

Social Organisation in the Aftermath of ‘Fast Track’: An Analysis of Emerging Forms of Local Authority, Platforms of Mobilisation and Local Cooperation

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Introduction

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) has led to significant social change, with approximately 160,000 families now settled in areas previously inhabited by approximately 4,000 large-scale farmers. As of 2005 most of this land was held through leases and permits issued by the state, as opposed to freehold land tenure (see Moyo, Chapter 2). Significant change was also evident in the manner in which the ‘new’ communities organised themselves to utilise land, with their land use preferences not necessarily conforming to the preferences of former large land owners (see Masuko, Chapter 4). In addition, the Fast Track resettlement process disrupted known ties of reciprocity developed within lineage and kinship ties in customary tenure areas.

This chapter tells the story of how the newly resettled land beneficiaries have been organising themselves. It discusses some of the factors that have shaped emerging social relations in the Newly Resettled Areas (NRAs) through an examination of the variety of arrangements which constitute rural social organisation, including the emerging social infrastructure, local institutions,

customs and material and non-material relations. The chapter interrogates the forms of local authority, mobilisation and local cooperation that evolved among 'strangers' resettled together. It explores how the new land rights conferred on settlers through permits (for A1) and leases (for A2) influenced the relationship between land beneficiaries and local government structures and assesses how local government was being established within these areas.

It is important to note from the outset that, although there is an emerging consensus on the social and economic outcomes of land reform, the discussion on social organisation has been peripheral and the patterns remain contested. Matondi et al (forthcoming) have been dismissive of the process of social organisation and, instead, valorise the chaotic moment of the land redistribution, suggesting that the process has led to the emergence of conflict ridden communities and also negatively affected farm production. Moyo et al (2009) argue that the resettled are organising themselves, even though they are socially differentiated, based on their common needs to defend the newly found rights and also to improve their capacities for utilising land. Scoones et al similarly observe: 'social networks, replicating those found in communal areas have emerged in various forms... and these include work parties, funeral assistance and religious based interactions' (2010: 207). They argue that, 'religion and church affiliation have emerged as a vital component in the construction of social relations and networks on the new resettlements' (ibid: 71). Recent field-based studies (Murisa 2007, 2009; Masuko 2009) have found that, even though beneficiary selection did not prioritise resettling people of the same lineage and clan group on the same former large-scale farm, the newly-resettled beneficiaries have, on their own, begun a process of establishing networks of cooperation that include structured local farmers' groups in the few years of being settled together. Furthermore, earlier studies of the first phase of land reform (see, for instance, Barr 2004; Dekker 2004) found out that communities of Newly Resettled Areas were characterised by an accelerated process of investing in new social relations by entering into association within local organisations.

Field evidence from Goromonzi and Zvimba (Murisa 2009) concurs with Moyo et al (2009) and Scoones et al (2010). The Newly Resettled Areas have, since 2000, been characterised by the simultaneous emergence of local platforms of cooperation which include informal networks and structured groups on the one hand and the introduction of local structures of authority, especially traditional village heads and the mutation of local land occupations' Committees of Seven into Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) on the other. Furthermore, there has been an implicit reform of local government

processes, which elevated the authority of traditional structures. Post-independence local governance reform effort in Communal Areas sought to limit the authority of traditional authority structures (Tshuma 1997), through the introduction of representative structures such as the Village Development Committee (VIDCO) and Rural District Council (RDC), although such elected structures were rarely effective in addressing the various grievances of rural communities. Instead, hereditary structures of power continued to influence the allocation of critical resources such as land since their authority was perceived, at times, to be superior to that of elected functionaries.

Post-independence rural social organization was shaped by four important developments: (i) slow movement on land reforms and economic development, (ii) local government reforms, (iii) restructuring of representative farmers' unions and (iv) the emergence and proliferation of non-state development agents in the form of NGOs and locally established voluntary Community Based Organisations (CBOs).

Evolution of forms of social organisation in rural Zimbabwe

The discussion in this section briefly examines the evolution of social organisation from the period of colonisation up to independence. Historically, social relations of production in Zimbabwe, like those in most of Africa, were structured around belonging within a defined lineage grouping that ensured access to land and related benefits (Adholla 1962: 23). Changes in the structures of the political economy from around 1903 accelerated the integration of the majority black indigenous population into the wage economy. The structural determinants of the proletarianisation process in the Rhodesian context were: diminishing access to land, increasing taxation and the inroads made by a government-protected and competitive white commercial agricultural sector (Van Onselen 1976). There was a gradual increase in the number of workers from 10,000 in 1909 to about 320,000 in 2000 (see Chambati and Moyo 2003; Chambati, Chapter 5). De Janvry (1981) observes that, under such conditions, rural labourers are prevented from getting access to land as freeholders and from capturing their opportunity cost on labour markets so as to make them dependent on both sectors of the economy.

The labour process came to be characterised by an enduring contradiction between proletarianisation and a politically engineered functional dualism, by which petty commodity production in the Communal Areas and unwaged labour (especially female and child labour) would subsidise the social reproduction of male labour power on mines and farms (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

This contradiction produced neither a settled industrial proletariat nor a viable peasantry, but a workforce in motion, straddling communal lands, white farms and industrial workplaces (Moyo and Yeros 2005). It sustains the infant capitalist system of production in two ways (Burawoy 1980): (i) the two processes take place in geographically different places and, at the level of institutions of reproduction, the institutions of maintenance are different from those of renewal; (ii) in the case of the family, geographical separation of the two processes is reflected in a corresponding division of labour and internal differentiation of the family unit. Under capitalism, the binding of production and reproduction is achieved through economic necessity: for the labouring population, work is necessary for survival. In colonial Zimbabwe, the system of migrant labour was reinforced through pass laws restricting urban or mine compound residence for workers only and also the low wages paid to mine and farm workers always necessitated the need to supplement through subsistence farming. In essence, therefore, the rural areas were seen as labour reserves for mining and settler agriculture.

Furthermore, the same household was subject to a dual form of authority in the form of the traditional authority (chief and his/her hierarchy of officials) and the domestic/‘civil’ (defined by the ‘Master and Servant Ordinance’ of 1901) in the Large-Scale Commercial Farm sector. The social organization that emerged in the Communal Areas was, therefore, a result of both traditional norms and colonial social engineering. Through a number of racially-motivated laws, from the creation of Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) to the enactment of the Land Husbandry Act (LHA) in 1952, there was a remaking of traditional authority. The LHA (GoR 1951) was not only aimed at ‘modernizing’ the smallholder sector, but it also proved to be a watershed moment for the office of the chief as the colonial authorities strengthened the authority of the chief with the intention of using it to establish firmer control over the ‘natives’.

The slow redistribution of land after independence ensured that the semi-proletarianisation continued with peasants remaining as generally petty commodity producers firmly located in the generalized system of commodity production that is capitalism (Yeros 2002). The grievances of the semi-proletariat were divided into two: the rural (family) and urban (workplace) grievances. In the majority of cases, the family farm shrank due to periodic sub-divisions necessitated by the results of reproduction (sons normally inherit from their father’s portion), consequently negatively affecting farm yields. At the workplace, the wages were characteristically low, necessitating reproduction in the countryside and the conditions of employment were poor.

Local government reforms

The GoZ's position on local government has evolved from being suspicious and dismissive of the role of traditional authority in local government to a very difficult accommodation. From 1982 until 1984, the government was, through the Prime Minister's directive on local government engaged in attempts to introduce Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WARDCOs) as part of a broader attempt to modernize local government and also to limit the functions of traditional structures. Further complications in terms of local government reform emerged when the Ministry of Land and Agriculture shifted the land reform discourse towards 'communal area re-organisation'. In 1992, a ministry official was quoted saying '...resettlement alone can never fully solve all the problems of the communal areas...the implementation has to be carried out in tandem with the programme of communal area re-organisation' (quoted in Von Blackenburg 1994: 37).

Local government reform in the decade prior to 'Fast Track' seemingly entailed undoing some of the democratisation gains that had been made in the 1980s in terms of institutionalising civil authority within the countryside, mainly due to policy recommendations from the Land Tenure Commission. The 1994 Commission on Land Tenure under the chairmanship of Prof. Mandivamba Rukuni recommended the abolition of the Village and Ward Development Committees and, in their place, recommended the enhancing of the administrative power of the Traditional Authorities, including over land matters. The association of Rural District Councils opposed the move, arguing that '...our traditional leaders are not known for accountability...a system that goes even beyond the dark ages (Chikate 1995: 43).

