est située entre les riches et les pauvres de part et d'autre des frontières nationales ; mais il demeure que les investisseurs,

* Department of Publications and Dissemination, CODESRIA, BP 3304, Dakar, Senegal.

E-mail: francis.nyamnjoh@codesria.sn

Paper prepared for Afro-Asian Dialogue conference on 'State and Nation Making in Contemporary Africa and Asia', jointly organised by CODESRIA and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) Sri Lanka, at Pretoria, South Africa, 17–19 February 2003.

les annonceurs et les riches consommateurs, dont les intérêts sont représentés par le capitalisme mondial, se retrouvent surtout dans le monde développé et représentent une large proportion de la population de cette zone, à l'inverse de l'Afrique où seule une élite minoritaire est concernée, et dont presque aucun produit de consommation local n'est compétitif sur le marché mondial. Pourtant, bien qu'exclue sur le plan structurel, la majorité des Africains moyens refuse de sombrer dans la victimisation. Grâce à leur capacité de manœuvre et de manipulation, à la sociabilité et à la convivialité de leurs communautés culturelles, les Africains ont refusé d'intérioriser et de se laisser marginaliser par des États affaiblis par la recherche de profit généré par le capital mondial. Cette communication présente ainsi certaines des stratégies créatives mises au point par les Africains pour s'appropriier, transcender, amortir, bouleverser ou résister aux conséquences de leur exclusion par les structures mondiales inégales. Cet article est une contribution au besoin croissant d'une meilleure compréhension des processus et perspectives de mondialisation de l'Afrique et d'africanisation de la mondialisation.

Africa and the world are living the era of intensified globalisation: a process marked by accelerated flows and, quite paradoxically, accelerated closures as well. The rhetoric of free flows and boundaries dissolving seems to be countered by the intensifying reality of borders, divisions and violent strategies of exclusion. As the possibility of free and unregulated flows provokes greater mobility by disadvantaged labour in search of greener pastures, the neo-liberal doctrine of globalisation becomes more rhetoric than reality for most people, as global capital is privileged to the detriment of labour. This glorification of multinational capital is having untold consequences, especially in marginal sites of accumulation where devalued labour is far in excess of cautious capital. The accelerated flows of capital, goods, electronic information and migration induced by globalisation have only exacerbated insecurities, uncertainties and anxieties in locals and foreigners alike. In their wake has come about an even greater obsession with citizenship, belonging, and the building or re-actualisation of boundaries and differences through xenophobia and related intolerances. The response almost everywhere, is for states to tighten immigration regulations, and for local attitudes towards foreigners and outsiders to harden. Where migrants are welcome, interest in having them tends to be limited to those with skills or capital to invest in the local economy. When unskilled migrants are reluctantly accepted, they have to be ready to go for the menial jobs for which even the most destitute nationals would seldom settle. Skilled or unskilled, immigrants tend to be exploited and treated as 'slave labour' or 'sleepwalkers' by employers keen to 'take advantage of their precarious state to drive down wages and circumvent labour laws' (cf. Dieux 2002). This is as true of Africa as it is of the rest of the world, and invites scholarly attention to the growing importance of boundaries in a world pregnant with rhetoric on free flows and boundless opportunities for individuals and communities without discrimination.

Today in Africa, like elsewhere, there is a growing obsession with belonging and the questioning of conventional assumptions about nationality and citizenship. This is as true of how nationals and citizens perceive and behave towards one another, as it is of how they behave towards immigrants, migrants, and/or foreigners. Even countries where ethnic citizenship and belonging had almost disappeared in favour of a single political and legal

citizenship and of nation-building, there has, in recent years, been a resurgence of identity politics and overt tensions over belonging, as various groups seek equity, better representation and more access to national resources and opportunities. In such situations, while every national can claim to be a citizen legally, some see themselves or are seen by others to be less authentic nationals or citizens. The growing importance of identity politics and more exclusionary ideas of citizenship are paralleled by an increased awareness and distinction between 'locals', 'nationals', 'citizens', or 'autochthons' on the one hand, and 'foreigners', 'immigrants', 'outsiders' or 'strangers' on the other, with the emphasis on opportunities, economic entitlements, cultural recognition and political representation (cf. Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Nyamnjoh 2002a; Werbner 2002a&b; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002). Customary African values (e.g. mainstream philosophy of life, agency and responsibility that privileges interdependence over autonomy) and policies of inclusion (opening up to minorities and foreigners) are under pressure within the struggles and politics of entitlements in an era of sharp downturns and accelerated flows of opportunity-seeking capital and migrants.

This paper takes a closer look at the paradoxes of globalisation as a process of flows and closures, empowerment and enslavement, hope and disappointment. It argues that the neo-liberal rhetoric and euphoria on globalisation must be countered with the reality of exclusion for all but an elite few. Although 'the basic split is not between nation-states, but between the rich and the poor, across national borders' (McChesney 1998:6; 2001:13), the fact remains that the investors, advertisers and affluent consumers whose interests global capitalism represent, are more concentrated in and comprise a significant proportion of the populations of the developed world, than is the case in Africa where only an elite minority are involved and hardly any local consumer products are competitive globally. Yet, although structurally excluded, the bulk of ordinary people in Africa refuse to celebrate victimhood. Thanks to their ability to manoeuvre and manipulate, and thanks to the sociality and conviviality of their cultural communities, Africans have refused to internalise and surrender to marginalisation by states weakened by the profit motives of global capital. Thus, the paper also explores some of the creative strategies employed by Africans to appropriate, gatecrash, cushion, subvert or resist the effects of their exclusion by the global structures of inequality. The paper is therefore in tune with the growing need to understand 'the processes and prospects of globalizing Africa and Africanizing globalization' (Zeleza 2003:viii).

The Reality of Boundaries

Boundaries are part and parcel of our world. We are born within borders and struggle for or against them throughout our lives. These boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are political, social, cultural, and above all, material. How well we succeed in claiming and realising our citizenship - global, national or otherwise - and in what form or forms, depends very much on how we are able to negotiate away the boundaries of exclusion of which we are victims. But given our basic tendency towards sterile accumulation (greed) in whatever form as humans (a condition currently aggravated by the global dominance of neo-liberalism), claiming rights often entails denying rights. However, the degree to which we enjoy the rights we claim (if and when we achieve them), very much depends on how successfully we are able to keep firm the

boundaries we create or inherit. Sometimes we renegotiate inclusion and exclusion in order to maintain or increase the privileges of citizenship. In other words, no boundaries, no matter how taken-for-granted they have become, are permanent. This is both a source of constant hope and constant worry, and reason as well for the competing rhetoric on borders by the included and the excluded of our micro and macro worlds. Because it is impossible for everyone to belong everywhere to the same degree as everyone else, ideologies of containment and contestation are the order of the day, even as we continue to propagate and recognise the virtues of globalisation and a global citizenry.

In the face of these struggles, most would agree, not always for the same reasons, on the need to guarantee, enshrine, institutionalise or provide juridico-political provisions and protection of our perceived fundamental rights as human beings. In this connection, law and the rule of law become essential for every society and for inter-community and international relations. In other words, seeking political freedom or citizenship is perceived as a must for every human. In certain settings and circumstances, a human or person is immediately defined and perceived as 'an autonomous' individual with rights enshrined in the constitution and protected, in principle, by the state and its institutions. If these rights are threatened by the state in such settings, individuals at different levels of society are expected, again in principle, to be able to mobilise themselves 'as individuals linked by common interests', to defend their freedoms.

In those settings, few would argue, in principle, against the claims of rights by all and sundry as individuals. But not everyone who claims political rights is likely to have them, even when these are clearly articulated and guaranteed legally. Nor do political rights necessarily imply cultural, social and economic rights as well. And even if they did, these other rights would still have to earn value in real terms, as availability is hardly synonymous with affordability. The American liberal democratic system which champions the dominant model in the current global order, offers some interesting examples of how human beings, assumed to be autonomous individuals by law, find themselves bargaining away their political, cultural and economic freedoms in all sorts of ways under pressure from the neo-liberal emphasis on 'profit over people' (cf. Chomsky 1999).

The electoral system, voting practices in the various states, and logic of choice are such that they technically disenfranchise some even when they are legally qualified and protected. The Florida saga in the Bush-Gore presidential election of November 2000 is a good case in point. African Americans, legally political citizens, found their votes wasted because they were not sophisticated or educated enough to punch in their ballot papers. For lack of education or intimacy with modern technology, often through no fault of theirs, the supposedly 'enfranchised' African Americans, found themselves technically 'disenfranchised'. And the illusion of a single citizenship and rights for all is unaffected, because of the assumptions and rhetoric that tend to mistake prescriptions for reality, constitutions and institutions for action, availability for affordability, persons for individuals. While the texts deny subjection, reality proves that being an autonomous individual or citizen is impracticable for most, and must not simply be deduced from juridico-political provisions. The test of the political and legal pudding of citizenship and rights must be in the practical eating.

Materially as well, 'The American Dream' does not come true for everyone who embraces it (cf. Gray 1998:100-132; Good 2002:69-90). The citizenship and consumer sovereignty promised all Americans, can in reality be afforded only in degree and by those who manage to harness the limited economic, cultural and social opportunities that translate into reality legal and political rights or abstract notions of the autonomous individual. The rest, to get by, must negotiate themselves into various levels of subjection and alienation, often with devastating costs to their humanity and that of their dependants or others. Being a rights-bearing individual ceases to be as automatic in reality as is claimed in principle, and/or for hegemonic purposes. For those who succeed after hard struggle, the tendency is to monopolise opportunities, since it is, quite paradoxically, only by curbing the rights of others that advantages are best guaranteed in effect. The majority are those who struggle on a daily basis to fulfil themselves, with varying degrees of failure, which, under neo-liberalism, is blamed on the individual to the extent that he or she has failed to sacrifice others through the sacrifice of history, memory, relations or community. Many do not quite make even the barest minimum, and much alienation, inequality, violence, cultural and social malaise, psychic and emotional disorders and exploitation in America, Europe, and increasingly elsewhere, has been linked to the suffocating grip by neo-liberalism on the throat of human imagination and creativity (cf. Dufour 2001).

This reality makes a process of being an autonomous individual, beyond a simple matter of providing for citizenship and rights in the constitution. We are born persons, but how we defend and enhance our humanity depends very much on the enabling process of individuation, and the concessions individuation is able to negotiate for itself from mitigating factors such as society, politics, economics and culture. But to be totally autonomous individuals is impossible even for the privileged few, although the elusive pursuit of self-fulfilment can occasion various attempts by some to diminish the humanity of others. This makes of life in all its translations and interpretations a bazaar to which many are drawn but few rewarded because of boundaries of various kinds. Persons attracted by the rhetoric of rights and values informed by various ideologies and philosophies have found themselves confronted by myriad ways in which the rights and values are bargained away, leaving them with only the illusion of individuality most of the time.

Globalisation: A World Without Boundaries?

This reality has done little to temper neo-liberalism and its determination to celebrate the autonomy and success it claims to bring individuals who embrace it. Optimistic accounts present globalisation as a process of empowering individuals by breaking down boundaries or negotiating conviviality between physical and social geographies of inequalities. Globalisation is said to accelerate flows and fluidity across physical, economic, social and cultural boundaries in ways that turn individuals into veritable melting pots of plurality and diversity. Rigid notions of geography, class, culture and identity are said to meet their Waterloo in globalisation and the world is said to have witnessed 'the end of history' (cf. Fukuyama 1992). No natural or social boundaries are too sacred or too remote to be penetrated and humbled by the human and electronic agents of global flows of and encounters with Western

capitalism. It has been argued that the globalisation of consumer capitalism and its attractions by Western entertainment electronic media imbued with liberal icons and illusions of freedom and superabundance brought the Berlin Wall and Soviet Bloc crashing down in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since then it has brought Eastern Europeans knocking at the doors of Western capital, institutions and consumer culture. Thanks also to the globalisation of real and imagined freedoms in the West, Africans are said to have embarked upon a second liberation struggle around the same time as Eastern Europe, forcing their autocratic leaders to pay more than lip service to democracy. It is also expected that Africans would embrace the globalised 'condom' culture to counter the multitudes of deaths that their promiscuity occasions yearly in connivance with HIV/AIDS. Indeed, optimism on and around globalisation is so profound, that even the remote Bushmen of the Kalahari are hardly remote enough to be spared instant transformation even when encountered merely by an empty bottle of Coca Cola dropped from a plane, as the controversial film, 'The Gods Must be Crazy', demonstrates. In short, globalisation is said to engender global citizens by unsettling old certainties and erasing stubborn boundaries. That is as far as optimism goes.