Whilst in the previous dispensation prior to the RDC Act (1996), the chiefs had been regarded as *ex-officio* members of the council, the new legislation did not make any reference to traditional leaders. The RDC Act (1996) was silent, not only on the relationship with the chiefs, but also on the council's role in terms of the communal lands. The Traditional Leaders Act (TLA 1999), on the other hand, created the impression that the two institutions of local government could easily work together. In terms of land, the TLA stated that the chief would:

ensure that land is allocated in accordance with the Communal Land Act 1982 (20:041) and to prevent any unauthorised settlement or use of any land; and to notify the Rural District Council of any intended disposal of a homestead and the

permanent departure of any inhabitant from his area and, acting on the advice of the headman, to approve the settlement of any new settler in his area (GoZ 1999).

The Communal Lands Act (CLA-1982, amended in 2002) ascribed land authority to the RDC. It stated that a person may occupy and use communal land for agricultural or residential purposes with the consent of the RDC established for the area concerned (GoZ 1982: 3). It went on to state that, when granting consent, the RDC should 'consult and cooperate with the chief appointed to preside over the community concerned in terms of the TLA (1999)'. It created the impression that the RDC was the initial point of contact in granting authority over land, whilst actual practice in the Communal Areas suggested otherwise. The concept of *kuombera*, which has now become embedded in customary practices, meant that outsiders seeking land approached the chief or lineage elder with a gift which symbolised the request to be considered as part of the lineage or clan – thus deserving land.

Terms such as 'consult', 'cooperate' and 'notify' within the TLA (1999) and the CLA (1982, amended in 2002) created an impression of a harmonious existence between the two institutions and failed to appreciate the real contestations and competition between RDCs and traditional authority. The Act stipulated that the RDCs should:

grant consent only to persons who, according to the customary law of the community that has traditionally occupied and used land in the area concerned, are regarded as forming part of such community (CLA 1982, amended in 2002).

However, the act did not specify how the RDCs would verify this complex issue of belonging, especially considering the fact that lineage and clan affiliations were determined by the elders of those particular groups. The foregoing discussion suggests that there were real challenges associated with combining elected and hereditary structures of local government. Notably, the history of land alienation was closely associated with local government reform, which, during colonialism, marginalised traditional authority only to elevate such authority in the 1960s in response to escalating demands for land through the nationalist movement (see Nyambara 2001). The enduring popularity of the office of the chief among people derived from the fact that, despite the overt attempts at cooption by the state and the lack of explicit means of coercion, the former maintained a form of independence and autonomy in articulating the interests of the subject communities. Studies by Ranger (1999) in Matopos District and Alexander (2006) in Insiza District suggest that the relationship between traditional leaders and the state, whether colonial or post-colonial, have always been more nuanced

and complex than is captured by the notion of cooption (Fontein 2009: 5). These nuances around the popularity of the office and the possibility of cooptation may explain the recent evolution of local government in Newly Resettled Areas.

Representative farmers' unions

This sub-section examines the origins and roles played by the apex level national farmers' unions. Towards the late 1980s, the GoZ pursued the 'one sector one union' policy, which envisaged the merger of all representative unions within the agricultural sector despite their different material interests. The unions, instead, formed a loose umbrella committee known as the Joint President Agricultural Committee (JPAC) comprising the presidents of the three unions, namely the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union (ZNFU) and the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), as a forum to discuss marketing, pricing and related issues (Bratton 1994: 24). Eventually the GoZ used the bait of levying authority to coerce the NFAZ and ZNFU to merge into the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU).¹ In 1992, some black commercial farmers formed the Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Union (ICFU), to represent them, independently of large white farmers and small black farmers, but it was only recognized by the GoZ in 1995.

Despite the proliferation and consolidation of these representative unions, demands for land reform remained poorly represented in formal pluralist policy lobbies (Moyo 1999: 15). The ZFU did not recognize the differentiation within the smallholder sector, where only 10 per cent could be described as capable, 50 per cent were poor (land-short, cattle-less and experiencing food deficit), whilst the remaining 40 per cent could barely break even from farming (ibid: 16). The ZFU leadership resisted identifying the different socioeconomic groups within their structures and potential membership, despite the fact that the union's structures of participation were designed according to landholding size: Small-Scale Commercial plot holders, indigenous large-scale and communal and resettlement area farmers (ZFU undated: 3). The leadership insisted that all its farmers had common interests with regard to agricultural issues (Bratton 1994: 27). However, the union advocated for land to be redistributed to the 'capable', instead of the 'needy'. Consequently, the demand for land during the 1990s could not be gauged on the basis of formal ZFU advocacy, but rather it was reflected in the informal land occupations and natural resource poaching (grazing, grass, wood and water), as well as localized demands for land redistribution through chiefs, parliamentarians, some NGOs and government staff (Moyo 1999: 19).

Development agents and rural social organisation

Rural social organisation in Zimbabwe has, in recent years, come under the modernising influence of external agents such as NGOs, church organisations and political parties, which seek to 'speak' for the rural poor (Moyo and Yeros 2005a: 41).² Although the NGOs are a relatively recent rural organisational form, compared to other social arrangements such as religious institutions, political movements, governments and transnational networks of various kinds (Bebbington et al 2008: 6), they have become a ubiquitous feature of development interventions in Africa (Moyo et al 2000a: ix; Helliker 2008: 240).

While Alexander (2006) has argued that it was not the chief running the countryside in the colonial era, but a wide range of state officials, one can also argue that, in the post-independence period, it was not only the chief and the newly established local structures in charge of the countryside, but also a variety of other non-state organisations such as farmers' unions, churches and NGOs engaged in various livelihood improving projects. In the process, NGOs facilitated the development of new social relations of production.

As of 2005, Zimbabwe had over 1,000 formal NGOs, which included local and national level organisations (Moyo 2005: 45) and which varied in size from those with over 100,000 members to smaller ones with 10 to 100 members or households. Some were membership-based and others positioned as vehicles of innovative interventions in rural development. In the 1990s, their presence through a variety of community development projects was pervasive in the Communal Areas. One community in Mhezi Ward (Chiduku District) was dealing with at least 15 NGOs operating in one ward alone (Moyo 1995: 43), while Makumbe (1996) notes that there were over 7 local and international NGOs in one ward (Makumbe 1996: 75). In this process, NGOs became intermediaries between donors and local communities, providing services such as project formulation, execution, training and consultancy. Historically, rural development NGOs in Zimbabwe have responded to four interrelated challenges affecting rural communities: (i) declining land quality as a result of continuous use and soil erosion, (ii) declining agricultural yields, (iii) inadequate farm-based incomes and (iv) inadequate social service provision (Helliker 2006; Murisa 2009). The NGOs designed a variety of interventions, some of which were influenced by Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) philosophies. However, despite their increase in numbers and budgets, NGOs have had a very limited impact on rural development, mostly due to the fact that they have avoided the harder questions in development (such as skewed land ownership patterns) and so most of their interventions have not had a lasting impact beyond the lifetime of the project.

Nature and context of economic and social grievances since the FTLRP

Following the FTLRP, rural agency has been concerned with a variety of social and economic constraints, in addition to local democratic practise. Debates on the impacts of the FTLRP have tended to focus on the disruption of Zimbabwe's economy, including the decline in agricultural production, without noticing the recovery in the output of various crops (Moyo et al 2009; Jowah 2009; Chambati, Chapter 5). Rather than dwell on these productionist perspectives, this paper seeks to examine the challenges faced by the newly resettled farmers in the wider context of the broader effects of macro-economic declines on rural livelihoods.

The Zimbabwean economy faced a debilitating economic crisis from 1997, partly due to the negative effect of the economic reform programmes adopted in 1990 (Moyo 2001; Yeros 2002; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Murisa 2009), although others have argued that the crisis resulted from economic 'mismanagement' and the manner in which the Fast Track Land Reform was implemented (Richardson 2005). The economic decline worsened following the Land Reform Programme, weak macro-economy management frameworks, frequent droughts and an unfavourable external policy environment, including the impact of international isolation (World Bank 2006). Economic decline directly impacted rural livelihoods and potential for agricultural recovery, although it is accepted that land reforms generally lead to a transitory production decline (see Moyo and Yeros 2007a).

The social dimensions of the crisis were characterised by the decline of social service delivery in housing, health and education and the erosion of household incomes, as well as food insecurity and chronic vulnerability during drought years. The user fees at health centres introduced during the 1990s strained most rural households, while the capacity of health centres to effectively service communities was severely eroded, as evident in widespread shortages of essential medical supplies and qualified personnel (Human Rights Watch 2003), following the emigration of numerous health and education professionals.³ Furthermore, in 2002 the Central Statistical Office (CSO) estimated that 70 per cent of the population was living below the poverty datum line, given the considerable increase in the price of food and other consumables due to inflation. The plight of the poor was exacerbated by a substantial shortfall in maize production. The GoZ estimated that in 2005 approximately 36 per cent (2.9 million) of the rural population would require food relief (Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee [ZIMVAC]⁴).