The reality is more nuanced. That boundaries are a permanent feature of life is well illustrated by the factors that limit current euphoria about globalisation and its benefits for all despite the virtually unrestrained pursuit of profit by the multinational gendarmes of neo-liberalism. Far from leading to a presupposed convergence, globalisation appears to accelerate the production of differences, heterogeneities or boundaries through the structures of inequalities inherent in global capitalism (cf. Chomsky 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; Moore and Sanders 2001; Bond 2001). As Bill Clinton has very aptly pointed out, the 'abject poverty' which is part of our globalised world, 'accelerates conflict', 'creates recruits for terrorists and those who incite ethnic and religious hatred', and 'fuels a violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our future depends' (Clinton 2001). With their insensitivity to history and geography, mainstream discourses are yet to prove that what they term 'globalisation' is not simply a new way of perpetuating age-old boundaries and divisions that have polarised societies and the world for centuries (cf. Zeleza 2003:1-63). 'It looks as if, in a world characterised by flows, a great deal of energy is devoted to controlling and freezing them: grasping the flux often actually entails a politics of 'fixing' - a politics which is, above all, operative in struggles about the construction of identities' (Geschiere and Meyer 1998:605).

Homogenisation accounts generate false optimism, as they mistake the globalisation of neo-liberalism for development by ignoring the growing polarisation and marginalisation of peoples and societies that result from the process (Amin 1997a:38-40). The assumptions that feed such accounts are quite oblivious of the fact that increasing co-existence and seeming competition at airports and city centres between Western consumer goods and tourist art from the remotest corners of Africa for example (cf. Davis 1999), are hardly enough to credit global capitalism with harmonising 'seemingly disparate and incompatible zones of accumulation and production' (Surin 1995:1191-6). Much remains to be done, even in the domain of African art (despite its impressive export record), to promote meaningful and mutually rewarding encounters between African artisans and their Western customers (cf. Davis 1999).

Although its standard-bearers have been the information, communication and culture industries, discussions on and about globalisation have tended to be dominated by its economic and regulatory dimensions. Much emphasis is placed on the internationalisation and integration of economic activities and their implications for the authority and sovereignty of nation-states, especially as global capitalism means global power for multinational corporations, and calls for a new way of public governance (cf. Zeleza 2003:24-45). While some see in globalisation a requiem for the nation-state, others believe that the state would continue to be relevant, but must work in conjunction with non-state actors to facilitate trade and investment. Such private and international agencies include multinational corporations, NGOs and international inter-governmental institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO and also other international standard-setting bodies which are often unofficial, informal and not clearly recognised as such (cf. Thompson 1999).

If the authority of the state is threatened by global capital in general, this is less the case in Africa where multinational capital colludes with states at the expense of democracy, equity and social development (cf. Mkandawire 2002). In spite of World Bank and IMF policies and support, Africa's share of global trade has fallen to 1 percent. Given the weakness of African states in relation to the interests of rich nations, international financial institutions and multinationals, and given their peripheral position in the global economy and politics, the only real authority or semblance of power affordable to African governments is towards their own populations, which are often too poor and too vulnerable to organise and mobilise against exploitation and repression. What neo-liberalism wants of African governments are national and regional policies in tune with the profitability expectations of global capital, policies that minimise countervailing traditions, customs, worldviews and expectations of continuity. Once they have guaranteed global capital stability, security and protection from local labour and its needs, African states need not do more than embrace the rhetoric of liberal democracy and the tokenism of its freedoms. All multinational capital really needs of them is not so much a guarantee of democracy and stability, as a dictatorship to ensure that local labour and national interests are kept subservient to the interests and power of big business. Often, it is understood, though not openly stated, that they need not do more than embrace liberal democratic rhetoric, since few seriously believe that it is possible, in practice, for African states or governments to be both tolerant to the demands of global capital and to the exigencies of their own nationals. There is trouble only for governments who, in an effort to please their own populations, begin to claim national sovereignty beyond rhetoric, thereby impairing the interests of multinationals and of Western states.

Nowhere is this partnership and collusion between state and global capital better illustrated than in the relationship between African governments and the Bretton Woods institutions. Both the World Bank and IMF have preferred to impose pre-packaged, undomesticated ideals of liberal democracy, civil society and citizenship on Africa, to the reality of democracy that embraces both the rights of individuals and those of groups, however constituted or defined. Keen to see their neo-liberal projects through, these institutions that service worldwide capital markets do more than 'resist punishing companies that patronize tyrants', as 'they fear frightening off businesses that prefer to shop for financing where executive decisions won't be judged' (Fishman 2002:41). In addition, they have readily provided support

for acquiescing states and governments in order to neutralise opposition to their unpopular structural adjustment conditionalities that have excelled at the globalisation of poverty. In this way, instead of helping bring about democracy, structural adjustment has had highly repressive and authoritarian political consequences; exogenously induced. It has had to repress popular opinion and rely on authoritarian regimes for its implementation. Its negative economic, social and political effects have been responsible for the most violent forms of exclusion (Gibbon et al. 1992; Mkandawire 1996; Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). Everywhere they are likened to medicine more dangerous than the disease it seeks to cure, and the IMF in particular is more appropriately seen as the 'International Misery Fund' by ordinary people flattened by its conditionalities. The polarisation of power and wealth produced by such neo-liberal structures and global capitalism, makes democratic rule at peripheries like Africa virtually impossible, as global capitalism needs autocratic powers to be able to penetrate the peripheries with its inequalities (Amin 1997a:22). This is well illustrated by the state-condoned violence among the Ogoni minority in relation to entitlements over the oil of the Niger Delta of Nigeria (cf. Obi 2001). Globalisation has not significantly corrected, in practice, this centre-periphery logic (Amin 1997b; Zeleza 2003). If anything, it has compounded the predicaments of most Africans reduced to consuming fantasies about the West (cf. Nyamnjoh and Page 2002), even if some do succeed in translating such fantasies into new social identities, as have the Sapeurs of the two Congos, thereby affording themselves 'psychological redemption' from 'social dereliction' while simultaneously making a political statement against the misery imposed on them by the Western illusion of material success for all and the authoritative structures of their own African states (cf. Gondola 1999; Friedman 1990, 1991, 1994).

This reality of collusion between multinational capital and the state challenges the idea of the self-regulating free market economy, for as Thompson argues, [big] business needs public support and regulation as 'an insurance against the full vicissitudes of a turbulent and potentially self-destructive system' as global capitalism, especially as [big] 'Business does not want to go about its activity totally unprotected.' In other words, the 'free flow' of capital needs an ordered global environment to function properly and sustainably. It needs 'public governance of the world trading and investment system', for 'A pure free market economy is so fragile, volatile and vulnerable that the implications of its operation on a truly global scale could be disastrous' (Thompson, 1999:142). Thus, Thompson sees 'a modified minimal multilateralism based upon the strengthening trilateral relationship between North America, the European Union and Japan' as representing 'the most likely prospect (but not the only one) for the effective governance of the world economic system' (Thompson 1999:144-150). The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and African based 'anti-globalisation' activists, their shortcomings notwithstanding, are there to ensure that Africa is given the voice and space to articulate its own concerns and negotiate inclusion on its own terms.

These concerns imply that globalisation is not all about 'unregulated flows' or the disappearance of political and social boundaries as enthusiasts of the global village or the global republic of technology seem to imply (cf. Appadurai 1996; Geschiere and Meyer 1998; Gray 1998; Nyamnjoh 2000; Zeleza 2003). It is a 'deeply and starkly inegalitarian' process (Golding and Harris 1997:7) that still favours a privileged minority as it compounds the

impoverishment of the majority through closures and containment. Increasingly 'We are witnessing a convergence of economic thinking and policy as well as technologies', with the growing power of multinational corporations, and 'their abilities to dictate the terms of competition' through hostile takeovers, mega-mergers, or 'by forcing weaker players out of the game' (Murdock 1994:4-6; McChesney 1998, 2001; Gray1998). Their objective is to control not only global markets, but also global consciousness, by encouraging 'the emergence of a small number of monopoly concerns which command a disproportionate share' of the global market (cf. Thomas and Lee 1994; Murdock 1994; McChesney 1998; Gray 1998). As Murdock argues in connection with the media and information market, 'the new media mogul empires' are 'empires of image and of the imagination' in that 'They mobilise a proliferating array of communications technologies to deliver a plurality of cultural products across a widening range of geographical territories and social spaces, and are directed from the centre by proprietors who rule their domains with shifting mixtures of autocracy, paternalism and charisma' (Murdock 1994:3). The tendency is to mistake plurality for diversity, oblivious of the possibility that an appearance of plenty could well conceal a poverty of perspectives (Murdock 1994:5).

While capital is enabled to 'seek competitive advantage and the most secure and largest returns by roaming the globe for cheap but efficient production locations' (Thompson 1999:40), labour is denied the same privilege. According to Ted Fishman, 'Capital has traveled more freely across more borders over the last twenty years than it has at any time since the first wave of modern globalization, in 1870' (Fishman 2002:34). If capital can search the globe for competitive advantage, why cannot labour? In their editorial to a special issue of *Media Development* on 'Migrants, refugees and the right to communicate', Pradip Thomas and Philip Lee highlight the predicament of migrants and refugees in a world where globalisation seems to generate an obsession with boundaries and belonging. In EU countries where 'the dominant accent and concern is the protection from rather than the protection of refugees and asylum seekers' (Thomas and Lee 1998:2), no amount of integration appears enough to qualify immigrants for citizenship or to limit the powers of individual states as critical players in this area (cf. Bhabha 1998). In the words of an immigrant in Germany, 'It doesn't matter if you've read Goethe, wear lederhosen and do a Bavarian dance, they'll still treat you as an immigrant' (cited in Thomas and Lee 1998:2).

In Britain, India and Portuguese Africa for example, similar essentialist notions of culture, identity and belonging imply that not even encounters and marriage shall bring together what cultural and social geographies have put asunder. Persons who cultivate relationships across race, class and caste are treated with condescension; and so are their offspring, whose worlds are 'half-and-half' and who are not credited with more than 'half a life', regardless of their personal desires and experiences. They feel like pawns in someone else's game, as if they were forced to live the lives of others and to bear identities imposed by authorities with ambitions of dominance. As 'half-and-halves' they live with the idea of a great disaster about to happen. They are not sure what this disaster is going to be, whether it is going to be local or worldwide, but they feel it is going to do away with their security. This makes them overly sensitive to the need to prove themselves, often with an arrogance that attracts envy from those who see themselves as 'full lives' (Naipaul 2001). Insecurity for those who do not quite

belong is increasingly the case in Europe with the growing popularity of the extreme right and of anti-immigration and racial purity policies. Such threats of insecurity push the 'half-and-halves' to look for a mythical home elsewhere even when they were born and have grown used to a real home somewhere else.

In South Africa and Botswana where the economy is relatively better off than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, xenophobia is rife against migrants from other African countries with economic downturns. Referred to derogatorily as Makwerekwere (meaning those incapable of articulating local languages that epitomise economic success and power), some of these migrants come from countries that were very instrumental in the struggle against apartheid (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Nyamnjoh 2002a; Sichone 2001). Such tensions and boundaries between 'undeserving outsiders' and 'entitled nationals', are eloquently captured by Phaswane Mpe in *Welcome to Our Hillbrow*, a novel about a part of Johannesburg where 'citizens' fear to thread because criminal and violent Makwerekwere have welcomed themselves to and imposed a reign of terror in Hillbrow (Mpe 2001). Even South African nationals from the ghettos, townships and Bantustans of the former apartheid dispensation, who are yet to graduate from subjection into citizenship in real terms, have been co-opted by the rhetoric of abundance and success under threat from unregulated immigration. Polarisation and tensions are exacerbated by the racialised lexicon, categorisation and registers of the apartheid era that have fed into the new South Africa, where even progressive academics are in no hurry to deconstruct and reconstruct. A consequence, by no means the only, is that of recent South Africans of Indian descent have come under a scathing attack in a pop tune by Mbongeni Ngema, a popular Zulu musician. Titled *Ama-Ndiya*, the controversial song claims to 'begin a constructive discussion that would lead to a true reconciliation between Indians and Africans', and accuses South African Indians of opportunism and of enriching themselves to the detriment of Blacks, who are presented as more indigenous but most exploited nationals. If the Indians are to be taken seriously as belonging to South Africa, they must display greater patriotism and stop straddling continents. In this way, elite capitalism becomes less of the problem, as black nationals for whom socio-economic citizenship remains an illusion scapegoat Makwerekwere and increasingly Asians. This raises questions about the meaning of the juridico-political citizenship guaranteed by the constitution (often touted as the most liberal in the world) of the new South Africa where the socio-economic and cultural cleavages of the apartheid era are yet to be undone in a way that is beneficial to the majority of the victims of apartheid.