The cyclical linkages of support and cooperation that have traditionally existed between the rural and urban households that involved cash remittances from urban to rural and grains from the rural to the urban sector came under severe threat. Due to increased unemployment rates, urban to rural remittances for the purchase of essential inputs and working capital were reduced (Chigumira and Matshe 2004). A country that, in the late 1980s, was close to food self-sufficiency and closest to achieving the goal of health for all, now faced the reversal of these post-independence gains (World Bank 2006).

A variety of other social constraints affected land beneficiaries in the Newly Resettled Areas. The most apparent of which include the unavailability of suitable water for domestic use and lack of sanitation facilities, inadequate health and education facilities and general poor planning for any investment in social infrastructure. The health and schooling facilities prior to 'Fast Track' were barely sufficient to cover farm worker households: only 10.5 per cent of the households had access to clinics and only 12.9 per cent of children under the age of six were benefitting from early childhood education and care programmes (FCTZ 2001a & b). The increase in terms of population in formerly under-populated LSCF areas put a strain on the pre-existing social infrastructures and the situation was worsened by the vandalism that led to many resettled families using untreated and unsafe water from nearby rivers and dams (*The Standard*, 15 December 2002). Only 34.9 per cent of farm worker households had toilets of their own (ibid). The average distance to the nearest primary school was 14.3 kilometres. Table 7.1 below shows, in more detail, the nature of the social grievances affecting newly resettled households. Approximately 50 per cent of the respondents identified consultation fees at the local clinics as too high and felt that this discouraged the habit of seeking treatment at an early stage, whilst 16 per cent complained about the unavailability of essential drugs in the clinics. In terms of education, the respondents identified the challenges as unaffordable school fees (47.6%), unavailability of essential books (21.7%) and inadequate staffing levels (20.6%).

Table 7.1: Social grievances

Social grievances	Chipinge		Goromonzi		Zvimba		Mangwe		Kwekwe		Chiredzi		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Exorbitant consultation charges at clinic	17	39.5	28	51.9	43	55.1	4	57.1	10	41.7	18	42.9	120	48.4
Inadequate availability of drugs	6	13.6	9	16.4	16	21.1	2	14.3	6	22.2	3	6.5	42	16.0
Shortage of skilled personnel in the clinics	7	17.5	17	29.8	20	29.4	3	23.1	8	27.6	17	38.6	72	28.7
Exorbitant school fees	11	22.9	30	44.8	34	47.2	6	40.0	13	35.1	42	89.4	136	47.6
Lack of essential text books	4	8.3	19	30.6	3	4.5	2	13.3	19	51.4	13	27.7	60	21.7
Shortage of skilled personnel in the schools	2	4.2	17	26.6	9	13.4	6	40.0	13	35.1	10	21.7	57	20.6

The local state and competing local authorities in Newly Resettled Areas

Rural local government in Zimbabwe is composed of a combination of traditional and elected local authorities who do not necessarily complement each other, but are engaged in ongoing contestations for power and influence (see Murisa 2009). These conflicts have led to poor service delivery and have contributed to the proliferation of other platforms that organise local communities for improved social reproduction capacity, such as NGOs, churches and local groups. These non-state actors have gained legitimacy, even though they do not explicitly possess instruments of coercion, unlike the official agents of local government. The local state is thus a sum total of the different public spaces in which households interact with the aim of extracting specific social gains such as food security and improved health status.

The actual organisation of the process of land occupations was under the leadership of a new cadre of popular leadership. At the peak of the land occupations, the leadership, mostly war veterans, restricted traditional leaders to subordinate advisory roles and they invited them to identify ancestral lands and also to lead cleansing ceremonies after an occupation (Sadomba 2008a: 98). In some instances, however, such as in Svosve Communal Lands in the Marondera District neighbouring Goromonzi, traditional leaders were

instrumental in mobilising subject communities to occupy lands on the basis of restitution claims (Moyo and Yeros 2005b: 187).⁵

The extension officer is the most visible local government agent on the ground, since the GoZ has resettled extension officers among the A1 land beneficiaries as part of efforts to increase farm production. They mostly reside in the former farm owner's house or the manager's quarters.⁶

The second most easily recognised actor of local government is the Ward Councillor, a locally-elected official of the RDC, responsible for establishing and chairing of the Ward Development Committee (WARDCO), which reviews development plans from the VIDCOs and for integrating them into a ward development plan for onward submission to the RDC (GoZ, Rural District Councils Act, 1996: 460). However, ward development activities have been limited by financial constraints. The ward councillors' popularity does not necessarily derive from their official roles as councillors, but rather from their roles as political functionaries at the forefront of mobilising the newly-resettled into political party activities.⁷

Competing sites of local government in the Newly Resettled Areas

Traditional authority at the village level

At the height of the land occupations, 'seven member committees' were established to facilitate the selection of land beneficiaries and to provide them with administrative support at the local level. Chaumba et al (2003: 10) describe these new village authority structures as 'a sudden emergence from seemingly nowhere', but in reality they were a slightly different version of the defunct VIDCOs that had been established in the first year of independence through the Prime Minister's directive of 1984. The seven member committees were an innovative, integrated, top-down system of governance in the new resettlements which were as 'striking as the dramatic physical transformation of the landscape' (Chaumba et al 2003: 11). They were characterised by a hierarchical committee-based structure with parallels to the decentralised local government development committee structures of the 1980s. Among other tasks, they were established at every occupied farm to ensure that land occupiers were not evicted by previous owners.

Various authors such as Moyo (2001), Moyo and Yeros (2005, 2007), Chaumba et al (2003) and Sadomba (2008a, 2008b) have disputed the chaos focused theory regarding the execution of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and have (using field evidence) demonstrated that structures

and procedures (albeit rudimentary) were established in land and beneficiary identification and allocation of plots. Smaller and localised administrative units capable of making decisions within a short amount of time were established in most of the locales (Moyo and Yeros 2007b). At the district level, the new land committees included local government ministry officials, traditional leaders, the ruling party, security organs and war veterans. Locally, the role and place of traditional leaders varied, in some instances, they were called in to lead the land identification process based on historical claims and, in others, they were asked to legitimise occupations and also to 'bless' the occupation (Chaumba et al 2003: 21). In certain instances, traditional leaders competed among themselves in defence of their territorial boundaries and also competed with local government structures and outsiders in order to settle their 'subjects' (Moyo and Yeros 2007b).

Furthermore, Chaumba et al (2003) noted the visible leadership role of war veterans and the replication of an 'army barrack' like form of organisation in which curfews were established and visitors had to report to the base commander. Initially, the Committees of Seven were dominated by war veterans, who, in many instances, occupied the post of Base Commander (Chairperson) and Head of Security (Chaumba et al 2003: 8; Masuko 2009: 5). Traditional authority functionaries such as chiefs and village heads were rarely part of the structures, but were consulted on some matters which included traditional cleansing ceremonies and beneficiary selection. The activities of the committee, in particular the pegging of plots, stand in stark contrast with the depiction of 'chaos' on the farms. Chaumba et al (2003: 17) state that, 'at the same time as they were riding roughshod over the rule of law, war veterans and other land occupiers employed the tools and practices of colonial land use planning to becoming visible and legitimate'.

The Committees of Seven were also responsible for ensuring that farm production commenced as soon as land beneficiaries had been allocated their individual plots (Sadomba 2008a: 115). However production on individual plots was not automatic: some well-endowed individuals managed to utilise the land in the first year of occupation, while others had to wait for state subsidies. Some of the Committees of Seven were instrumental in the institution of joint farm production when they demarcated plots for collective agriculture and provided farm inputs in the tradition of the *Zunde raMambo*⁸ (Sadomba 2008a: 115). Beyond collective work on the *Zunde* fields, the occasion provided a moment of building solidarity among the land occupiers and an opportunity for the chief to legitimise the land occupations

on the basis of a historical link with the occupied lands. Field observations in Glendale, Goromonzi and Zvimba indicate that the Committees of Seven are still thriving on many of the resettled farms, although their composition and names have changed. They are now mostly headed by village heads and are referred to as Village Development Committees.

In 2003, the GoZ issued a directive on local government which stated that, 'in terms of the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 20: 17), all resettlement areas shall be placed under the relevant traditional chiefs or headmen' (GoZ 2003: 4). The Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) empowered the chief to nominate village heads for appointment. The chiefs have, since the 2003 government directive on local government, been appointing village heads in the Newly Resettled Areas from among the land beneficiaries. The criteria and manner of appointment varies. Chief Rusike in Goromonzi has been combining arbitrary appointments with elections in areas where he is not familiar with the land beneficiaries and, in certain instances, appointments have been made after consultations with Ward Councillors.⁹ The appointments without elections have been more common in areas contiguous to customary tenure areas, where the chief has appointed those related or belonging to a lineage group with a history of holding such office. In areas previously dominated by large-scale farms, such as in Bromley, the land beneficiaries have been asked to elect their village head, while Chief Matibiri of Zvimba mostly appointed land beneficiaries with whom he is familiar to positions of village head in consultation with extension officers. Most of the village heads appointed in the Banket area are from the neighbouring Zvimba customary lands.