The tightening of immigration conditions in the West and other vibrant centres of accumulation is clear evidence that multinational labour is not given the same opportunity to globalise as is multinational capital. Although it must be added that not all labour gets confined in the same way, with 'the overwhelming black poor', being the most discriminated against by Western politicians keen on ensuring that the advantages gained by their peoples are maintained (Seabrook 2000:22). Thus, while even mediocre labour from the North usually finds its way to the South at Western salary rates, labour from the South is both devalued and confined by stiff immigration policies in the North, except for the most skilled, monied and privileged. Even in the South, governments are more accommodating to labour from the North, and current policies by African governments are to detect, detain and deport fellow Africans whose skills

are found to be redundant in their host countries (Akokpari 1999, 2000, 2001; Morris and Bouillon 2001; SAMP 2001; Nyamnjoh 2002a). Africans, the educated and skilled elite included, face stiff financial and bureaucratic hurdles procuring visas to travel to other African countries, even when the same visas are readily made available, at little or no cost, to Europeans and North Americans who often deplete more than enhance the economies of the states they visit. Only the cream of the elite few, white and black, armed with additional hard passports from a Western country, can penetrate Africa with the privilege and ease of outsiders, much to the envy of colleagues and friends with only soft passports to show. In this connection, it is difficult to take the initiative for an African Union seriously when African governments are yet to give Africans reason to take fellow Africans seriously through facilitating relations of interconnectedness and conviviality. This and other factors discussed in this paper, make globalisation only marginally beneficial to the South in general, and Africa in particular.

In cultural terms, those who emphasise globalisation as a homogenisation process, perceive its basic mission in Africa to be that of inviting Africans to partake of the 'standardised, routinised, streamlined and global' consumer culture, of which McDonalds, Coca-Cola, CNN and satellite entertainment television such as DSTV are harbingers (Golding 1994:7). In this way, such versions of Western cultures have been forced onto the peoples of Africa as the one best thing of the one best way, to be followed without equivocation or reservation. Evident in this outlook and practice is impatience with alternative systems of thought and practice, and a desire to impose the neo-liberal consumer outlook and approach as the one best way of achieving betterment (cf. Laburthe-Tolra and Warnier 1993:15-52; Warnier 1999). While inviting others to break free of the boundaries of customs, traditions and worldviews informed by their cultures of origin, the homogenising view of globalisation affords itself the insensitive arrogance of power and comfort by refusing to make concessions or negotiate conviviality with difference. Modernity as hegemonic 'modes of social life and organisation' of European origin (cf. Giddens 1990) thus poses as a giant compressor determined to crush every other civilisation in order to reduce them to the model of the industrialised, preying and globalising West.

By defining globalisation in terms of cultural homogenisation, advocates of Mcdonaldised consumer culture have lured and/or coerced Africans, their cultures and creativity to be consumed by the giant compressors of the West. The ultimate effect being, as Soyinka has so aptly observed, that Africans are encouraged 'to develop an incurable dependency syndrome and consume themselves to death'; for the consumerist culture propagated in the name of globalisation can only guarantee productivity at home in the West by vigorously exporting itself to Africa and the rest of the Third World (Soyinka 1994:209). And thus capitalism as a way of life cannot leave the Africans free to perform their work at home, nor their duty in the world (Fanon 1967:78; Amin 1997b:41-41), in terms of promoting cultural diversity and conviviality. The outcome, Soyinka argues, is that peoples of different cultures, often of poorer societies, 'are inducted into this unequal exchange'; and 'feeding the foreign consumerist machine becomes a way of life for countries whose consumer habits hitherto trailed an umbilical cord from their productive technologies, however, rudimentary, and were

indeed rooted in the totality of the nation's culture.' Youths, mothers, values and tastes are all victims, ravaged by the elite few of the consumer club (Soyinka 1994:209-210).

The identity and power conferred by consuming foreign explains why despite much rhetoric about cultural renaissance in many an African country (e.g. the authenticity of Mobutu (Zaire), négritude of Senghor (Senegal), Consciencism of Nkrumah (Ghana), Ujamaa of Nyerere (Tanzania), Harambee of Kenyetta (Kenya), African Renaissance and Ubuntu of Mbeki (South Africa)), the ruling elites continue to acculturate themselves and to 'progressively take on the look of strangers in their own country due to their daily lifestyle, modelled on that of homo consumens universalis' (Amin 1980:175). With a ruling elite whose weakness and marginality vis-à-vis global capitalism and its institutions of legitimation have been certified, consuming foreign becomes a major way of staking claim to power locally and of further mystifying the disaffected populations with whom they have lost credibility.

The paradox with the African elites is that they know what they do not need and need what they do not know. Thanks largely to a life-long history of cultural alienation for the African elites, thanks to the ubiquity of Western educational institutions and epistemological traditions, and thanks to the aggressive exportation of Western cultural products through the mass media, Africans have tended to know more about the rest of the world than about themselves and their own environment (cf. Nyamnjoh and Jua 2002). One must admit that in these matters, they baffle even the westerners. The misfortune is that the average westerner is made to believe that their national cultures and values must be universal, since even 'savages' from as remote a continent as tarzanic Africa appear to share them. Little wonder that they can't always understand what fuss academics and activists of peripheral countries tend to make about globalisation as a process of one-way flows that must be resisted. Just how can the average Westerner understand arguments to the effect that the global culture some presume to observe today is nothing but 'the transnationalization of a very national voice, the universal triumph of a supremely local and parochial set of images and values' (Golding and Harris 1997:9), when it is possible to find your McDonalds, Coca-Cola, Fish and Chips, Mars Bar, English or Continental breakfast and five course meal, John Lennon, Elvis Presley, Spice Girls or Madonna tune, Barbie, Batman or Mickey Mouse even in the remotest corners of the Dark Continent? It is largely thanks to facilitation by the African leadership (in the broadest sense of the word), that such unmitigated one-way flows are perpetuated, and everyone becomes trapped by the neo-liberal consumer web in one way or another, at one level or the other.

Coping with the Boundaries of Globalisation

However, granted the level of poverty in Africa, only an elite few do qualify (largely through corruption, embezzlement and abuse of state power and office) to consume first- or second-hand, for global availability is not synonymous with global affordability. The majority of people have to content themselves with what trickles down (in hand-me-down or worn versions) to them in the ghettos and villages (if at all), from relatives and patrons at the centre of power and resources. In the face of such inequities, it is difficult to envisage how ordinary Africans can relate to the global consumer culture in any other terms but the frustration and

disenchantment it brings them. Their experience of globalisation is the 'misery and incoherence of life in the suburbs' and villages; 'the collapse of public transport, state-run educational and public health services; the breakdown of electricity and sewage systems; the serious degradation of ... infrastructure and the sheer abuse of power by self-serving functionaries' (Devisch 1999:5). Their experience is in the enslavement and ever diminishing prospects that globalisation gives rise to, especially in contexts where many states have lost the capacity to handle problems of equity and social development (Mkandawire 2002; Zeleza 2003:1-63).

The devaluation of Africa that has come with a top-down idea and practice of globalisation, has meant the institutionalisation of consumerism and the enshrinement of dependency by a Westernised elite who have seen in consuming Western a source of power and identity. The result of this is mounting disillusionment at the grassroots, especially among the rural poor and urban slum dwellers, who have been forced to mark time with their 'expectations of modernity' by local elites at the service of global capital (cf. Ferguson 1999). In a previous paper (cf. Nyamnjoh 2000), I focused on the processes and effects of co-optation or assimilation of the elite few by consumer capitalism, and how these elite few, in turn, use their consuming foreign as an identity, and as a source of prestige, status and power. Here, I am more particularly discussing how ordinary or sidestepped Africans have refused to celebrate victimhood by opting instead, for the creative appropriation or the Africanisation of globalisation.

Globalisation and the power it brings to its disciples at the periphery in relation to their fellow countrymen and women, it must be echoed, are limited to a minority. While global capitalism caters for the needs of investors, advertisers, and the affluent consumers of the world as a whole, this, relatively speaking, tends to be a substantial portion of the population in the developed West, but only a distinct minority in the underdeveloped South (McChesney 1998; Chomsky 1999; Bond 2001). Hence Amin's argument that, unlike in the industrialised West where there is a good chance that globalisation could accelerate homogenisation of some kind—even if of consumer instincts only (Amin, 1980:31-2)—in underdeveloped and heavily plundered Africa, it is only by marginalising the masses that the power elite are able to afford the 'growing income' that encourages it to adopt Western models of consumption, the extension of which 'guarantees the profitability of the luxury production sector and strengthens the social, cultural, ideological, and political integration of the privileged classes' (Amin 1980:138). An argument echoed by Sharp (1998) and by Jean and John Comaroff (1999) in relation to post apartheid South Africa, where structural inequalities are yet to be resolved in a way that benefits more than just a black elite by a state that has opted to play according to the diktats of global capitalism. Jean and John Comaroff see 'widespread evidence of an uneasy fusion of enfranchisement and exclusion, hope and hopelessness; of a radically widening chasm between rich and poor; of the effort to realize modern utopias by decidedly postmodern means.' The ANC government has abandoned or toned down on rhetoric 'of an egalitarian socialist future, of work-for-all, of the welfare state envisioned in the Freedom Charter' of the days of anti-apartheid struggles, in favour of the free market and 'the perceived reality of global economic forces' (Comaroff J. and J. 1999:19).

Thus, while a small but bustling black elite can today wallow in the conspicuous consumption of prized commodities such as palatial houses, cars, TVs, cellphones and Jacuzzis, most ordinary South Africans who are still trapped in shacks, shantytowns, joblessness, poverty and uncertainty, can only marvel at the 'indecent speed and ... little visible exertion' with which the black elite have come by their riches and prosperity. These inequities have given rise to the belief 'that it is only by magical means, by consuming others, that people may enrich themselves in these perplexing time', and consequently, to a resurgence in accusations of witchcraft and zombification, and to the scapegoating of immigrants—makwerekwere—whose readiness, like zombies, to provide devalued labour is seen as compounding the disenchantment of the autochthonous populations in the face of rapidly diminishing prosperity in South Africa (Comaroff J. and J. 1999:22-26). In neighbouring Botswana, another island of prosperity in an ocean of downtowns and uncertainties, attitudes are equally hardening towards foreigners and even among nationals, citizenship is no longer to be taken for granted (cf. Nyamnjoh 2002a).

In Zaire (current Democratic Republic of Congo), getting involved in the dollarised diamond economy as an alternative to collapsed state structures, seems to create more problems than it solves among villagers who have come to believe that 'to be considered in Zaire, you got to have money!' With some going even further to assert that: 'you need money to be considered in the eyes of God, for God only recognizes the rich' (De Boeck 1998:793). Thus driven by desperation to capture and tame the wild, unpredictable and ambivalent diamonds and dollars, the young bana Lunda males who are at the heart of this economy, are ready to sacrifice (by means of sorcery and otherwise) their work power and productivity, their youth, strength and beauty, their fertility and sexual prowess, and their friends or family members. Diamonds and dollars 'totally isolate one and invert the normal ties of solidarity and reciprocity into the destructive internal mechanisms of redistribution by sorcery. The longing or hunger for dollars and diamonds is ... like an incurable festering sore which re-opens every time one runs out of money'; which happens pretty often since diamond dollars tend to 'evaporate', to be wasted away on beer, cigarettes and women ('economy of ejaculation')—'uncontrolled and wild flow of money and commodities' 'that does not correspond to accepted patterns of self-realization' (De Boeck 1998:789-799).