The village heads chair the new Village Development Committees. Members of the VIDCO are directly elected into office by the members of the village. Within the new VIDCOs, a new post of war veteran representative was created and is reserved for one of the war veterans resettled on the farm. Other posts in the village council include officers responsible for village development, security, women's affairs, health and the youth.¹⁰

The village head has administrative oversight over the village and works with the VIDCO. The responsibilities of the new village authority include administrative functions such as developing mechanisms for sharing inherited infrastructure like dams, irrigation equipment and tobacco barns, conservation of natural resources and enforcing traditional norms and government directives on infrastructure use.¹¹ It seems, however, that most of the village heads are more focused on satisfying the demands of the local council, rather than those of the land beneficiaries. The four village heads

interviewed listed their duties as ensuring that there is no unlawful cutting down of trees; ensuring that beneficiaries utilise received inputs instead of selling them; and, ensuring that there is no subletting of the plots. While the roles that were emphasised by the village heads are an essential part of local government, they are more oriented towards ensuring that government directives on agrarian reform are implemented at the local level. The village heads did not necessarily balance government's interest against the interests of the village members, which include a need for wood to build their homes and storehouses and being allowed to sublet some of their land in exchange for inputs and tillage support.¹² The new cadre of village leadership is different from the populist Committees of Seven which were more focused on the security of the land beneficiaries in the face of a real threat of counter eviction from the former owners. The village heads seem to be more content with policing the areas on behalf of the government.

Expansion of RDC frontiers and roles

The same GoZ directive on local government that empowered the chiefs to expand into Newly Resettled Areas also stated that, 'all resettlement areas shall fall under the jurisdiction of Rural District Councils and shall thus be incorporated into either existing wards, or new wards shall be created as necessary' (GoZ 2003). This policy vision was made official government policy in 2005 with the passing of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. These local government reforms replicate the forms of local government in the Communal Areas, where elected ward councillors have to share political space with traditional authority functionaries within an unclear framework of local government. The clear delineation of roles, especially the responsibility over land allocation and adjudication between these two functionaries of local government in the customary areas, has been difficult in practice (Murisa 2009). Chiefs and lineage elites have historically disregarded the provisions of the Communal Land Act (1982, amended in 2002) in land allocation and in presiding over land conflicts. Anderson (1999) and Dzingirai (1994) have also shown how customary area dwellers continued to defer to chiefs, despite the envisioned consultations between the two institutions (RDCs and chiefs) within the legislation.

While traditional authority structures have been quickly introduced at the village level, the RDCs do not currently have similar levels of representation. Rather, the RDCs are dependent on village heads to enforce their policies. The current Village Development Committees, consisting of elected officials,

operate as subordinate structures of the village head, unlike in customary areas where they were a parallel structure of local government made up of popular party functionaries elected by the villagers. Meetings of the VIDCOs in the Newly Resettled Areas are chaired by the village head, except for rare cases such as at Whyhill Farm in Zvimba, where they are chaired by the VIDCO chairperson (Murisa 2009).

Although the RDCs have slowly regained their authority over the informal structures established during the period of land occupations and are empowered to work with VIDCOs and Ward Development Committees (WARDCOs) to formulate area development plans, the coordination has not yet really taken off. According to the RDC Act (1996), WARDCOs are supposed to be chaired by the council's Ward Councillor, but, in reality, as in the customary areas, this structure does not exist. The councillors do not have any budgets to convene meetings and have made little progress in terms of establishing functioning WARDCOs. Traditional authority structures have not yet introduced the office of the *Sadhunu* (ward head) in these areas. In the customary areas, the *Sadhunu* works with a number of village heads operating within his *dhunu* (ward), but this office has been largely ineffective because of the arbitrariness of the establishment of wards, to the extent that in many circumstances the chiefs preferred to deal directly with the village head, also known as the Sabhuku.¹³

Local authorities such as the Goromonzi Rural District Council have developed a five-year strategic plan for infrastructure development without any significant input from the decentralised structures (VIDCOs). Village heads and members of the VIDCO in Goromonzi were not aware of the five year strategic plan that had been developed by the Goromonzi RDC. During interviews with officials of the Goromonzi Rural District Council, they revealed that the plan had been developed on the basis of perceived needs and in consultation with extension officers.¹⁴ It is important to note that the district extension office is housed within the RDC's office, hence such consultation would have been more convenient for the council than getting their hands dirty by going to the farms. The RDC officials stated that they had not started implementing the plan because they were still waiting for the funds from central government. Although the lease document for the A2 scheme has a clause on land rentals, RDC personnel were not sure if they would be the ones to collect and use the rentals for local area development.¹⁵ At the end of 2008, there were very few A2 plot holders (less than 6 per cent of the total number of beneficiaries) who had signed the lease agreements

due to problems surrounding the legal registration of the lease (see Moyo 2007; Murisa 2009). Generally, local government authorities have been affected negatively by the hyperinflationary environment which characterised Zimbabwe from 2005 until the end of 2008, to an extent that a number of infrastructural development projects had to be suspended.¹⁶

The extension officer and local power relations in Fast Track areas

In the aftermath of the Fast Track reforms, the Ministry of Agriculture announced in 2004 that it would need 6,000 new extension officers in addition to the approximately 3,000 extension officers already in service (Mlambo 2006: 7). By the end of 2008, approximately 2,900 extension officers¹⁷ had been recruited.¹⁸ Besides the lack of personnel, the department faced numerous challenges, including, but not limited to, 'increasing budgetary constraints, poor remuneration and conditions of service and lack of transport and equipment and the fact that extension officers are expected to provide services over too wide an area' (Mlambo 2006: 8). As part of measures to address these challenges, the Ministry of Agriculture took the decision that extension officers involved in field demonstrations should be allocated A1 plots in the areas they cover and that they should also be allocated houses on the former large-scale farms. However, the decision was made late and some of the farm-houses in A1 settlements had already been converted into social amenities such as schools or clinics or, in some instances, occupied by the Commanders of the Committee of Seven.¹⁹ The majority of extension officers in Goromonzi are settled on A1 farms, but in Zvimba (especially in the Banket area) very few got accommodation on the farms.

During the period of Fast Track resettlement, extension officers worked with officials from the Ministry of Lands and the Surveyor General's office in the official demarcation of the new plots. The roles of the extension officers in the aftermath of land allocations included training on improved farming methods, assisting the newly resettled farmers in obtaining necessary farm inputs and monitoring the proper usage of received inputs on behalf of the government.²⁰ They were responsible for the relaying of information on crop prices and other changes to the marketing of crops and livestock.

Current extension support methods in the Newly Resettled Areas remain limited by the fact that there is not sufficient knowledge of the actual training needs and land use preferences of the newly resettled beneficiaries. The newly resettled households are made up of people from different socio-economic and professional backgrounds, literacy levels, skills and resource endowments.

The Department of Extension has not yet undertaken proper research on the specific needs of these communities. The majority of the extension officers still use top-down methods based on the transfer of knowledge, methods which have been challenged on the basis that they do not adequately consider indigenous knowledge (Mlambo 2006: 8). The methods preferred by extension officers, such as securing treated hybrid seeds and the use of inorganic fertilisers, increase the farmers' integration into and dependence on agricultural commodity supply markets.

Despite these shortcomings, locally-based extension officers have been at the forefront of introducing innovations in social organisation that are aimed at enhancing farm production such as the establishment of structured local farmer groups. In Wards 21 and 22 of Goromonzi (Bromley area), the extension officer has aggressively promoted the establishment of local farmers' groups (see Murisa 2009). The extension officers carry out their extension work within these groups and they facilitate the acquisition of farm inputs from the GoZ.

Changing land relations and the local state

Fast Track has not only transformed the physical agrarian landscape, but has also substantially changed agricultural land relations by extending state land ownership to the bulk of Zimbabwe's land and expanding new forms of landholding: leasehold and permissory forms of tenure (Moyo 2007: 8; Moyo, Chapter 2). Most discussions of FTLRP land tenure have been dominated by concerns about the use of land to access credit, rather than about the tenure security of the A1 permit and the broader implications on social organisation and farm production. Evidence from the field, however, shows that cases of eviction of resettled farmers have been very limited, with only 1.1 per cent cases of evictions reported (Moyo et al 2009).