For being a very restricted club, global capitalism is attracting its fair share of opportunists and gatecrashers from among the sidestepped, not least in Africa. Today 'the Nigerian-based letter scam' and the Cameroonian 'feymenia' are wreaking havoc all over the business world (from the USA, through Europe, to South East Asia), making as many victims as there are men and women hungry enough for 'a quick buck'. Known locally as '4-1-9' (after the Nigerian penal code reference to fraud schemes), the Nigerian letter scam operates from Lagos and other centres of accumulation in Africa (e.g. Johannesburg) and the world. Their strategy, similar to that of the Cameroonian 'feymen' and Liberian fraudsters, consists in luring unsuspecting businessmen (both local and foreign) with fake deals, and then robbing them (cf. Elliot 1999:23). They often present themselves as close relations of this or that unscrupulous but demised autocrat, with knowledge of huge sums of hard currency (preferably American dollars) that he, his relations and/or associates had carefully stacked away somewhere, waiting to be laundered and spent with facilitation of potential partners in

business who stand to benefit enormously at little risk. Their deals, scope and opportunities are aided by the accessibility and anonymity of the Internet on the one hand, and the appetite for instant and effortless success created in people globally by consumer capitalism, on the other. It is naive to imagine that any amount of policing could eliminate these alternative ploys of seeking to make it, within a global capitalist structure where greed is the creed. While such scams eventually become a way of life, a business of some sort, one must not lose sight of the fact that the assimilation and exclusion logic of global capitalism that litters the world with victims, is often at the base of illegal and unethical shortcuts to riches.

The majority of Africans, on the other hand, are not as smart or as unethical as the Nigerian '4-1-9' or the Cameroonian 'feymen', so seldom come close to escaping the misery imposed on them by the entrenchment of boundaries. Thus, only the blanketing misery of the masses blunts Africa's craving to consume Western. For many are those who simply cannot afford what it takes to excel in consumerism, the pervasive mass mediated images of desire notwithstanding. Even then, misery can only stop most from consuming the best and first-hand, but not from second-rate consumption (in the form of second-hand cars, second-hand clothes, second-hand underpants, second-hand hair, second-hand shoes and socks, second-hand fridges, second-hand television sets and VCRs, second-hand computers, second-hand technology of all types, second-hand drugs, second-hand beef, second-hand knowledge, etc.). Because of misery, Africa has become a dumping ground for obsolete Western technologies and consumer products. Brussels and Utrecht for example, are Europe's leading centres for exporting used cars or what is more appropriately termed 'reconditioned comfort' to Africa. Africans, unconsciously, have become a solution to many an environmental problem in the West by dying to consume what Westerners are dying to dump. Western waste unfit for Western dumps find ready markets in desperate Africa, from cigarettes, through a host of outdated consumer items, to toxic chemicals, arms, infected beef and genetically modified foods.

Globalisation is intensifying the divisions between consumer 'citizens' and consumer 'subjects' first between the North and the South, and then within different countries of the North and the South. The overall effect is that nothing is too old or too worthless to be consumed, and that everyone is deluded into thinking that they do not need to enter the consumer market at the same level to qualify as 'bona fide' consumers. Global capitalism creates markets and opportunities for rejects even among the dead and the forgotten who normally should be fighting it. Slum dwellers may not afford first- or second-rate consumption, but they can scavenge the rubbish heaps of rich residential areas for leftovers and for disposable tins, plastic containers, dumped household effects, and other rejected consumer items, which they recycle to keep hope alive. Similarly, villagers wait for urban-based relatives to hand down to them what they have tired of consuming in the cities, battered or intact. Nothing is too old or too used to be used. Globalisation thus provides for the endless recycling of consumer products, and consequently, of the poverty, misery and voicelessness of the majorities of the world, North and South.

Such secondhand consumption is evidence that ordinary Africans refuse to lose hope in the face of disenchantment with neo-liberalism. New religions, some no less entrepreneurial than

leading multinationals, have risen to capitalise on such resilience in ordinary Africans. They promise 'new hopes' for 'the cheerful givers' (cf. Meyer 1998; van Dijk 1999) and their popularity is yet another indication of how determined to fight off exclusion Africans are. Together with healing churches informed by a creative marriage of African and Western traditions, the new churches compete for material and spiritual attention among slum dwellers trapped by 'misery and hardship' in 'tragic spaces' (Devisch 1995, 1996). Pyramid schemes, casinos and games of chance have also fed on the resilience of ordinary folks, by provoking in them 'fantasies of abundance without effort', and leading them to believe in the possibility of 'beating capitalism at its own game by drawing a winning number at the behest of unseen forces' (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2000:297). Criminal rackets promising effortless immigration and work permits have sprung up to take advantage of the burning desire in ordinary people to succeed. Similarly, Nigerian 4-1-9 and Cameroonian Feymen fraudsters have equally used the Internet and cellphones creatively to access more people with their letter scams and fraudulent business deals that have brought some of them dazzling riches (cf. Fisiy and Geschiere 2001:227-142; Malaquais 2001). Adults and children have been sold into slavery, and women invited to be consumed as prostitutes or as G-string beauty pageants desperate to belong. African medicine and diviners have been drawn to the West and other centres of modern accumulation where the rising interest in the occult is creating demand and opportunities for marabouts, sangomas, ngangas, muti, magic and clairvoyance of the kind explored by Amos Tutuola in *The Palm-Wine Drinkard* (1952) and Ben Okri (1991) in *The Famished Road*. The growing need for magical interpretations to material realities (Moore and Sanders 2001) under millennial capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000) has meant creating space at the margins for fenced out cultures and solutions. This would explain the back street shops and dealers in African cultural products in the West, ranging from foods, roots and barks to charms and amulets. It also explains the fact that not all the customers visiting these shops and markets are diasporic Africans. The diaspora and the world out there are thus connected to the local, and both can work actively to ensure continuity for cultures and communities marginalised at the national and global levels by the big players. It is clear that the reality of exclusion in neo-liberalism has created its own opportunists, but in this opportunism should be seen the determination of ordinary Africans to forge on, physical, social and material boundaries notwithstanding.