According to officials from the Ministry of Lands (MoL) in Goromonzi and Zvimba, there have been cases of removals of resettled beneficiaries in both districts to suit the re-organisation of land reform models. The officials claim that most of the displaced were re-allocated land on other former large-scale farms within the area. However, Sadomba (2008a) argues that the onset of Fast Track was associated with a clandestine strategy to remove war veterans who had allocated themselves land during the earlier period of *Jambanja*. The actual figures of the number of war veterans who were affected are not readily available, but the practice seems to have been more prevalent in Mazowe, where more than four former large-scale farms that had initially been converted into A1 plots were later re-converted into A2 plots (Masuko 2009: 7).

However, there are nuanced differences between the land rights being bestowed in the Newly Resettled Areas and those existing in customary tenure areas. In the customary areas, land access and use rights are based on belonging and membership of a lineage group. Traditional institutions and authority are prominent in the distribution and administration of customary lands. Whereas traditional leaders have been at the forefront of land administration and allocation in customary areas, the A1 permit elevates the role of the state as the initial provider of land and is responsible for administrative oversight. The permit is silent on the role of traditional authority in the new landscape, despite the fact that chiefs were mobilised by the state to verify applicants for A1 farms.

Evidence from the field shows that village heads have appropriated for themselves the role of land allocation. The village head at Dunstan Farm in Goromonzi offered A1 plots to four households that had been excluded during the official demarcations.²¹ At Whynhill Farm, the village head was removed from office by the chief and officials from the Ministry of Lands when he sold A1 plots that were vacant after the official beneficiaries had not taken the land.

It is important to note that land tenure is a social construct that is influenced by socialisation rather than legal contracts. While the legal contract through the permit seeks to promote a certain form of social relation based on individual rights and a direct relationship with the state, the new framework is yet to be adequately explained to the new beneficiaries who are mostly used to customary tenure. On the other hand, the introduction of traditional authority without the necessary rule book of what the village heads can and cannot do has contributed to misunderstandings concerning their powers in terms of governing the land. Their understanding of land tenure provisions is currently based on sketchy information from local leaders and government officials, to the extent that some of the beneficiaries interviewed believed that the chiefs have the authority to allocate land or to move them off the land. Some of the respondents indicated that they see no difference between the rights they have in the Newly Resettled Areas and those of their colleagues in the customary areas.²² The situation is compounded by the fact that the majority of the beneficiaries are from customary areas, where a strong relationship between traditional structures and land ownership exists. The A1 beneficiaries in Goromonzi and Zvimba revealed that they expect traditional leaders to ensure that land and natural resources are being managed properly. Notably, most of the respondents did not see a problem with the expansion of traditional authority into the Fast Track resettlement areas.²³

Despite the previous attempts to marginalise the office of the chief by both the colonial and post-colonial governments, it remains as one of the most enduring institutions in Zimbabwe. The authority of the chiefs derives from links with ancestors and certain beliefs in the protecting powers bestowed upon the chief. A similar connection between traditional authority and land was made by one of the chiefs when he said that 'the president does not own the land. The land belongs to the chiefs. The white settlers took the land from the chiefs and not the president' (Chief Charumbira quoted in *The Herald*, 3 December 2000).

Cooperation amongst resettled households

The manner in which individual households cooperate within their immediate neighbouring communities as part of a strategy to strengthen social reproduction capacities entails a bundle of strategies to overcome farm production and social constraints.

Maintenance of relationships with Communal Areas

The majority of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme beneficiaries are men, aged between 36 and 46 years, mostly from Communal Areas, with some form of secondary education (Moyo et al 2009). At independence, the oldest in this category of beneficiaries would have been in their early twenties and probably living with their parents. Given the dominant form of customary area organisation, some of the members of this demographic group could have left behind some small plots of land and even homes in the Communal Areas. Evidence from the field shows that social and economic interactions between the newly resettled land beneficiaries and their counterparts in the customary areas is ongoing, albeit at varying levels. There exist links between customary areas and land beneficiaries who used to live in customary tenure areas. Approximately 15 per cent still maintain homes there, for various reasons (see Table 7.2 below). The most (57.5%) commonly cited reason for the maintenance of a customary area homestead is because it is still home to other members of the extended family. There were very few instances of lineage groups being resettled together. During the survey, we only noted one A1 settlement on what used to be Dalkeith Farm in Zvimba District that was composed of land beneficiaries from the same clan. In the Shona and Ndebele cultural context, the concept of 'family' has a broad meaning, including what has generally been called the 'extended family'. In certain cases, these customary area homes are the location of gravesites for lineage members and, according to Shona custom, abandoning such homes would be seen as turning away from one's people (Bourdillon 1982: 3).

Table 7.2: Reasons for maintaining a Customary Area (CA) home

Reason for maintaining CA home	Chipinge		Chiredzi		Goromonzi		Kwekwe		Mangwe		Zvimba		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
To boost production	2	4.3	4	13.8	27	22.3	2	5.1	1	5.9	15	27.3	51	16.6
To reduce risk of crop failure	-	-	1	3.4	4	3.3	-	-	1	5.9	1	1.8	7	2.3
In case of eviction	-	-	7	24.1	8	6.6	3	7.7	2	11.8	7	12.7	27	8.8
Sentimental values	5	10.6	7	24.1	9	7.4	9	23.1	5	29.4	6	10.9	41	13.3
Home part of the extended family	39	83.0	10	34.5	73	60.3	25	64.1	8	47.1	22	40.0	177	57.5
Children attending a local school	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7.3	4	1.3
Business area	1	2.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.3
Total	47	100	29	100	121	100	39	100	17	100	55	100	308	100

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2007, Household Questionnaire, N=2089

Furthermore, the movement of people from one locality to new areas that potentially provide more land for grazing and cropping, but still maintain the old Communal Area home for the rest of the family, has been common ever since the opening up of formerly largely wildlife areas, such as Gokwe in the 1970s and 1980s (Nyambara 2001: 773). Among those households maintaining customary area homes, 16.6 per cent were doing so as an attempt to boost production. There were more A1 farmers retaining use of Communal Area homes for production boosting purposes and this suggests that a category of A1 farmers have the capacity to utilise more land than they were allocated. Few land beneficiary households (1.29%) maintained a Communal Area home as a safety measure against eviction, providing a clue to the perception of security of tenure and suggesting that beneficiaries had an optimistic perception of the prevailing land relations, unlike the claims of insecurity of permit tenure.

These Newly Resettled Areas were not necessarily insular as they were made up of people who associated in various ways with the outside communities. The nature and form of association with neighbouring customary areas was defined

by various factors, but the most important seemed to be physical proximity. The new communities associated with the customary areas to fulfil both economic and social needs. The activities ranged from utilising labour to establishing relations through marriage (see Table 7.3).

Historically, customary areas have served as a reservoir of cheap labour for the large-scale farms, mines and the urban formal sector. The tendency to recruit labour from customary areas is still prevalent, as 30.5 per cent of the beneficiaries were engaged in the practice as of 2006 (see Chambati 2009; Chambati, Chapter 5). Respondents revealed in 2007 that they usually go back to their area customary to recruit labour, especially during periods when a huge amount of manual labour is required. This practice suggests the initial signs of material differentiation between households within the NRAs and those in the customary areas.

Table 7.3: Cooperation between Customary (CA) and Newly Resettled Areas (NRAs)

Type of linkage	A1		A2		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Farmers getting labour from CA	782	30.5	213	30.7	995	30.5
Farmers utilizing productive resources from CA	600	23.4	153	22.0	753	23.1
Farmers sourcing inputs from agro-dealer in CA	459	17.9	147	21.2	606	18.6
Students enrolled in schools in neighbouring CA	472	18.4	119	17.1	591	18.1
Access to health facilities in neighbouring CA	240	9.4	54	7.8	294	9.0
Farmers get seeds from CA farmers	11	0.4	3	0.4	14	0.4
Markets	1	-	2	0.3	3	0.1
Marriage	-	-	3	0.4	3	0.1
Total	2565	100.0	694	100.0	3259	100.0

Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2007, Household questionnaire, N=3 259

Approximately 33.1 per cent of the resettled households hired draught power and other productive resources from customary area farmers. Although the GoZ had been running a tillage programme through the District Development Fund (DDF) in most of the resettled areas, the service was stretched in terms of its capacity and was, at times, abused by the politically connected land beneficiaries within the A2.²⁴ There were slightly more A1 farmers (23.4%) in the six districts relying on productive assets from the customary areas than A2 farmers (22%).