Like other anti-neo-liberal forces in the world, African activists have taken advantage of the new information and communication technologies (e.g. the Internet) to mobilise and strategise against the multinational corporations and the uncritical support they receive from African states. Prominent African activists such as Dennis Brutus, Trevor Ngwane and Fatima Meer of South Africa are leading members of the anti-globalisation coalition that has given WTO a tough time in recent meetings. A recent victory by popular forces against giant pharmaceutical companies in South Africa in connection with the production of affordable generic versions of AIDS drugs locally is equally significant (cf. Bond 2001). In general, formal and informal networks of various kinds are taking advantage of the Internet to push ahead their agenda in situations where the conventional media continue to blunt aspirations for creative diversity. WebPages and websites have sprung up to celebrate cultural diversity, representing various groups on the continent, from the interests of indigenous minorities such

as the Baka Pygmies of the Cameroonian rainforest and the Basarwa of the Kalahari desert, to the concerns of large cultural entities such as the Yoruba and Zulu of Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Marginalised groups fighting for cultural recognition and representation have found inspiration, support, accommodation and hope in the Internet.

True, the Internet is not free from the logic of domination and appropriation typical of neo-liberalism, but it clearly offers marginalised voices an opportunity for real alternatives, if well harnessed. Although connectivity in Africa is lowest compared to other regions of the world (cf. Jensen 2000; Franda 2002), Africa's cultural values of sociality, interconnectedness, interdependence and conviviality (cf. Nyamnjoh 2002b), make it possible for others to access the Internet and its opportunities without necessarily being connected personally. In many situations, it suffices for a single individual to be connected for whole groups and communities to benefit. The individual in question acts as a point of presence or communication node, linking other individuals and communities in myriad ways (cf. Olorunnisola 2000), and bringing hope to others who otherwise would be dismissed as not belonging by neo-liberalism and its excessive emphasis on the individual consumer.

The same creativity displayed in relation to the Internet is true of other technologies as well. The latest technology to be domesticated is the cell phone, which in South African townships and informal settlements for example, has been used creatively by poor urban dwellers to stay in touch with rural relatives and through them maintain healthy communication with ancestors (cf. Thoka 2001). Under the current structural adjustment programme, most African states have restructured and privatised some of their telecommunication facilities, providing for cellular networks that have transformed telecommunication remarkably (cf. Ras-work 1998). A case in point is Cameroon where 1998 saw the creation of the Cameroon Telecommunication Company (Camtel) by merging Intelcam and the Department of Telecommunications at the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Another company created was the Cameroon Telecommunication Mobile Company (Camtel Mobile), an affiliate of Camtel, with the specific duty of installing and exploiting of mobile phones in the country. With this initiative, private investors such as Mobilis (or Orange) and MTN-Cameroon have since extended and improved upon the telecommunication services. From a fixed telephone network of around 87,000 subscribers since independence, Cameroon now boasts more than 200,000 cellphone subscribers for MTN-Cameroon alone. Owning a telephone or being connected by the Internet has since 2000 become much less of a luxury for those who can afford it in the major cities. Even those who cannot afford a cellphone stand to benefit thanks to the sociality and solidarity of the local cultures of which they are a part (cf. Nyamnjoh 2002).

Most cellphone owners in West Africa tend to serve as communication nodes for their community, with others paying or simply passing through them to make calls to relatives, friends and contacts within or outside the country. Thus for example, although Nigerians might actually own fewer phones than most countries in the West, it has been noted to generate higher average revenue per user (ARPU) per month. The ARPU of a cellphone user in Nigeria, with a GDP per capita of US\$363 is US\$91 which is 5 times that of South Africa with six times Nigeria's GDP per capita, and almost 2 times USA's with close to 1000 times Nigeria's GDP per capita. For a country with a low level of economic activity relative to G8

countries, Nigeria has a high level of minutes of use (MOU) of 200, compared to France (154), Germany (88), Japan (149), Italy (118), Canada (249), UK (120) and the USA (364) (cf. Merrill Lynch Investment Bank 2002). The statistics could be explained by Nigerians receiving more calls than they make, and also by the reality of single-owner-multi-user (SOMU) communities. This suggests that the economic and social value (ESV) of a cellphone in countries like Nigeria and Cameroon with a higher volume of SOMU communities is much higher than the ESV of a cellphone for countries with single-owner-single-user (SOSU) communities. Contrary to popular opinion, sociality, interdependence and conviviality are not always a liability to profitability.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that boundaries remain a reality despite globalisation and much of the optimism that surrounds it. Indeed, quite paradoxically, the highly elitist, hierarchical and inegalitarian nature of globalisation as a process of accelerated flows has tended to result in obsession with boundaries everywhere, and often in aggressive and violent ways of displaying this, that are quite unprecedented. In the global hierarchies of humanity, ordinary Africans in their millions have the rawest deal: they are the most likely to be excluded anywhere in the world, if they attempt to cross the boundaries of poverty, powerlessness and despair that confine them. However, the creative responses hinted at in this paper and explored by others elsewhere (e.g. Friedman 1990, 1991, 1994; Gondola 1999), imply that it is hardly the end of the story to acknowledge disempowerment and marginalisation, for in process, and often veiled or subtle, are countervailing forces in the service of hope. Increasingly, Africans are appropriating new technologies to serve their struggles against exclusion, and are able to make the best of all worlds in a context where surviving socio-economic and cultural boundaries has long ceased to be a matter of course. In this way, even rural folks are able to harness from multiple influences a 'village modernity' that qualifies them as 'global' even if only 'remotely' so (cf. Piot 1999). And thanks to such creativity, sociability, negotiation and conviviality, Africans are able to resist the exclusion and homogenisation implicit in global consumer capitalism. But such resistance and appropriation, useful though they are to keep hope alive, can hardly substitute the structural changes needed to render real the 'world without walls' that globalisation is supposed to bring about. In this regard, I agree with Bill Clinton on the need for 'all of us... to develop a truly global consciousness about what our responsibilities to each other are and what our relationships are to be'. Only in this way, he argues, can the rich and poor 'spread the benefits and shrink the burdens' of globalisation (Clinton 2001). For a world without walls, it takes a crusade against the arrogance and ignorance that insensitive power, privilege or comfort display vis-à-vis the predicaments of those at the margins. There is need, at local and global levels, for enforceable corrective measures informed by the predicaments of the marginalised and such concerns as articulated by the growing number of 'anti-globalisation' campaigners.

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