These findings conform to the analysis of asset ownership among the newly resettled which indicated that the majority (95%) of A1 households only had full access to hand tools and that very few households (within less than 10%) had access to animal-drawn and power-driven implements such as planters, ridgers and

trailers (Moyo et al 2009: 73). In many instances, customary area farmers who hired out their draught power also hired out their labour to operate the draught animals and the ploughs.²⁵

There were also cases of land beneficiaries acquiring inputs and other productive resources from customary areas. Since the Fast Track reforms, agro-dealer activities declined and did not expand into the Newly Resettled Areas. While the former large-scale owners did not necessarily need local agro-dealers because they had capacity to move inputs from the neighbouring towns, the new breed of farm owners did not possess similar capacities. The GoZ revived the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) from being the buyer of last resort, to being the only supplier of inputs and buyer of controlled commodities such as maize and wheat (Govere 2006: 9). The price controls imposed on controlled commodities had a negative effect on the viability of agro-dealership networks that had contributed to the farm-input delivery. The GoZ's decision to supply A1 and A2 farmers with subsidised inputs dampened private sector participation in the inputs market. Approximately 18.6 per cent of the newly resettled have secured farm inputs from agro-dealer channels and informal markets within customary areas.

Due to the failure on the part of the government and other social service delivery agents, there is still a significant dependence on education and healthcare facilities in customary areas by the recently resettled A1 and A2 households. A total of 591 (18.1%) households have children attending schools in customary areas. There are 294 households (9%) utilising healthcare facilities based in customary areas. Nevertheless, investigations through key informant interviews revealed that resettled communities preferred to go to health centres in the satellite towns closer to their areas. In Goromonzi, they preferred to go to the district hospital at Goromonzi centre and some go to Harare.²⁶ In Zvimba, most of the resettled go to Chinhoyi, where there is a district hospital and a clinic. However, due to exorbitant commuter fares, they cannot afford to send their children to urban areas for schooling.

Networks of cooperation within the Newly Resettled Areas

Rural social organisation entails a complex array of social structures involving a number of interrelated associational forms of cooperation. Some of these are visible, whilst others are underground, within the context of wider local and central state authority structures and broader civil society structures (see Moyo 2002). The more underground forms tend to be more organically embedded in the every day practices of communities and mostly take on the form of solidarity in terms of defending livelihoods, territory, cultural spaces and strengthening one another in a crisis moment such as death. The motivation for cooperation ranges from

various social to economic imperatives, largely at a very local level and rarely does cooperation and solidarity entail distant communities within the Newly Resettled or Customary Areas (Moyo et al 2009). Eight common areas of cooperation were observed (see Table 7.4).

Table 7.4: Forms of cooperation among farmers on newly resettled large-scale farms

Areas of cooperation	A1		A2		No. of Households (HH) in parentheses								Total
	No.	% of HH	No.	% of HH	Chipinge	Chiredzi	Goromonzi	Kwekwe	Mangwe	Zvimba			
											Chiredzi	Goromonzi	
sharing of productive infrastructure	887	53.7	205	46.8	168 (50.3)	141 (60.0)	349 (50.2)	234 (62.9)	104 (71.7)	96 (31.2)	1092 (52.3)		
sharing of non-productive infrastructure	567	34.3	163	37.2	99 (29.6)	98 (41.7)	218 (31.4)	177 (47.6)	21 (14.5)	117 (38.0)	730 (34.9)		
reciprocal hiring arrangements	568	34.4	164	37.4	166 (49.7)	43 (18.3)	252 (36.3)	110 (29.6)	42 (29.0)	119 (38.6)	732 (35.0)		
reciprocal labour sharing	328	19.9	101	23.1	88 (26.3)	43 (18.3)	117 (16.8)	29 (7.8)	54 (37.2)	98 (31.8)	429 (20.5)		
combined farming operations	144	8.7	28	6.4	17 (5.1)	8 (3.4)	63 (9.1)	5 (1.3)	2 (1.4)	77 (25.0)	172 (8.2)		
membership in common agric and social groups	129	7.8	56	12.8	41 (12.3)	58 (24.7)	29 (4.2)	9 (2.4)	10 (6.9)	38 (12.3)	185 (8.9)		
sharing of advice and information	419	25.4	152	34.7	162 (48.5)	93 (39.6)	193 (27.8)	28 (7.5)	45 (31.0)	50 (16.2)	571 (27.3)		
sharing of seed and planting materials	101	6.1	28	6.4	44 (13.2)	14 (6.0)	43 (6.2)	4 (1.1)	7 (4.8)	17 (5.5)	129 (6.2)		

Source: AIAS Baseline Survey, 2007

Joint use of productive infrastructure

The land redistribution process was implemented in such a way that it brought together strangers from different backgrounds, such as Communal Areas, urban areas and former Large-Scale Commercial Farms, to settle on previously large-scale farms that had been subdivided into smaller units for the land beneficiaries (Murisa 2009; Murisa 2011: 1146). Most of these previously large farms had immovable productive assets such as tobacco barns, dip-tanks, cattle-handling facilities and irrigation equipment and non-productive or social assets such as farmhouses and farm worker compounds (GoZ 2001: 3) that could not be utilised effectively by a single household resettled on 6 hectares of land. As part of its efforts to rationalise access to such equipment, the GoZ issued a directive that all A1 households should share the productive and social infrastructure left behind by the previous owner, but did not clarify how this would be done (GoZ 2001: 2). The farm divisions in A1 areas created common grazing lands which had to be utilised by the resettled beneficiaries on a particular former Large-Scale Commercial Farm, thereby suggesting another need for mechanisms of engagement and cooperation among the beneficiaries.

The Government of Zimbabwe policy on social infrastructure inherited from the previous owners in A1 areas was that it became state property to be used for state-specified public purposes, such as conversion of farm houses into schools or clinics, while productive facilities were to be used on a shared basis. This policy, in some cases, provided an impetus towards the establishment of social structures to coordinate the use and maintenance of these facilities (Murisa 2007: 39). Within the A2 scheme, the lease agreement provided the holder of the farm on which infrastructure was currently installed the authority to 'use and to sublet infrastructure to other farmers and obliges them to grant such subtenants right of access to the infrastructure' (World Bank 2006: 24).

Evidence gathered from the field showed that slightly more than half of the population (52.3%) of the total sample had entered into an arrangement of sharing productive infrastructure (Table 7.4), with the phenomenon of sharing being most common in Mangwe (71.7%) and Kwekwe (62.9%). The infrastructure that they shared included tobacco barns, irrigation equipment, farm compounds, dams, cattle-handling facilities and dip-tanks.²⁷ The initial stages of resettlement were characterised by vandalism and looting of productive assets from the farms, while equipment such as tobacco barns remained mostly unused in A1 areas, due to the changes in land use patterns. Soon after the Fast Track Land Reform in certain localities, the sharing of infrastructure was done

through various arrangements, including the 'Committees of Seven', which contributed towards enhancing production capacities, although the holders of some plots with such infrastructure refused to share them with other land beneficiaries (Sunga and Moyo 2004: 7). In Goromonzi and Zvimba, the land beneficiaries also devised other mechanisms for managing the joint use of inherited infrastructure in order to ensure equitable access through the creation of sub-committees on equipment within the Committee of Seven (Murisa 2007, 2009, 2011), through the assistance of the local extension officer to coordinate the use of productive infrastructure in consultation with the village authority and the leadership of local farmers' groups.²⁸ A number of A1 settlements, including Dunstan Farm in Goromonzi District have come up with such an arrangement.

The GoZ's directives on cooperative access to and use of infrastructure on the farms also influenced cooperation in the sharing of other infrastructures not mentioned in the 2001 directive. For instance, at Whyhill Farm in Zvimba, a sub-committee of the Committee of Seven was established to coordinate the equal sharing and utilisation of inherited irrigation equipment and this sub-committee in 2008 mobilised funds from households utilising the equipment to purchase a new pump after the old one had been stolen and also to purchase new pipes in order to expand the area under irrigation.

Joint use of social infrastructure

Nearly 35 per cent of the respondents commonly used some of the inherited infrastructure for social purposes, such as health and sanitation facilities, water supply, classroom facilities and teachers' houses, farm worker compounds, service centres and recreational facilities. There was an equal distribution of households that jointly used inherited social infrastructure between the A1 (14.3%) and the A2 (14.8%) beneficiaries, despite the fact that the GoZ policy promoted autonomous use of inherited infrastructures on A2 individual plots, by asserting that it belongs to the beneficiary of the plot. This is one of the many areas in which local practice defies official policy.

The most shared assets among the A2 households were the farm worker compounds. At Warrendale Farm in Goromonzi, the land beneficiaries, both A1 and A2, agreed not to evict farm workers from their compounds and these workers provided labour on both temporary and permanent basis to those resettled on the former Large-Scale Farm. In A1 settlements, some of the farmhouses have been converted into schools, clinics, or houses for the extension officers; while, on some of the farms taken over during Jambanja,

some of these properties were claimed by the base commander. At Dunstan Farm in Goromonzi, the former owner's double storey house was converted into a primary school: the top floor was subdivided into classrooms, while the ground floor was reserved as accommodation for the teachers.

Joint hiring of labour

There were reciprocal labour hiring arrangements in both districts. These arrangements included utilising one pool of semi-skilled workers, such as mechanics, tractor drivers, seedbed handlers and curing experts. Farmers then come up with an agreement as to when these workers' services would be required on each farm. In certain instances, these arrangements also applied to the hiring of general casual workers who would work as part of a labour collective on adjoining plots, especially during planting, weeding and harvesting periods.²⁹ Approximately 35 per cent of the resettled farmers engaged in such labour-hiring arrangements and the practice is evenly spread amongst both the A1 and the A2 farms.

There are cases of jointly carrying out farming operations such as land preparations, especially where the fields are adjacent to each other. Approximately 8 per cent of the respondents have been engaged in such combined farming operations since resettlement. The most common form of cooperation is the establishment of labour teams that work jointly on farms. This is a common labour supplementing practice in the customary areas which entails the grouping of available labour from nearby farms and then carrying out a specific task, such as harvesting on a single plot over an agreed amount of time before moving on to the next farm. The practice, known as *nhimbe*, was developed within a lineage framework of social organisation where members of the same lineage group would be organised into labour teams for ploughing, planting, weeding and other tasks. The practice of *nhimbe* is being exported into areas where the lineage framework is either non-existent or very weak. As the figures from 2007 suggest, the uptake on the practice is very low, probably suggesting the need to establish and strengthen a sense of belonging within a community amongst the beneficiaries before such practices can thrive.

Information and extension services

Although the GoZ has historically boasted of a robust policy on extension support, its effectiveness has been restricted by a number of logistical constraints. One of the ways in which land beneficiaries have responded to the non-availability of extension support has been through unofficial

channels of technical advice. Some of the resettled farmers have experience in agriculture and they have been informally providing extension support to their colleagues. Approximately 27 per cent of the resettled households are engaged in providing local extension advice to others based on their previous experience. The issues that farmers advise each other on include where to buy inputs (seeds, fertilisers and chemicals), the dates on which to plant and responding to new market opportunities. The advice is normally reciprocal; instances where it has to be paid for are rare. Closely related to this practice is the sharing of seed and planting materials among resettled farmers. Only 6.2 per cent of the population is engaged in sharing seeds and planting materials. Although there has been an attempt since colonisation to commercialise all seeds for staple crops, there are certain crops, such as sorghum, cassava and sweet potatoes, for which seeds can still be obtained through various networks of cooperation (especially those from customary areas) and other local markets. However, the low numbers of households sharing seeds suggests the deepening integration of beneficiaries into the seed markets.

Structured multifaceted farmers' groups

There is a relationship between some of these unstructured networks and the emergence of more formal local farmers' groups, since many of the structured farmers' groups emerged from the former and membership was mobilised on the basis of previous membership in these networks.³⁰ Approximately 9 per cent revealed that they belonged to the same local groups as their neighbours.

There are many reasons for such association, including the previous socialisation of beneficiaries. Most beneficiaries came from customary tenure areas where NGOs (as discussed previously) had introduced various associational forms such as community-based organisations, farmers' associations, local clubs (for rotating savings and other income projects) and projects of cooperation. The second largest segment of beneficiaries came from the urban areas, where there are varied associational activities, ranging from religious activities to rotating savings and credit clubs among vegetable and other commodity vendors. The associational groups found in the NRAs were multi-focused: the most common activities included mobilising resources such as farm labour and productive assets into a common pool and sharing expert information, ensuring access to critical inputs such as fertilisers and seeds and mediation of farmers' grievances with regard to production.

Various layers of associational activity were in place by 2007. One layer consists of the representative associations established at the district, Intensive

Conservation Area (ICA)³¹ and the ward level in many provinces. In Bromley (an ICA within Goromonzi District), for example, the land beneficiaries formed the Bromley Farmers Association (BFA) with approximately 250 active members drawn from the A1 and A2 farms. The association was formed in 2005 and seeks to address common grievances within the resettled community.³² The association has been involved since its establishment in the bulk buying of inputs such as fertilisers and seeds for members. The executive committee of the association is almost entirely made up of A1 beneficiaries with just one A2 farmer as an ex-officio member. However, the association has been facing challenges since 2008 because it failed to secure inputs for its members and has not managed to come up with a constitution that clarifies its mandate and objectives.³³

The Zvimba South Farmers' Association, to give another example, services half of the Zvimba District, which includes Banket and surrounding areas. The association has a pre-Fast Track resettlement history. It was created by local leaders (mostly politicians) to foster improved yields and nurture good agricultural practice among smallholder farmers, but was always hampered by low membership levels. In the aftermath of the Fast Track Programme, the association experienced a new lease on life. It was revived as a mobilising platform for those who had been offered land, but were struggling to obtain inputs.³⁴ The association represents all the newly resettled farmers and customary tenure area households. Since 2003, the association has been involved in securing inputs for its members through bulk buying or entering into contract farming arrangements. However, due to its broad-based membership, it has not adequately managed to satisfy the differentiated internal interests within the association and has been accused of prioritising the interests of the A2 farmers.

The second layer of associational activity is composed of loose networks of cooperation and structured local farmers' groups operating at the level of the A1 village. The village in the Newly Resettled Areas is composed of A1 households settled on what used to be one large-scale farm. In some cases, where there are more than 100 A1 beneficiaries, more than one village has been created within a previously single large farm. For instance, there are two villages at Dunstan Farm in Goromonzi, where there are a total of 115 beneficiaries and three villages at Chabwino Farm near the Juru business centre in Goromonzi. Approximately 40 per cent of the resettled households (both A1 and A2) belong to such farmers' groups (Moyo et al 2009; Murisa 2011). Membership levels vary from as low as ten (Goromonzi) to as high as 75 (Zvimba).

Table 7.5: Activity and number of groups involved

Benefit	A1		A2		Total	
	No. of HH	% of HH	No. of HH	% of HH	No. of HH	% of HH
Social support	21	16.2	4	10.5	25	14.9
Extension	67	51.5	17	44.7	84	50.0
Marketing support	5	3.8	6	15.8	11	6.5
Input procurement	29	22.3	10	26.3	39	23.2
Labour provision	1	0.8	0	0.0	1	0.6
Profit sharing	7	5.4	1	2.6	8	4.8
Total	130	100	38	100	168	100

Source: AIAS Baseline Survey (2007)

These groups serve a variety of purposes and at times duplicate the activities carried out within the unstructured networks discussed above. The most common activities carried out by the groups include mobilisation of resources such as savings, extension support, labour and asset pooling for production, input procurement and marketing of farm products (see Table 7.5).

The groups were formed as part of a bundle of strategies to improve the means by which inputs are obtained from government agencies. Some of the actors involved in these formations had prior experience of formalised associational activity and, in some cases, external agents such as lending institutions induced communities to establish one. Some of these groups were established in an opportunistic manner: for example, the availability of productive infrastructure such as irrigation equipment on the former large-scale farm has provided a justification for the establishment of groups.³⁵ Local farmers' group leaders and extension officers based on the resettled farms explained that some of these groups started off as informal networks of mutual cooperation, but eventually formalised themselves for a variety of reasons, which include an increase in membership, the need for increased accountability and transparency in the handling of resources, or to meet the lending conditions of financial institutions.

The local farmers' groups tended to be location-specific and most of them were not linked to the larger groups at district, provincial and national level. As of the end of 2009, there was no clear mechanism linking these fragmented organisations to the national unions, either to the ZFU or the CFU, or even to the new Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers' Union (ZCFU).

Nature of the emerging local state in Fast Track areas

When the GoZ regained the initiative in land redistribution in late 2001 through the Fast Track Programme, some observers (Sadomba 2008a&b) saw this process as aimed at marginalising the leadership of war veterans. The state sought to restore its planning authority (see Moyo 2005) using the Fast Track Land Reform legislation. According to one perspective, it focused on removing war veterans from the plots they had allocated themselves on the pretext of the need to re-zone the land either into A1 or A2 farms (Sadomba 2008a: 187). Although the programme was often perceived as 'chaotic' in execution, it was implemented through a centralised mechanism that controlled decentralised structures from the local (farm) level up to the central government level (Chaumba et al 2003: 9-10). In the process, the Fast Track approach gave 'a new impetus to local structures at a relatively low direct budgetary cost' (Moyo and Yeros 2007b: 108). The defunct Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) were revived and reconstituted in structure to be run by a seven member committee³⁶ (Chaumba et al 2003: 10). These were later subjected to the 'traditional' authority of village heads appointed by chiefs. At the district level there were District Land Committees (DLCs), which included the Rural District Council (RDC) Chairperson; the District Chairperson of the War Veterans Association; traditional leaders (chiefs and village heads); an officer from the President's Office (Intelligence), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA); and officials from the departments of Social Welfare, Health, Veterinary and Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX). The responsibilities of the DLC included identification of land for resettlement, beneficiary selection and attending to land disputes among the newly resettled farmers (GoZ 2001). The DLC reported to similarly constituted provincial land committees, coordinated by provincial governors, who in turn reported to the central government (Moyo and Yeros 2007b: 108).

Parallel to the reconfiguration of the local state, new power relations have emerged. While during the period of *Jambanja* the role of traditional leaders in beneficiary selection was overridden by war veterans, the former were elevated during the Fast Track Programme. The chiefs managed to weave their way into official structures and advocated for the expansion of their territories into neighbouring resettlement areas. While the pronounced role of traditional authority in beneficiary selection and the expansion of territorial control were logistically rational, especially in beneficiary selection, it reinforced customary authority as a whole, giving sustenance to possibilities of ethno-regional biases in land allocation (Moyo and Yeros 2007b: 111). The local leadership of war veterans, once dominant within the Committees of Seven at village level and

within the DLCs, has increasingly been replaced by the various tiers of traditional authority, including chiefs (at district level), ward heads (at ward level) and village heads (at village level).

Government of Zimbabwe policy on local government in the Newly Resettled Areas seems intent on replicating the prevailing form of local government in customary areas despite the tenure differences between the two areas. In the Newly Resettled Areas, the permit creates a direct relationship between the land beneficiary and the state through civil courts, while in customary areas the traditional authority has considerable influence in land administration and allocation matters. While within the customary areas, allegiance to the chief and their structures is based on a historical claim to power and social relations that have been developed over a number of years, the Newly Resettled Areas are composed of a mixture of people from different social backgrounds who might not necessarily recognise the authority of the chief. The tensions that defined the relationships between war veterans and traditional authority leadership remain in a number of areas. In the selection of village heads, traditional leaders have used the criteria of belonging as the main qualification for one to operate in the office. Many of the war veterans, who were previously responsible for village administration on occupied farms, have been marginalised. The tension between settlers and the newly installed village heads is more pronounced in areas such as Goromonzi where land occupations were more dominant. At Dunstan Farm, one of the first farms to be captured by the land occupiers, resettled war veterans reiterated that they could not respect the newly installed village head because he did not participate in the land occupations.³⁷

Conclusion

The Fast Track resettlement period and its aftermath offer contradicting opportunities. On the one hand, the physical and social changes to the agrarian terrain suggest the emergence of a pluralistic democratic form of social organisation with potential to nurture inclusive and participatory processes of local government that are amenable to a multiplicity of actors with conflicting agendas, but building towards more vibrant communities. At the same time, land reform has provided an opportunity for the expansion of traditional authority into areas that had previously been effectively dominated by the authority of large-scale farmers. Thus, while land beneficiaries are engaged in their own trajectory of forging relations of sociability that aim at enhancing farm production, state-based policy 'craftsmen' are attempting to replicate customary area forms of authority in the Newly Resettled Areas.

Land occupations initially contributed to the emergence of new forms of popular rural authority. However, since resettlement, these have gradually been replaced by the fusion of traditional and modern institutions which bring together customary and popular political functionaries to serve on the same platforms. In the post-Fast Track period, there has been a shift in the form of the local state towards re-establishing traditional structures in the Newly Resettled Areas. The manner in which the turn towards re-instituting traditional authority has taken place does not augur well for local democratic practice and is reminiscent of the manner in which the colonial state imposed traditional authority structures after the land alienations. The forms of social relations and action that have emerged in Newly Resettled Areas vary, but do not necessarily confront the turn towards the re-establishment of traditional authority. Rather, they respond to weak state delivery and limited market activity.

Although none of the existing Fast Track resettlement models provide for the creation of collective schemes, the resettled are combining individual and group action in response to different social reproduction constraints. Local networks of cooperation have been established to complement individual household efforts. A variety of local networks and associational forms have been formed recently on a number of former large-scale farms and these are established in various ways, including the very informal (with no structures) and at times invisible forms that are only activated during specific periods.

One of the notable outcomes of the Fast Track period has been the surge towards 'organic' association (in the sense that it has mainly been driven by the land beneficiaries with minimal input from external agents) and formalised associational activity. Approximately, 25 per cent belong to the more structured associational forms and there are more who belong to unstructured networks of cooperation.

Fast Track resettlement areas remain, not only isolated from the national smallholders' union, but also from global and national civil society comprising a complex web of networks involving local and international actors such as NGOs, unions and donors. The local farmers' groups that have emerged operate outside the parameters of this civil society. They sit uneasily in both the civil society and as subordinate agents of the state as they help their members to undertake productive and economic activities, a role associated with the state. They remain shunned and isolated by other civil society-based networks despite the state's attempts to civilise the Fast Track resettlement areas by ensuring that the land beneficiaries are legitimate property holders.

Notes

1. See Bratton 1994; Moyo 1999; Murisa 2009. The national leadership of the new union was elected at a national congress which the NFAZ leadership believed was a platform for discussing the process of merger, but it is reported that the Minister of Agriculture changed the agenda and called for elections. District- level and lower structures of the NFAZ complained, citing inadequate consultations prior to the merger.
2. Aggregate NGO budgets covering a wide array of social activities equal or are more than national budgets of some of the countries in which these organisations work (Bebbington *et al*, 2008:4).
3. It is estimated that more than 3.5 million people have left the country since 1997 (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 19 December 2004).
4. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) is a sub-committee of Poverty Eradication and Social Services Delivery Development Action Committee (PESSDDAC). This committee is chaired by the Food and Nutrition Council (FNC), which is part of the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC), and is also composed of the UNWFP, FAO, UNICEF, OCHA, FEWSNET, SC (UK) and the University of Zimbabwe.
5. Interview with Chief Bushu, Nyanga, 2006.
6. Based on observations at Dunstan and Lion Kopje farms in Zvimba.
7. Based on Focus Group Discussions held in Goromonzi and Zvimba, June and September, 2006.
8. This is a long established tradition in rural Zimbabwe, where subjects of the *Mambo* (chief) work in the *Zunde* field. The harvest from the *Zunde* is then stored for times of crisis and various households rely on these reserves only when their food stocks run out (Sadomba 2008a: 114).
9. Interviews with Extension Officer in Wards 21 and 22 of Goromonzi, September 2008.
10. Based on interviews with headmen based at Dunstan and Buena Vista farms, September 2008.
11. Based on interviews held with the village headmen at Dunstan Farm and Lot 3 of Buena Vista Farm, September 2008.
12. Based on focus group discussion with local farmers' group members, held at Dunstan and Lot 3 of Buena Vista, September 2008.
13. Based on interviews carried out with Chief Bushu, June 2006.
14. Interviews with Goromonzi RDC, Chief Executive Officer, September 2006.
15. Interview with Goromonzi RDC, Chief Executive Officer, September 2007.
16. Interview with Zvimba RDC, Chief Executive Officer, June 2007.

17. Consisting of graduates from the University of Zimbabwe, Bindura University and other agriculture colleges.
18. In fact, the GoZ led drive for extension officers was so great that it had to lower the entry level requirements for this post. Whereas previously one had to have at least two 'A' level passes at and a Diploma from a recognised tertiary college in the period just after Fast Track resettlement, the GoZ recruited into the position of extension officer even those with only five 'O' level subjects, as long as one of these was Agriculture.
19. Based on interviews held with Zvimba and Goromonzi District extension officers, September 2008.
20. Interview with Acting Zvimba District Extension Officer, September 2008.
21. Interviews with Dunstan Farm Village Head, September 2008.
22. Focus group discussions in Zvimba, September 2008.
23. Focus group discussions, Goromonzi and Zvimba, September 2008.
24. Interviews with Goromonzi District Extension Officer, September 2008.
25. Goromonzi district focus group discussions, 2008.
26. Interview with Goromonzi Rural District Council official, June 2008.
27. Interviews with AREX officers in Goromonzi and Zvimba, September 2005 and 2006.
28. Interviews with Goromonzi District Extension officer, September 2009.
29. Interview with Goromonzi AREX extension officer, September 2008.
30. Interview with local farmers' group leader in Goromonzi, September 2008.
31. An ICA comprises 4-5 administrative wards and an average of 6 ICAs make up the district.
32. Interviews with BFA members, September 2008.
33. Interview with AREX officer, September 2008.
34. Interview with Executive Committee member of the Association, August 2006.
35. See Murisa (2009) and Murisa (2011) for a more detailed discussion on the emergence of local farmers' groups in A1 settlements.
36. The seven member committee comprised a Chairperson (usually a war veteran), Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Vice Secretary, Treasurer, Security Officer (usually a war veteran) and one ordinary member.
37. Goromonzi, key informant interviews, September 2008.

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